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ABSTRACT
The Federal Regulation of Pesticides
May 1983
Charles L. Guerin, B.A., Temple University
M.A.
,
University of Delaware
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by Professor Kenneth M. Dolbeare
The Federal Regulation of Pesticides is analyzed
and evaluated on the basis of defined environmental
criteria and found to be inadequate for two reasons.
The first is that the Agriculture committees in
Congress which have jurisdiction over the primary law
regulating pesticides have been successful in their
efforts to enact a weak law and when the EPA enforced
the legislation more than most of the Committee members
wanted, to weaken the law further. They have done this
by depoliticizing the pesticide issue as much as
possible. Depoliticization has been achieved by
passing a law with ambiguous standards, weakening the
law by enacting many small, less visible revisions to
it, making it needlessly complex, interfering with its
vi
enforcement, and claiming that these actions are an
attempt to make pesticide regulation more "rational"
or "scientific."
The second reason is that the generation of the
information available to the public, regulators, and
legislators concerning the risks and benefits of pesti-
cides is heavily influenced by the pesticide manufactur-
jers, pesticide user groups and farm groups all of which
\tend to support less stringent regulation. Pesticide
testing for safety is done by the manufacturers. Several
examples are presented to support the contention that,
at best, the manufacturers often tend to interpret test
results in a way that minimizes the dangers to human
health posed by their products. The schools of
agriculture in the nation's land grant universities
are a source of much information concerning pest control
and the benefits of pesticides. Because of the close
relations and shared attitudes between these institutions
and pesticide manufacturers, users and farmers these
schools tend to devote too much attention to chemical
means of control and too little to more environmentally
sound technologies. Many industry scientists promote
vii
a point of view concerning the standards for determining
carcinogenicity which is in contrast to the views of
many other researchers. For example the applicability
of animal tests to humans is often questioned. The
dissertation examines the industry role in promoting
its point of view concerning carcinogenicity.
viii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The problem of toxic substances in the environment
has become a primary environmental issue. This issue
includes such problems as toxic waste disposal and the
presence of allegedly harmful chemicals in food, drinking
water or the air. In testimony to Congress given in 1980
the Surgeon General of the United States said:
We believe that toxic chemicals are adding to
the disease burden of the United States in a
significant, although as yet not precisely
defined, way.-'-
As the technological basis of our economy expands, more
toxic products and wastes will be produced and the issue
of their control will be one of the major problems of at
least the next decade. This dissertation will analyze
and evaluate one aspect of the toxic substance problem,
the federal regulation of pesticides.
The pesticide problem can be seen as part of a large
class of technological problems which now confront, and
1
2will confront, the United States. These important issues
are very complicated and to understand them requires a
considerable investment of time. As Eugene B. Skolnikoff
has pointed out, the complicated nature of many techno-
logical issues puts them at a distance from the public and
tends to make more difficult the approximation of the
2ideal of democratic decision-making. Their complicated
nature also increases the opportunity for symbolic
manipulation of the issue and distortion of the facts.
Before proceeding further we should be clear about
what we mean by "pesticides." Pesticides are chemicals
which are used to kill or control pests. Some of the
most common types are the following:
1) Insecticides, which are used to control insects
2) Acaricides, which are used to control mites and
ticks (mites and ticks are not, strictly
speaking, insects, but acaricides are often
included in the general term "insecticides")
3) Herbicides, which are used to control weeds
4) Nematicides, which control the microscopic
organisms known as nematodes which parasitize
plants
5) Molluscidides, which are used to control slugs
and snails
6) Fungicides, which are used to control fungal
diseases of crops, stored produce, and fabrics
7) Bactericides and viricides which control bac-
terial and viral diseases of crops and
8) Rodenticides, which are used to control rodent
3
manunals
.
In the following chapters some of the harmful effects
of pesticides will often be described. This should not
lead the reader to conclude that the author is against
the use of all pesticides. The opinion underlying this
dissertation is that pesticides in general should be used
less and that some of the more harmful ones should be
more stringently regulated or eliminated from use com-
pletely. This does not mean that in the forseeable future
there will not be a need for the careful use of these
chemicals. Pesticides can help to reduce crop losses
and are very important in the control of such insect
borne diseases as sleeping sickness, malaria, river blind-
4
ness and yellow fever. Furthermore, control of such
pests as species of mosquitoes which do not cause
5diseases, contributes to human comfort and well being.
4The Pesticide Indust^ry
There are two aspects of the manufacture of pesticides.
A basic (or technical) product is first manufactured. Then
the basic products are formulated into end-use products for
sale to the consumer. Some manufacturers of technical
products also formulate them into end-use products, but
usually the processes are carried on by different firms.
In the United States there are about 400 manufacturers of
approximately 1400 different active pesticide ingredients.
These ingredients are produced in about 2500 basic pro-
ducts which are formulated into an estimated 35,000 to
50,000 separate end-use products by 4600 companies o Thus
90 percent of pesticide producers depend on the other 10
percent for their supply of active ingredients.
At the level of the manufacture of the basic product,
the industry is very concentrated. Only 12 products account
for more than 40 percent of all technical product sales and
45 account for 70 percent. The 10 largest firms are esti-
7
mated to be responsible for 75 percent of production. The
significance of this is addressed by an EPA report:
5This means that the industry is quite highly
concentrated or "oligopolistic." The structurebeing not highly competitive means that indi-
vidual firms have significant shares of the
market and are capable of influencing market
parameters such as quantity, quality, and price
of production.
Business is usually good in the industry. One study
indicates that profits are high because of such factors as
strong patent protection, significant barriers to new
entrants, concentration of sales among a few dominant
manufacturers and market fragmentation into many sub-
markets. This study describes the industry as one with
"extraordinary profitability" and one in which, "the
most important determinant of marketing success is the
9R&D capability of a firm." A March 1980 report written
under contract to the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment describes the economic health of the major
producers
:
Pesticide manufacturing is the most intensely
regulated sector of the chemical industry, with
the exception of drugs. But R&D investment in
pesticides has increased significantly, the in-
crease in the number of new patents obtained for
pesticides in recent years is greater than for any
other part of the chemical industry, sales of
pesticides have soared, and at least for some
companies, pesticide sales bring in higher profits
than sales of other types of chemicals .-'-0
Although information on the production and use of
pesticides is somewhat unreliable, some estimates do
exist. In 1978 annual pesticide production in the
United States was estimated to be about 1.416 billion
1
2
pounds with a value of about 3.34 billion dollars.
Exports in that year amounted to approximately 677
13
million pounds. Imports in 1978 totaled 74 million
14
pounds. One estimate is that about 55 percent of the
pesticides sold in this country are used in agriculture,
30 percent in industrial, institutional and governmental
15
use, and 15 percent in home and garden use.
Because agriculture comprises the largest user seg-
ment much of the discussion of pesticides in this
dissertation will focus on these chemicals as used on the
farm. The three crops on which pesticides are used the^
most are corn, soybeans, and cotton. In 1978, these '
three crops accounted for 63 percent of all farm pesti-
cide purchases ."^^ Figuring the percentages on the basis
of weight, in 1976 herbicides comprised 58 percent of the
pesticides used on farms. They were followed by insecti-
cides (24 percent); fumigants, growth regulators, dessi-
cants, and defoliants (9 percent); and fungicides
( 7 percent)
.
7es
e
In 1978 an estimated 8.67 billion dollars was spent
for pesticides worldwide. In that year the United Stat
accounted for one-third of all the pesticides used in th
world. This country manufactures about 40 percent of the
dollar value of these chemicals ."'^
What This Di ssertation Will Do
This dissertation will define what "adequate" regu-
lation of pesticides would be. It will do this by estab-
lishing several criteria which would have to be met for
regulation to be adequate. It will be argued that regu-
lation does not conform to these criteria. The reasons
why it does not will be analyzed. This will require an
examination of the roles of the major participants in the
pesticide policy process including the industry groups,
the environmentalists, the EPA and Congress. It will also
require an examination of some of the scientific bases of
pesticide policy. The pesticide issue involves much
scientific input and in order to analyze it, it is nec-
essary to look not only at the dynamics of the normal reg-
ulatory and political processes, but also at the processes
8influencing the generation of scientific information
relative to this issue. in particular, with regard to
the effects of pesticides on human health, it will be
argued that the generation of scientific information is
itself a political process which is characterized by strong
economic influences on what types of questions are asked
and answered. In order to understand the pesticide issue
one must understand the politics of pesticide related
science, who the most powerful actors are, and how these
actors affect the scientific information which forms an
essential imput into the more visible arenas of pesti-
cide regulation such as the EPA or Congress.
This ch^er will provide an introduction to the
pesticide policy issue and an explanation of how the issue
will be analyzed and evaluated. The second chapter will
describe some of the harmful effects of pesticides in
order to emphasize the importance of adequate regulation.
A definition of "adequate" regulation will then be set
forth. This definition, which will be based on several
criteria, will offer a basis for evaluation when examining
this policy issue.
Chapter III will offer a history of pesticide regu-
lation. It will focus on the period from October 1972 to
December 1980, but in order to understand the events which
occurred during this time, at least some knowledge of the
years from the earliest federal regulation (1910) to 1972
is necessary. Consequently this chapter will also outline
the most significant events of this earlier time. In
describing the history of pesticide regulation this chap-
ter will point out the tendencies of Congress, since 1972,
to weaken the law, and to ignore much easily accessible
information
.
Chapter IV will focus on the Congress. The partici-
pants in the Congressional politics of this issue will be
described and their relative influence explained. This
will be followed by a description of the roles of several
Congressional committees. The rest of the chapter will
offer an explanation and criticism of how Congress goes
about weakening the law regulating pesticides. It will
describe and criticize the types of explanations most
often offered by legislators for their actions. It will
examine the tendency of legislators to describe their
decisions, which are essentially political in nature, in
scientific terms thus portraying them as the results of
careful consideration of scientific evidence. Infor-
mation will be presented which indicates that in fact
legislators tend to ignore much evidence concerning the
harmful effects of pesticides and the need for stricter
regulation. The dissertation will also describe the
tendency of Congress to weaken the pesticide law through
many small changes which have the effect of either
weakening the law as a direct result of the change, or
by making it more complex and difficult to administer.
Finally, it will explain the tendency of Congress to
discourage the EPA from rigorously enforcing the law.
The next three chapters will deal with the relation
of the pesticide regulatory process to science. It is
difficult to overemphasize the importance of science to
this issue. Administrators make many regulatory decisions
on the basis of scientific input. Legislators are also
influenced by science. Some use it in making decisions
concerning the revision of legislation. Others use it as
a justification for decisions which appear to be based
primarily on political considerations. Chapter V will be-
gin with an explanation that the economic relation of the
11
pesticide industry to the scientific infrastructure which
produces information concerning the risks to human health
and benefits of pesticides is so structured that this
infrastructure does not provide as objective an assessment
of the effects of these chemicals as it would under an
alternative set of conditions. This chapter will explain
that evidence to support this contention will be offered
by describing three aspects of pesticide related science:
1) The testing of pesticides for registration
2) The relation of the pesticide industry to
agricultural science in the universities and
3) The relation of the industry to cancer testing.
The greatest part of this chapter will explain the re-
quirements for the testing of pesticides. It will
present evidence to support the contention that the
industry (which does its o-»vn testing) has often reported
inaccurate results. It will also be argued that the EPA
has failed to adequately audit industry test data. The
central argument made in this chapter is that the present
law, which allows the industry to do its own testing, is
likely to produce test results which tend to be biased
in favor of the interests of the industry.
12
In chapter VI we will look at the relation between
the pesticide industry and the agricultural sciences in
the nation's universities, in particular this chapter
will look at the entomology profession and at a group
of agricultural scientists known as the Council for
Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST).
Many pesticides are suspected of causing cancer.
Thus two important scientific questions related to the
pesticide issue are whether or not specific pesticides
are carcinogenic (cancer causing) and, if they are, the
strength of their carcinogenic effect. Chapter VII will
look at conflicting theories concerning how cancer is
caused by chemicals and what tests constitute acceptable
proof of carcinogenicity. Some of these theories tend
to support the arguments about regulation most often
made by industry people and some tend to support the
environmentalist's arguments. This chapter will argue
that the theories which tend to support industry argu-
ments tend to be transmitted to the public and legis-
lative decisionmakers more frequently than environmental
ones. It will explain how the industry promotes its
theoretical perspective in the press and in communication
13
with legislative decisionmakers, and it will point out
that often this perspective is presented as if it were
fact rather than opinion.
The concluding chapter will summarize the arguments
which have been made and will relate these arguments to
some of the theoretical observations which have been set
forth by other analysts. The chapter will also discuss
some possible practical steps which might provide a so-
lution to the problem of regulating these chemicals, but
it will argue that these steps could never be implemented
within the present framework of Ajuerican political and
ecological consciousness. The reasons why they could not
be implemented will be explained and the needed changes
in political and ecological perspectives will be dis-
cussed .
FIFRA, Congress and the EPA . The dissertation will focus
on the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)
.
This law is the primary legislation on which the
federal regulation of pesticides is based. There is other
legislation covering minor aspects of the use of these
chemicals which will be described, but FIFRA is the major
14
law covering pesticide use and this analysis will con-
centrate on FIFRA. We will examine the role of Congress
in revising and overseeing this legislation and the role
of the EPA in enforcing it. FIFR.^ was first passed in
1947. In October, 1972 the law was so thoroughly re -
vised that it was, in effect, a completely new law.
Further changes occurred in 1975, 1978 and 1980. Some
of the changes made in these years since 1972 have been
quite significant, but they have not changed the basic
nature of the 1972 law. Although the 1972 law would not
meet our criteria for regulation, it did allow for con-
siderably more control of pesticides than had previous
legislation. The 1972 FIFRA has been the basis for the
EPA's regulation of pesticides (the EPA took over this
responsibility from the USDA in 1970). In 1972 with a
new pesticide law and a new agency having taken over the
regulatory function, many thought that the regulation of
pesticides would be much improved. The new law and the
previous assignment of enforcement responsibility to the
EPA were hailed as effective ways in which to correct the
abuses of previous years. The dissertation will focus
primarily on the period from October, 197 2 to December 31,
1980 in order to evaluate the extent to which these
aspirations have been met and, to the extent that they
have not been met, in order to analyze the reasons why.
The EPA is the federal agency with the primary
enforcement authority for FIFRA. Before a pesticide can
be sold it must be registered by this agency. The regis-
tration of pesticides is a major responsibility of the
EPA which takes up much of its resources. Setting tol-
erances also requires a significant portion of EPA
attention. The responsibility for enforcement of the
rules concerning pesticide use by consumers is shouldered,
for the most part, by the states. Although the roles of
the FDA and the states will be discussed, the primary
administrative agency focused on will be the EPA.
In analyzing the regulation of pesticides, the
conceptual approach employed will not draw a sharp
distinction between the administration of the pesticide
law by the EPA and the revision of the law by the Con-
gress. This is because of the close relationship of the
two processes. Congress is closely involved in the reg-
ulatory process through informal communications with EPA
personnel and through questions in frequent hearings which
16
hold officials accountable for their actions. When the
law is strongly enforced by the EPA, revisions of the law
which tend to weaken it are often threatened and some-
times passed by Congress. Thus a sharp distinction
between administration and legislation is a less useful
way of conceptualizing the process which is taking place.
What This Dissertation Will Not Do
It should be mentioned what this dissertation will
not do. There are many aspects of the pesticide issue
which it will not be possible to examine in detail. One
example is the section of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act which regulates the amount of pesticide
residues permitted on food. This law, which is enforced
by the FDA, will be described, but it will not be ana-
lyzed in detail. Another very important aspect which
will not be treated in detail is the regulation of the
exposure of farmworkers to pesticides. Some of the most
serious effects of these chemicals are experienced by
farm laborers. The problem of worker exposure has been
the subject of various reports, studies, and congress-
17
ional committee hearings. However there are many who
would argue that this problem has not received nearly
the amount of attention that it deserves. Another
problem with its own set of technical and political
questions is the exposure of pesticide workers in
factories. Another is the increasing conflict between
farmers spraying pesticides and their neighbors who are
exposed to pesticide spray drift. This problem has grown
in recent years as a result of the development of housing
in rural areas, and as this trend continues, it is likely
to become an even more serious problem. A related
problem is the exposure of urban populations to spraying
aimed at controlling agricultural pests. The classic
example of this is the divisive California fruit fly
issue. All of the problems just mentioned are important,
but the aim of this dissertation is to attain an under-
standing of the overall process of the federal regulation
of pesticides. Thus these problems will not be analyzed
in detail. Some of them will be mentioned as they relate
to the observations being made, however a detailed anal-
ysis of each one is not the purpose of this work.
18
Policy Analysis and Values
This dissertation will analyze the pesticide issue
in as objective a manner as possible. It will attempt
to discern the true nature of the process under study;
however no large collection of data can be given order
and meaning without the imposition of values. The same
collection of data could be interpreted in several diff-
erent ways depending on the values of the observer. To
argue that only one interpretation of a political issue
is the correct, objective one is to argue that human
nature, the basis of political activity, is perfectly
understood.
The person who has carefully thought about the nature
and logical consistency of his values and who is thus
more conscious of what these values are, is more likely to
realize the effect which they have on his conceptuali-
zation of policy processes. Likewise the reader who has
at least some idea of the author's values can better
understand the philosophical basis of the arguments made.
Thus it is appropriate to make clear the writer's
19
assumptions. This author believes that long term eco-
nomic and social stability can only be maintained by
preserving the physical environment in which the economy
and society functions. For example farming can only be
a prosperous activity in the long term if the soil is
properly maintained. It can be argued that several
modern farming methods tend to deliver high short term
profits while reducing the ability of the farm ecological
system to produce food, and thus profits, in the long
20
term. Another example is the pollution of ground water
from toxic wastes buried in the ground. This type of
problem, of which the Love Canal is the classic example,
is likely to produce social instability in the form of
conflict between polluters and those identifying with
them on the one hand, and those who suffer the effects
of pollution and those who support their interests on
the other
.
The author's perspective sees the resources of the
earth as being limited. On the basis of this reali-
zation it is considered prudent to place more emphasis
on the need to look at the long term needs of society
(considered in a global sense) and to match these needs
to resources. While resources are limited, the complex-
ity of nature is seen as being almost without limits.
Because nature is so complex, it is extremely difficult
to gain complete knowledge of the effects of tech-
nology on the environment. The complexity of nature is
not easily reproducible in the laboratory where con-
trolled experimentation can take place. Due to this
difficulty in understanding the effects of technology,
the wisest course is to tend to be cautious with new
technological innovations which may have an adverse
effect on the environment. Such technology should
be carefully studied before being introduced at all and
if its possible effects are still uncertain, but there
is a strong need for it, it should be introduced slowly
and carefully. if this is done it is more likely that
if a harmful effect is found it will cause less damage
and be controlled more easily than it would if the
technology had been introduced on a wide scale. This is
not at all an anti-technological perspective. It is a
pro-technological perspective which advocates the
development of ecologically sound technologies and
caution in introducing potentially harmful innovations.
The author believes that there is much which is not
known about fundamental ecological processes and the
possible harm caused by polluting technologies. it is
believed that not enough is being done to understand these
questions or to control the harmful effects of pollution
which are understood. The Reagan Administration has
significantly reduced the amount of environmental regu-
lation, but even in recent years when this regulation
Was at its height, not enough attention was being paid to
the environment. The author believes that a sound en-
vironment can only be achieved by making greater efforts
at understanding the effects of technology and controlling
its harmful effects. Controlling its effects will some-
times require the replacement of some technologies by
21
others which are less inherently polluting.
It is important to reiterate that all this is not
an anti-technological argument (as the critics of the
environmentalists are likely to argue) . It is, in fact,
an argument for the development of more information about
the effects of technology and for the wise use of tech-
nology based on this information. It is an argument for
the development and careful innovation of new technology.
technology which is, as far as possible, unpolluting and
inherently compatible with nature, technology such as
solar power, organic farming, and integrated pest
management
.
The ideas just discussed will never become a reality
unless the public has a significant understanding of
environmental problems. There must be a greater con-
sciousness throughout society of the nature and import-
ance of ecological processes and the potential effects
of pollutants on these processes. This knowledge must
include an understanding that some ecological issues are
not just matters of aesthetics or health. There must be
a realization that some ecological issues may be related
to the long term survival of the human species or at
least to potential catastrophes which if they did not end
all human life would seriously affect the entire world.
An example described by author Amory Lovins is the problem
of nuclear power for energy and the associated problem of
potential proliferation of nuclear weapons manufactured
22
using material from nuclear reactors. The public is
not likely to support legislation which provides strong
environmental protection unless it has been educated
23
about the nature and potential seriousness of environ-
mental problems
.
The small progress which has been made in controll-
ing pollution has involved significant costs such as the
equipment needed to clean smoke stack emissions or the
catalytic converters used to clean automobile exhausts.
It is likely that future efforts aimed at providing
substantial protection of the environment will be even
more costly. It does not seem probable that under the
present set of social and economic arrangements pre-
dominating in America there will be much support for
these measures. Throughout American culture there is a
strong ethic of individualism. It is the author's
opinion that while a certain amount of individualism is
desirable, the excessive manifestation of this trait
which characterizes American culture precludes the amount
of cooperation necessary to share the burdens associated
with significant environmental improvement. Excessive
individualism is rooted in an economic system which
stresses competition rather than cooperation. As authors
William Connolly and Michael Best argue in their book,
The Politicized Economy , there is no internalized "we"
24
23With which many people naturally identify. Because
there is no internalized "we" there is little willing-
ness to make the sacrifices needed to assure the welfare
of society. Thus it is the author's assumption that in
addition to a need for an effort to change the public's
consciousness of environmental problems through an
educational effort, the solution of environmental
problems will also require the development of alternative
forms of economic and political organization, forms which
tend to encourage and reenforce the development of coop-
erative attitudes while discouraging excessive individ-
ualism.
Sources
The source material for this dissertation includes
government documents, books, articles, and interviews.
Particularly useful among the government documents were
the several General Accounting Office reports which
criticize the EPA's handling of the pesticide problem.
Also useful were the records of the congressional
hearings whi,ch have been held on the matter.
25
Interviews were conducted with congressmen who are
members of the House Agriculture Committee, Agriculture
Committee staff members, other congressional staff, EPA
officials, environmentalists and chemical industry
representatives. m general the interviews tended to
provide a useful confirmation and elaboration of the
positions already taken by the various parties in the
written record of the pesticide policy process, that is
the many books, reports, records of congressional
hearings, and newspaper, magazine and journal articles.
The interviews also provided some information in addition
to the written record, but most of the information,
opinions, and ideas were already in the record. This
fact deserves comment. The positions of legislators
and their staff seem to be the results of careful de-
liberation. To add much to their previously stated
positions is to risk going out on a limb and possibly
offending either industry, farm or environmental groups.
The same is true for EPA staffers most of whom seemed
sincerely interested in providing useful answers while
avoiding controversies which might make their already
difficult jobs even more complex. The industry people
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interviewed were representatives of a trade association.
Their positions are the result of negotiations within
their association and it seems unlikely that a repre-
sentative would be interested in adding too much to
the official position of his association, and thus risk
provoking reactions from association members who do
not agree with him. of those interviewed the environ-
mentalists seemed to be the most candid and willing to
volunteer information.
In general all those interviewed impressed the
interviewer as being sincere and honest. However inter-
viewing the participants in a public policy forming
process is different from interviewing other subjects
such as, for example, working class Americans in a study
of their attitudes. In the latter case interviewers
tend to provide spontaneous and very candid answers.
This may be because they believe that their answers are
not likely to lead to any reprisals against them. For
those group leaders who form pesticide policy, however,
there must exist at least a subconscious realization
that the wrong answer is likely to offend some important
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political actors. Given this realization, answers are,
inevitably, carefully framed and somewhat cautious.
The literature on pesticides
. The literature on pesti-
cides is quite extensive, however the following para-
graphs provide a description of some of the most
significant works.
The most important book written on the pesticide
problem is probably Rachel Carson's Silent Spring which
was first published in 1962. This book not only focused
attention on pesticides, but also contributed signifi-
cantly to the emergence of "the environment" as a
political issue. Robert L. Rudd's Pesticides and the
Living Landscape (1964) and Kenneth Mellanby's Pesti-
cides and Pollution (1969) followed Carson's book.
J. C. Headly and J. N. Lewis analyzed pesticide policy
from an economic perspective in their book The Pesticide
Problem: An Economic Approach to Public Policy (1967).
Frank Graham focused almost entirely on the political
aspect of the pesticide issue in Since Silent Spring
(1970). In Unfit for Human Consumption (1971) Ruth
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Mulvey Harmer criticized pesticide regulators and the
pesticide industry while also discussing biologically
sound ways to control pests. The problems of pesticides
in food and government regulations concerning them were
examined by Harrison Wellford in his Sowing the Wind
(1972). Politics and Pesticides (1975) by Laura Tallian
described the harmful effects of these chemicals and
suggested ways in which political action might bring
about change.
More recent books include V. G. Dethier's Man'
s
Plaque? (1976) in which the author suggests that indis-
criminate use of pesticides may facilitate the compara-
tively rapid evolution of insects who are resistant to
them. An excellent outline of the harmful effects of
pesticides is provided in Samuel S. Eptstein's The
Politics of Cancer (1978). Although the author never
proves the assumption stated in its title. The Pesticide
Consp^iracv (1978) by Robert van den Bosch provides in-
sight into how political pressure is exerted by pesticide
manufacturers. Malignant Neglect (1979) by Robert H.
Boyle and others discusses several environmental factors
associated with cancer. The book includes a chapter on
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pesticides in which the authors describe the lengthy
regulatory proceedings required to ban the pesticide
aldrin/dieldrin. m their book Pest Control; Cultural
and Environmental Aspects (1980) editors David Pimentel
and John H. Perkins present several articles by a
collection of sociologists, economists, lawyers, ecolo-
gists, science policy analysts, and pest control
scientists who examine the social, economic, political,
and ethical factors which influence the development of
pest management systems. Authors David Weir and Mark
Shapiro focus on the international aspects of pesticide
regulation in their Circle of Poison (1981).
The history of pesticide use in America beginning
in the nineteenth century is described in James Whorton's
Before Silent Spring; Pesticides and Public Health in
Pre DDT America (1975). More recent histories are pro-
vided in William Hazelton's The Legislative History and
Meaning of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act As Amended, 1972 (1975), and in John E.
Blodgett's article "Pesticides; Regulation of An
24Evolving Technology" (1974). In his book DDT;
Scientists, Citizens and Public Policy (1981), Thomas R.
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Dunlap attempts to put the controversy over DDT in
historical perspective.
Several books present arguments against the environ-
mentalist perspective on the use of pesticides. Among
the most important of these are Bugs or People? (1975)
by Wheeler McMillen, That We May Live (1966) by Congress-
man Jamie Whitten, The DDT Myth (1973) by Rita Gray
Beatty, The Pest War (1974) by W. W. Fletcher, and
Pesticides - Boon or Bane (1976) by M. B. Green.
There are many books which focus on the scientific
aspects of the issue. Robert L. Rudd's Environmental
Toxicology: A Guide to Infomation Sources (1977) pro-
vides a useful starting point for research. Understanding
of the scientific dimension of pesticide pollution can be
obtained from D. L. Gunn and J. G. R. Steven's Pesticides
and Human Welfare (1976), and Rizwanul Hague and V. H.
Freed' s Environmental Dynamics of Pesticides (1975). In
addition to the book mentioned above, the entomologist,
David Pimentel, has written and edited several good books
among them: Pest Control Strategies (1978) with Edward
H. Smith, World Food, Pest Losses and the Environment
(1978), and Pesticides: Contemporary Roles In
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Agriculture, Energy and the Environment (1979) with T. G.
Sheets. An explanation of the difficulties of proving
that a substance is carcinogenic can be found in H. F.
Kraybill and Myron A. Mehlman eds . Advances in Modern
Toxicology Volume 3. Environmental Cancer . in his
The Pest icide Book (1978), George W. Ware provides an
extensive description of the types of pesticides avail-
able and their uses.
There have been several important studies of the
pesticide problem by scientific committees. A study in
1963 by the President's Science Advisory Committee
(Use of Pesticides ) focused on the inadequacy of regu-
lation. In 1969, a Department of Health, Education and
Welfare study looked at the environmental effects of pest
control chemicals ( Report of the Secretary's Commission
on Pesticides and their Relationship to Environmental
Health ) . The National Academy of Sciences has produced
several studies. The most important of these are:
Pest Control: An Assessment of Present and Alternative
Technologies (1975), Pesticide Decision-making (1978),
and Regulating Pesticides (1980).
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This chapter has introduced the reader to the sub-
ject of the federal regulation of pesticides. it has
described what this dissertation will do and how it will
be done. It has explained the author's value perspective
and it has described the most significant literature
related to the subject of pesticide regulation. We move
now to the effects of pesticides and some criteria for
regulation
.
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CHAPTER II
PESTICIDES: THEIR EFFECTS AND SOME CRITERIA FOR REGULATION
Why is it so important to regulate pesticides and
how should they be regulated? This chapter will provide
answers to these questions by looking at the effects of
these chemicals on humans, wildlife, and the farm en-
vironment, and by establishing some criteria with which
to judge regulatory efforts.
Effects of Pesticides
In the following pages we will outline the effects
on humans and wildlife of the pesticide use patterns
which are now permitted by the present law. The criteria
for pesticide regulation to be proposed later in this
chapter would greatly reduce these harmful effects by
greatly reducing the use of all pesticides and by
possibly eliminating the use of the more dangerous ones.
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In discussing the effects of pesticides, it would
be nice to present some hard data; to say, for example,
that cancer deaths resulting from the use of pesticides
are now "x" number and that the number would be reduced
by 97% if our criteria of regulation were met. There are,
however, insufficient data to do this. No one knows how
much cancer pesticides cause and figures describing how
many people become sick from pesticide poisoning are
merely estimates. We can only say that regulations
which led to decreased use of pesticides would reduce
their harmful effects.
Three types of effects will be described. These
are: toxic effects on humans, effects on the environ-
ment, and effects on target pests and their natural
insect enemies. Although carcinogenic and mutagenic
effects fall under the rubric of toxic effects on humans,
they will be discussed in a separate section due to their
importance and complicated nature.
Toxic effects
. The World Health Organization has esti-
mated that, worldwide, there are 500,000 cases of
pesticide poisoning a year with a fatality rate of one
1
percent. The data concerning the number of pesticide
poisonings in the United States are unreliable. While
some states collect data on the amount of pesticide
2poisonings, others do not. Estimates of deaths and
injury caused by pesticides in this country vary con-
siderably. Estimates of deaths caused annually vary
3from 35 to 200. One estimate of the number of pesti-
cide poisonings requiring medical attention each year
4 5IS 1500. Another estimate is 6,000. The EPA has
estimated that there are about 14,000 cases of pesticide
poisoning in the United States a year, but the incom-
pleteness of this figure is indicated by the estimate of
the California Department of Food and Agriculture that in
California alone there are about 14,000 cases a year of
personal exposure to pesticides involving requests for
6
assistance. Furthermore, it is claimed that there is
much more illness than is treated and that only a very
low percentage of pesticide related illness in field
7
workers is reported. One estimate is that there are
over 100,000 cases a year in California of illness re-
8
la ted to pesticide exposure. A representative of a publi
interest group which is concerned with the health effects
of pesticides on farm workers reported to the author that
for many workers the vomiting and other effects of pesti-
cides are accepted as inevitable, as part of the job.^
The effects of pesticides are manifested through
several channels and, because they are exposed to higher
levels, some occupational groups experience these effects
more than do members of the general public. Prevalent
among the victims of pesticide poisoning are farm workers
Factory workers are also sometimes involved. Public ex-
posure, while not as serious as the risk to specific
occupational groups, is also extensive. Long term ex-
posure to relatively low levels of pesticides occurs
through the ingestion of food containing pesticide resi-
dues, through use in the home, and through neighborhood
10
or area spraying programs. A growing problem is the
drift of pesticides sprayed on farmers' fields onto ad-
11jacent housing developments. Another problem is the
contamination of drinking water supplies by pesticides
which have seeped into water tables after having been
sprayed on farmers' fields. An example of this is the
contamination of private wells on Long Island by the
.12
pesticide Temik.
Although everyone is exposed to at least some level
of pesticides, there are indications that the burden of
exposure is not equally shared. Evidence suggests that
Blacks and the poor have higher levels of pesticide resi-
dues in their bodies than the rest of the population ."^'^
The author of one article on this subject suggests that
this is related to routes of exposure other than food/"^
There are several ways in which pesticides may harm
humans. Serious damage is easy to diagnose, but some
effects are subtle and the fact that pesticides are
causing them may not be realized. There may be chronic
damage to the nervous system. Even tiny amounts of
pesticides can alter brain activity for more than a year
and cause irritability, insomnia, loss of libido and re-
duced powers of recall and concentration.
Carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, and teratogenicity
. Many
pesticides are believed to be carcinogenic, mutagenic or
teratogenic. These terms refer to the ability of a sub-
stance to cause cancer, mutations, or birth defects. One
estimate is that of the approximately 1500 active in-
gredients in pesticides, approximately one fourth are
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mutagenic and carcinogenic. Author Lawrence Fishbein
in an article in the journal Environmental Health Ppr--
^P^^^^^^ warned that the possible mutagenic effects of
pesticides could threaten the genetic health of future
generations ."'"^
One of the most controversial issues related to
pesticide regulatory policy is the potential of these
chemicals to cause cancer. Probably no other aspect of
this policy area is the subject of so much debate. There
is much disagreement concerning which pesticides cause
cancer and how to establish a causal link between a chem-
ical and cancer. The scientific standards of proof are
different for environmentalists and the pesticide in-
dustry. Furthermore, there is disagreement concerning
how much exposure to carcinogens is safe. Many scientists
argue that any exposure to a carcinogen, no matter how
small the amount, is associated with at least some risk of
cancer. Others argue that exposure to carcinogens in
concentrations below a "threshold" means no risk of can-
cer. There are many other aspects of this debate. It is
an extremely complicated controversy and it is so
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important an aspect of this issue that a later chapter
has been devoted entirely to it.
The tendency of very small amounts of pesticides to
cause cancer is seen by many as being their most danger-
ous property. This is because everyone is exposed to
small residues of these chemicals on the food they eat.
If those who claim that many pesticides are an important
cause of cancer in humans are correct, then the number
of deaths caused by these products may far exceed the
estimates previously mentioned.
The pesticide residues on food are comparatively
small and cannot exceed a "tolerance" level which is set
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for each
type of crop. Some believe that residues have remained
within safe limits. Others claim that little is known
about the long term effects which low-level dosages of
. .
18
pesticides may have on public health. Furthermore, the
possible interaction between low level dosages of pesti-
cides and the numerous drug and food additives which the
19public consumes has not been completely studied.
After the EPA has set a tolerance for the amount of
pesticide residue permitted on a food crop, this
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regulation is then enforced by the Department of Agri-
culture for meat and poultry, and the Food and Drug
Administration for most other food products. The EPA
sets its tolerances on the basis of tests which it re-
quires the producers of pesticides to submit. The
tolerances are set at a level which is presumably safe,
but whether or not one accepts them as being safe depends
on one's theory of cancer causation.
Assuming for the moment that the tolerances are
safe, there are still problems with their administration.
A 1978 report of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce noted that the EPA tolerance setting
20program was poorly administered. This criticism has
^ ^
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also been the theme of other reports. An example of
its poor administration is the fact that the EPA has
established tolerances for chemicals without waiting for
submission from the manufacturers of all the testing data
22
needed to substantiate them.
In addition to problems with EPA tolerance setting
there are difficulties with FDA and USDA enforcement.
In Congressional hearings in 1978, it was noted that 195
of the 268 pesticides with tolerances were seldom if
.23
ever monitored. A 1979 General Accounting Office (GAO)
report indicated that although the USDA reported that
only 2 percent of the meat it inspected contained illegal
residues, the real amount was closer to 14 percent.^'*
Environmental effects
. The use of pesticides causes con-
siderable ecological damage. This damage results in a
degraded environment and sometimes in economic damage.
For example about 20 million dollars worth of bees are
25destroyed yearly by pesticides. Bees are important not
only as a source of honey, but also as a means of polli-
nation. Without the domestication of honey bees by
professional beekeepers, foods such as cherries, avo-
cados, tangerines, apricots, and almonds could not be
produced on a large scale. Honeybee pollination is also
required for the production of most vegetable seeds:
broccoli, cauliflower, cucumbers, eggplant, celery, and
onions, as well as clover and alfalfa which are among
the major constituents of feed for beef cattle, poultry,
26
and dairy animals.
There is much evidence to substantiate the concern
that current methods of pesticide use are an important
hazard to flora and fauna. Often birds and fish
suffer the worst effects. In 1974 virtually all of the
brown pelicans along the Gulf coast of Louisiana were
killed by the pesticide "endrin" which was flushed by
floodwaters into the Gulf of Mexico from Louisiana's
28
cotton fields. Another example of pesticide related
wildlife damage is the decline of lake trout in Lake
George in New York.^^
Effects on insect resistance and natural enemies . The
indiscriminate use of insecticides to control insect
pests may actually lead to increased losses to these
pests. This is because of insect resistance and the
destruction of natural predators and parasites. Insects
tend to develop resistance to insecticide chemicals and
the same chemical which kills harmful pests may also
destroy those natural predators and parasites of the
insect pest which normally keep its numbers under
control
.
The seriousness of these problems has been pointed
out in a report of the National Academy of Sciences:
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... we have come to recognize that the induction
of genetic resistance in pest species and the
disruption of natural control mechanisms constitute
rising threats to the continued success of our
current control technologies. We believe these
problems will become more acute, because we predict
that incentives for increasing agricultural pro-
duction will continue over the next decade. ... we
contend that the problems of genetic resistance and
disruption of natural control, lying entirely within
the enterprises of agriculture, forestry, and public
health, warrant substantial expansion of present
efforts to promote alternative technologies, including
integrated control strategies."^
When a pesticide is used many insects are killed.
Some, however, may survive because they possess a certain
trait in their genetic makeup which makes them less
31
susceptible to the insecticide. This trait varies with
different insects and chemicals. Often it is a biochem-
ical capacity to metabolize the pesticide so that it is
32
converted into nontoxic products. it may also involve
the sensibility of critical target enzymes, or the
33
permeability of the insect or its internal organs.
Another mechanism of resistance is diversity in behav-
ioral mechanisms which may affect the contact of the
34insect with the chemical. With respect to one or all
of these traits, there is apt to be considerable di-
35
versity among natural populations of pests. With
repeated exposure to pesticides, those individuals
possessing one or more of these traits tend to survive
while others are killed. Because insects reproduce at a
comparatively rapid rate, it may not be long before an
insect population with resistance to a chemical evolves.
Often the biochemical modifications involved in the evo-
lution of resistance have fairly wide applicability. For
this reason it is often found that a species has become
resistant to a chemical other than the one to which it
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has been exposed.
Of course not all insects have developed resistance
but the extent of the problem is quite significant. One
entomologist points out that resistance is the main
37
obstacle to successful pest control. The problem
exists not only in insects, but also in rodents, fungi,
weeds and bacteria; however the most serious aspect of
resistance, and the one concentrated on here, concerns
38insects. There are many insect species which have
developed resistance and nearly every species is po-
tentially capable of becoming resistant to any kind of
. . ,
39insecticide. a world survey indicates that there are
364 species of insects and mites which have developed
48
resistance to chemical pesticides Of these, 304 have
been confirmed by laboratory tests.
There are many insects which are natural predators
or parasites of insect pests but which are relatively
harmless to crops. in a diverse, stable ecological
system these natural enemies tend to keep the numbers of
insect pests down, however many pesticides which are
applied to control insect pests also kill large numbers
of natural enemies. This is because most of the chemicals
which dominate the pesticide market have a broad spectrum
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of toxicity. Sometimes the use of chemicals depletes
the numbers of pests to such low levels that natural
enemies move on to other areas to search for food.
Of course if insect pests can become resistant to
pesticides, why can not natural enemies? Beneficial
species do become resistant, but it seems that they do
not do so at the same rate as their prey. One possible
reason is that pest populations are normally larger than
their predators and thus more likely to include any given
rare genotype necessary for the development of resis-
44
tance
.
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A typical scenario is that of a fanner using pesti-
cides and resistance beginning to develop. As resistance
develops among the pest population, it begins to grow,
this time unhampered by natural enemies. The result is
that after several months of spraying, the farmer may
well be faced with higher numbers of pests than he origi-
nally encountered. In order to control the increased
levels of pests, he applies more pesticides. This leads
to more genetic resistance and more destruction of enemies
and thus the use of more pesticides, or, as van den Bosch
^ 45describes it, an "insecticide treadmill." After
natural enemies have been killed off, it is sometimes
the case that organisms which had existed at such low
population levels that they had not previously been
pests, increase to the extent that they become serious
46
pests. Thus the farmer may find that the result of
excessive pesticide use has been an increased level of
pests which are noW more difficult to control because of
resistance and a lack of natural control mechanisms.
This increased level of pests may not only include
greater numbers of the original pest species, but also
new species which had not previously existed at high
50
enough levels to be considered pests.
A classic example of the effects of insect resis-
tance and the destruction of natural enemies is the
Canete Valley of Peru/^ This is one of many coastal
valleys in Peru. Cotton yields ranged from 415 to 526
pounds of lint per acre in the years immediately pre-
ceding the development of the synthetic organic pesti-
cides. Soon the organic insecticides, primarily DDT,
BHC and toxaphane, were being used heavily while im-
proved cultural practices were also adopted in order to
increase yield. Yields went up to over 600 pounds per
acre, however many growers assumed that there was a
direct relationship between the amount of pesticides
used and productivity. Thus pesticides were used ex-
cessively. Insecticide resistance developed in a number
of species and beneficial insects were destroyed.
Pesticides were applied more frequently, but with
increasing resistance, pest populations climbed to
disastrous levels. In addition, a number of previously
harmless insects became serious pests. All this led
to a 1955-56 season which was an economic disaster with
yields dropping to 296 pounds per acre. The farmers
asked experiment station entomologists for help and a
biologically sound program of pest control was intro-
duced. This program led to an impressive reduction in
pest problems and in a few years yields were the highest
that they had ever been, ranging from 644 to over 900
pounds per acre.
Unlike the Canete Valley there are many places
where appropriate, ecologically sound pest control
programs have not been developed or implemented. m
addition to such factors as increased rates of ferti-
lization and irrigation and a greater number of plants
per acre, resistance and the destruction of natural
enemies have been important contributing factors to an
increase in crop losses in the last 30 years. Over this
time period the use of insecticides for insect control
u 48has increased about 10 fold. During this same period
overall losses of preharvest crops to pests have risen
^ ^
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from 7 to 13 percent.
One of the most important uses of pesticides is to
control those insects which are threats to the public's
health, but the overuse of these chemicals can lead to
52
the increase of disease. The case of malaria, a disease
transmitted by anopheline mosquitoes, provides an ex-
ample. In several parts ofthe world these mosquitoes
have tended to become resistant after repeated exposures
to chemicals applied to protect crops. m Central Amer-
ica insecticides have been heavily used in the coastal
plain areas to protect cotton. The chemicals have con-
taminated most of the coastal plain and the mosquito
population has become increasingly resistant to a wide
variety of them. Entomologist David Pimentel points out
that, "Currently, all insecticides, with the possible
exception of landrin, are relatively ineffective against
50
this mosquito."
This phenomenon is not confined to Central America.
An increased level of pesticide resistance in mosquitoes
has contributed to an increase in malaria throughout
51
the world. In the last five years the number of
malaria cases reported to the World Health Organization
5 2has doubled and many cases are not reported. In the
period from 1961 to 1963 malaria occurred at its lowest
incidence in many parts of the world. During that time.
in India there were about 100,000 cases, but over the
years pesticide use in agriculture increased and
quito resistance increased with it. 53 By 1978 there
were 50 million cases of malaria in India. 54
Criteria For Pesticide Regulation
The following chapters will look at various aspects
of the regulation of pesticides. Clearly we will need
some standards with which to judge this regulation, some
criteria against which we can evaluate the law and the
enforcement of the law which will be described. I shall
offer several criteria for these purposes. Providing
such criteria unavoidably involves the values of the
author. The explanations offered in Chapter I of the
values which I hold and of my perception of the role of
values in policy analysis should make clear the philo-
sophical basis on which these criteria have been framed.
They are based on an assessment of what appears to be
the basic consensus of most members of society that
protection of the environment should be a primary goal.
(This assessment is based on several public opinion
polls discussed in Chapter IV)
.
The criteria for pesticide regulation are as
follows
:
1) A strong basic law regulating pesticides.
2) The implementation of legal requirements which
would facilitate the increased use of Inte-
grated Pest Management techniques.
3) Effective enforcement of pesticide regulatory-
legislation free from arbitrary interference
by Congress
.
4) The production of accurate, objective, scien-
tific data concerning the effects of pesticides
on human health, wildlife, and the total en-
vironment .
The following chapters will illustrate how, on the
whole, these goals have not even been approximated.
But first they should be described in more detail.
A strong law . The first criterion is that there should
be a strong law on which the regulation of pesticides is
based. This law should prevent damage to human health
or the environment from these chemicals. At the same
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time it should take into account the farmer's need to
avoid large crop losses to pests which would deny him a
reasonable level of profit. Furthermore the law should
consider the importance of pest control to public health.
Thus it should allow for the use of pesticides when nec-
essary, but it should promote the use of more environ-
mentally sound means of pest control whenever possible.
The law should not be a merely symbolic document. it
should not be a piece of legislation which, on first
reading, appears to provide adequate environmental
protection, but which is so full of loopholes and ex-
ceptions or which is so poorly enforced that environ-
mental protection can not be assured.
The use of pesticides is a fairly sophisticated
technology with potential adverse effects which are
quite serious. A law regulating pesticides should
provide for a strong program of education so that pesti-
cide users are well aware of the potential adverse
effects of these chemicals. Those desiring to control
pests should understand the biologically sound pest
control methods which are available as an alternative
to pesticide use. These methods are often quite
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sophisticated and require a knowledge of the basic eco-
logical relationships of certain plant pests and their
predators and parasites. Thus, an educational effort
aimed in this direction ought to be fairly substantial.
As will be further explained in just a few pages,
biologically sound pest control methods use less pesti-
cides and thus leave less potentially harmful insecticide
residues on plants. The use of less pesticides, however,
means that much produce, while quite safe and nutrit-
ional, will contain higher levels of blemishes caused
by insect attacks and higher residues of insect parts.
The American consumer presently tends to expect produce
which is cosmetically appealing and which contains as
close to a zero level of insect parts as possible. Many
experts argue that the public is much more likely to be
harmed by higher levels of insecticide residues on food
than by eating food with surface blemishes and higher
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levels of insect parts. Thus there should be a strong
provision aimed at educating the public about the poten-
tial harm caused by pesticide residues on food and the
lack of need for extremely high cosmetic or insect
residue standards for food.
Requiring I. P.M. This requirement might have been dis-
cussed under the heading of the previous criterion, but
treating it separately may be a means of making it more
clear. Under the first criterion it was said that the
law should promote the use of more environmentally
sound means of pest control wherever possible. Specif-
ically this means the promotion of the Integrated Pest
Management system of pest control.
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) is a holistic
strategy for pest control which attempts to manage a
56pest population rather than eradicate it. It is a
technique which strives to minimize damage to the
surrounding environment because it is based on a phil-
osophy that looks at the pest control problem as one of
applied ecology rather than one of pesticide chemistry
or merchandising.
IPM uses a variety of mutually augmentative tech-
niques to control pests. These include: the use of
natural enemies; certain cultural practices; the use of
resistant crop and livestock varieties; microbial agents
genetic manipulation; chemicals which affect insect re-
production or development; and, when necessary, the use
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of pesticides. An example of an IPM method is the use of
natural enemies of pests. A natural enemy of the aphid
is the ladybird beetle. The larva of a ladybird beetle
may consume as many as 474 aphids in one day. Any one
or combination of the above tactics are used according
to the type of pest control problem encountered. All
tactics used are integrated into a system to optimize
the results of their combined use.
IPM is a constantly developing technique. It inte-
grates the results of research to build models of crop
production and pest management systems. These models
are then used in advising farmers. Systems analysis
is heavily relied on as a central unifying and research-
guiding tool. Research requirements include a variety
of disciplines and topics. Among these are the popu-
lation dynamics of pests and their natural enemies, and
the biological, ecological and economic processes in crop
culture and growth.
The need for pesticides is not eliminated by IPM,
but IPM uses pesticides more judiciously and to serve
special purposes rather than for broad-spectrum efforts
sought by regularized applications. For example Carl
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Huffaker, an IPM expert, has estimated that the amount of
insecticides and acaricides used in the United States on
cotton, apples and citrus could be reduced by about half
5 7if IPM systems were put into practice. A report pub-
lished in 1979 by the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment estimates that IPiM programs for major U.S.
crops could reduce pesticide use by up to seventy-five
percent, reduce pre-harvest losses to pests by fifty
percent, and reduce the total costs of controlling pests
by a significant amount.
Although pesticides are used when needed, most
advocates of IPM stress the use of non-chemical methods
to control pests wherever possible. Among the most often
used non-chemical methods are the use of natural pre-
dators and parasites of pests. As in the previous
example of the ladybird beetle, an attempt is made to
manage fundamental biological variables so that predators
and parasites (which are harmless to crops) of pests are
kept at levels high enough to control them.
The public demands crops which are almost unblem-
ished and which contain a very low level of insect parts,
but, as explained earlier, the decreased use of pesti-
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cides called for in IPM systems is likely to lead to
crops Which have higher levels of minor surface blemishes
as a result of insect attack and to higher levels of
insect parts remaining in picked crops. These crops would,
however, be at least as safe and nutritional. Blemishes
are harmless. They have no effect on nutritional content,
storage, life, or flavor. As for insect parts, all
produce already contains at least some and all herbiv-
orous insects found in or on fruit or vegetables are
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nonpathogenic to man. Not only are they harmless,
but they may even contribute to the nutritional value of
food. Insects are eaten as a food by many people in
other countries. Much pesticide is used unnecessarily
merely to control blemishes and insect parts. About
two-thirds of the insecticide used on tomatoes grown for
processing is to control the tomatoe fruitworm, a pest
which does damage which is essentially cosmetic in
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nature
.
In addition to the amount of pesticide used, an
important quantitative concept related to IPM is profit.
It is not possible to say exactly how the widespread use
of IPM would affect profits. Generally, the advocates
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of IPM are concerned with ensuring a reasonable profit for
the farmer. Many IPM studies indicate that for a partic-
ular crop in a particular area, these techniques can yield
an equal or greater profit than conventional pest control
methods. If IPM were the primary means of pest control in
the United States, many farmers would earn profits equal
to or greater than those they now earn without producing
the adverse effects of pesticides. Nevertheless this is
not the case for every crop or ecological system. There
are situations in which IPM methods will not produce as
much profit as conventional pesticides and IPM research is
attempting to focus on this problem. However short term
profit is not the only concern of this environmentally
conscious technology. IPM is concerned with the long term
optimization of the costs and benefits of crop protection.
Some of these costs and benefits are as yet not completely
quantifiable because they are not completely understood.
For example the effects of pesticides on wildlife are often
difficult to identify and thus to quantify.
Federal Pesticide Regulatory policy which was con-
ducted in the public interest would include legislation,
rules and strict enforcement which strongly encouraged
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IPM. This method should be encouraged even in those
cases in which profit would be somewhat reduced. How
much profits should be affected by regulatory policy is
impossible to specify exactly, but a regulatory scheme
in which IPM is strongly encouraged and large losses in
profit are avoided is possible. A reasonable reduction
in profit would allow a closer approximation to a balance
between the need for farmer's profits and the public
interest just as, for example, steel industry profits
are balanced against the public's need for clean air.
How should federal policy encourage the use of IPM?
First, there must be strong funding for research. There
is much which is not known about the many variables in-
volved in IPM systems. A considerable amount of research
has been accomplished, but much remains to be done.
Second, as has been mentioned, there should be a
strong educational program to introduce farms to IPM
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methods, and to train IPM experts. There should also
be an educational effort aimed at demonstrating to the
public the need for less stringent standards regarding
insect parts in food or the cosmetic appearance of
produce
.
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Third, the law should require that environmentally
sound IPM methods be used instead of pesticides to control
pests whenever possible.
If IPM is concerned with the need for profit, why
coerce pesticide users into using it? Will not farmers
tend to use IPM methods as they are developed by re-
searchers? The problem here is one of implementing new
technology and amount of profit. Although IPM methods
sometimes provide as much or more profit than conven-
tional means of pest control, many farmers are hesitant
to try new technologies. Furthermore there is a con-
siderable amount of knowledge which must be understood
in order to use many IPM methods correctly. Learning
and implementing this new technology is sometimes not
as easy as merely applying a conventional pesticide.
At other times, IPM methods are available which
produce a level of profit which is reasonable, but which
is not as high as would be obtained by the use of con-
ventional pesticides. However the criterion being
proposed here suggests that the farmer's right to a profit
is not absolute and that this right must be balanced
against the public's right to protection from the adverse
effects of pesticides. Thus it is not, of course, being
suggested that profits are unimportant, however this
criterion would require that IPM methods be used wherever
possible even if profits were somewhat reduced.
Another reason why IPM should be implemented by
requiring that it be used is that often these methods
do not work unless they are applied over a very large
area. For example if many farmers plant the same crop
year after year, they may provide an environment for
pest populations which overwhelm the crops of neighboring
farmers using IPM methods.
Also important is the concept of "learning by
doing" as described by Michael Perelman in his article
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"Social Valuation of Pest Management Strategies."
According to Perelman "learning by doing" is an important
concept to consider in the choice of pest management
strategies. The experience acquired in the use and
manufacture of chemical pesticides makes their use
relatively more economic. By expending a great deal of
effort in chemical pesticides, society forgoes the
development of a comparable experience in biological
.
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control
.
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How could the use of ipm methods be required by the
law? There are several ways in which legislation could
bring about the widespread practice of im. For example
in agriculture the law could allow for the establishment
of pest control districts. Each district would be a
geographic area, perhaps a county, under the supervision
of a federal pest control expert. Farmers would be
permitted to use conventional pesticides only after the
issuing of a permit for each application. Permits
would be issued by the pest expert, or by licensed
federal pest control experts under his supervision, only
after alternative means of control had been considered
and found wanting. If an alternative, effective, IPM
method was available, a permit for the use of chemicals
would not be issued. Chemicals which were dangerous, or
which incomplete evidence suggested were dangerous, would
not be approved for use unless the need for them was
most serious and unless no effective, safer chemical was
available. In this manner dangerous pesticides would be
regulated in a way analogous to dangerous drugs.
A number of detailed proposals which would facili-
tate the increased usage of IPM methods have been
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suggested, but the three fundamental needs discussed
above (research, education, and legal requirements to
consider IPM methods in the making of pest control
decisions) are the essential foundations needed for the
development of the potential inherent in this technol-
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ogy.
Effective enforrPtnPnt. The law is a useful means of
protecting man and the environment only if it is enforced
In order to enforce it the EPA must have adequate re-
sources of personnel and money. if enforcement is to be
vigorous, effective, and equitable, administrators must
be allowed to regulate without fear of arbitrary or
uneven interference by Congress. Arbitrary inter-
ference discourages an agency from taking aggressive
action and tends to weaken the morale of agency personnel.
It also violates the principle of "equal justice under
the law" as less powerful actors will not be able to
muster the political influence with Congress that more
powerful ones can.
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Accurate data. Accurate scientific data is needed by the
Congress in its revision of the pesticide law, by the EPA
in its administration ofthe law, and by the public.
Congress has fairly often revised the basic law regu-
lating pesticides. In making its changes, Congress needs
to have the most accurate information available concerning
the effects of the chemicals, in particular the effects
on humans, wildlife, and the environment.
In a similar manner, the EPA is in need of a great
deal of accurate information about the effects of pesti-
cides. As will be explained in the following chapter,
this agency decides whether or not to allow the regis-
tration of pesticides. (In order to be sold, all pesti-
cides must be registered.) Registration decisions are
based, in part, on the consideration of a great deal of
scientific data concerning pesticide effects. A pesti-
cide which the available scientific evidence demonstrates
to be significantly harmful to human health, while not
being economically essential, will not be registered.
Finally, the public is in need of accurate infor-
mation concerning the effects of pesticides. If high
quality scientific information is accurately reported
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in the press, the public will be aware if the law regu-
lating pesticides does not provide the degree of
protection for human health which the public desires.
If a problem exists concerning the protection of human
health, the public can generate pressure for legislative
action to correct the problem. On the other hand, if the
scientific information reported by the press is not
always accurate or if reporters tend to publicize only
one side of scientific controversies, such as whether
or not certain tests comprise acceptable proof that a
pesticide causes cancer, then the public may be much
more inclined to accept pesticide regulatory policy in
its present form.
A particular segment of the public which is es-
pecially in need of good data is those engaged in
agricultural production. A farmer who is well aware of
the potential adverse effects of a pesticide on his health
or on beneficial species of insects may choose not to use
it if an alternative means of pest control is available.
If the adverse effects of a pesticide are well understood,
farm worker groups may negotiate with employers to reduce
or eliminate its use.
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CHAPTER III
PESTICIDE REGULATION: 1910 TO 1980
Introduction
This chapter will provide an overview of pesticide
regulation from its beginning in 1910 to 1980. It will
focus on the basic legislation authorizing regulation
examining the structural evolution of this legislation
and the politics of this process. Regulation from 1910
to 1980 can be looked on as divided into two periods.
From 1910 to 1972 regulation was based on statutes aimed
primarily at protecting farmers. From 1972 to 1980 the
law has included an emphasis on environmental protection.
As has been noted, this dissertation will focus on the
latter period but some knowledge of the former time is
essential
.
The early use of pesticides will be described along
with the gradual accumulation of knowledge concerning
their adverse effects and consequent demands for statu-
tory changes to provide more stringent regulation. A
fairly extensive description of the law regulating
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pesticides is provided. This description is necessary
in order that the reader understand some of the arguments
made in later chapters.
Pesticide Regulation 1910 - 1970
1910-1947. In the middle of the 19th century, the trend
in farming began to move toward the intensive cultivation
of specialized crops. This created imbalances in nature
which were ideal for the development of pest species.
For example in 1850 the Colorado potato beetle lived on
local plants in its natural environment and maintained a
balanced population. When potatoes were planted by early
settlers the beetles were provided with a vast new source
of food and consequently their numbers greatly increased.
To correct the effects of the imbalances of intensive
farming, chemicals began to be used. In the case of the
potato beetle, Paris Green, an arsenic compound provided
1
control
.
Federal regulation of pesticides began with the
passage of the Federal Insecticide Act of 1910. (State
regulation was begun in some states at an even earlier
date)
.
The act prevented the manufacture, sale or
transportation of adulterated or misbranded insecticides
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and fungicides and authorized regulation of the sale of
. . 2insecticides and fungicides. Its purpose was to protect
farmers from fraudulent, ineffectual and misbranded
pesticides. The basis of the law was post-market control.
If fraud was discovered, the product could be taken off
the market. The 1910 act was one of the last of a
sequence of consumer protection laws begun around 1900
with the purpose of protecting the public from medical
quackery and gross abuses in food processing."^
The act was administered by the Department of
Agriculture which also conducted research on pesticides
and pest control. Legislative jurisdiction was vested
in the House and Senate Agriculture Committees. Thus
at the very beginning the control of pesticides was
institutionalized in the Department of Agriculture and
in the House and Senate Committees on Agriculture. These
committees have, up to the present, held primary juris-
diction over basic federal legislation concerning
4
pesticides
.
In the early 1930 's several books described the
dangers to the public from unhealthy food and drugs.
Then, after some public health scandals, the Food, Drug
5
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was passed in 1938. This act
was enforced by the FDA which, until 1940, was located in
the Department of Agriculture. It permitted the
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Secretary of Agriculture to allow the addition of a
poisonous or deletrious substance to food if it was
required in production or could not be avoided. The
Secretary was required to promulgate regulations limiting
the quantity of such substances in food. This was the
beginning of a tolerance setting system which, in modi-
fied form, is still in use today. The process of setting
these "tolerances" for pesticide residues in food was
quite complicated and regulatory enforcement could be
undertaken only after the product was marketed. If the
Government believed that a particular food contained
residues of a pesticide which were excessive, it had to
wait until the product was marketed and then go to court
to prove this assumption, with the burden of proof resting
on the Government. An essential weakness of this system
was that damage to the public could occur before the
6
Government could prove its case.
World War II significantly increased the demand for
pesticides. Malaria was the most important single factor
reducing the effectiveness of troops in the South Pacific.
In that theater, it caused five times as many casualties
7
as enemy action. This led to a great deal of research.
The usefulness of DDT was dramatically demonstrated and
just after the war, the first synthetic organic herbi-
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cide, 2,4-D, appeared. The war brought about significant
changes in the pesticide industry and in the role of the
Federal Government.
After the war, a scientific agricultural revolution
which had been delayed by the war and by the depression
developed. Chemical manufacturers, who were geared for
wartime production, found a large domestic market avail-
able for their new pesticides which became an essential
part of the scientific agricultural revolution. The
manufacturers expanded their research on chemical pesti-
cides and took the lead in this endeavor away from
government and university scientists. As interest in
chemical pesticides grew, research in other pest control
measures, especially biological controls, declined. As
author John E. Blodgett puts it, "The era of synthetic
g
organic pesticides was at hand."
As the quantity and variety of manufactured pesti-
cides increased, individual states increased the scope
of their regulation. The Council of State Governments
developed a uniform insecticide, fungicide and rodenti-
cide act in 1946 for the consideration of, and adoption
by the individual states. The act was subsequently
adopted by many states. During this year. Congress
c
began holding hearings on proposed pesticide legislation.
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Post World War II to Rachel Carson . In 1947 Congress
repealed the 1910 Federal Insecticide Act and passed the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)
.
The new law, which was designed to function in
harmony with the uniform state insecticide, fungicide and
rodenticide act, was passed in response to the appearance
of a large number of new chemicals, many of which had been
developed during the war. These new products were being
vigorously marketed in unprecedented quantities and users
were unable to assess their safety and efficacy.''"^
The administration of the new law remained with the
Department of Agriculture. Its purpose was to protect the
farmer from dangerous or ineffective pesticides. The act
required that the product be safe when used in accordance
with the label. Additionally it required:
1. The registration of pesticides prior to their sale
or movement in interstate or foreign commerce
2. Prominent display of poison warnings on the labels
of highly toxic pesticides
3. The coloring or discoloring of dangerous white
powdered insecticides to prevent their being
mistaken for foodstuffs
4. The inclusion of warning statements on the label
in order to prevent damage to people, animals and
plants
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5. The inclusion of instructions for use to provide
adequate protection for the public
6. That information be furnished to the administrator
of the act with respect to the delivery, movement
or holding of pesticides.
The USDA could deny a request for registration if
the pesticide was found to be mislabeled, if it lacked
adequate warnings and directions for use, or if it was
injurious to beneficial organisms. The burden of proving
safety and efficacy lay on the manufacturer; however if
the USDA denied a request for registration, the manu-
facturer could still market his product under "protest
registration" without any indication on the label that
the product was not registered. This was because the
law prohibited the label from indicating that the product
had been registered. In order to remove an unregistered
pesticide from the market, the Department had to prove
12
in court that it was unsafe or mislabeled. Thus the
1947 FIFRA was basically a labelling act. It set forth
no sanctions against the misuse of a pesticide and no
authority for immediate stop - sale orders against
13
dangerous pesticides.
After World War II some concern developed over the
effects of pesticides on human health. In 1950 the House
Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals In
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Food was formed. Under the leadership of Representative
James J. Delaney (D.-NY.), the select committee held a
number of hearings and produced four reports, one of
which recommended that chemicals used in or on foods be
tested to establish their safety prior to their use.^^
In 1954 the Pesticide Chemical Amendments (the '
Miller Act) to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
were passed. This legislation required that if a
pesticide would leave a residue on a raw agricultural
product, the manufacturer had to obtain a "tolerance"
for his product from the FDA before registering it with
the Department of Agriculture, under the standards set
up by FIFRA.^^ The "tolerance" was an FDA specification
of how much pesticide residue on or in a raw agricultural
product was safe. The burden of proving that residue
levels were safe was made the responsibility of the
manufacturer. If the FDA, on the basis of the scientific
evidence presented, decided that any amount of residue
would be dangerous, they could refuse to establish a
tolerance level. Without a tolerance, the manufacturer
could not register the product with the Department of
Agriculture. Any raw agricultural product which had a
residue exceeding that set by the FDA could be seized
17
and condemned. The Miller Act did not affect pesticides
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which were not used on food such as household insecti-
18cides, mothproofing chemicals, and non-food crops.
With several minor revisions this Act is still the basic
19legislation affecting pesticide residues. The EPA
took over the setting of tolerances in 1970, but the
FDA still handles enforcement.
In 1957 suspicions developed that large scale pest
control programs of the Agriculture Department, particu-
larly the fire ant control program, were having adverse
effects on wildlife. Evidence to support these suspicions
was sparse, so in 1958 Congress passed the Pesticide
Research Act. The Fish and Wildlife Service in the
Department of Interior had been doing research on the
environmental effects of pesticides, but its staff and
funds had been far from adequate. The new Act provided
$280,000 for research in 1958. The next year the
authorization was amended to provide $2,565,000 annually
and research was considerably expanded. The studies
resulting from this Act provided scientific evidence
on the overall hazards of pesticides. The Act did not
20
grant to the Interior Department any regulatory power.
From 1959 onward, a series of events tended to
focus public attention on the hazards of toxic substances
in the environment in general and pesticides in
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particular. m 1959 an allegedly carcinogenic herbicide,
aminotriazole, was found to have contaminated the autumn
crop of cranberries. The Government condemned 55 million
pounds of cranberries. Furthermore the public fear of
contaminated cranberries so affected the market that
Congress authorized $10,000,000 to indemnify those
growers who had not misused aminotriazole. ^"^ A month
later attention was focused on DES, a synthetic hormone
used in poultry fattening. The use of the chemical had
been legal, but testing techniques revealed residues
which had hitherto been undetected, a statement by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, claimed that
22
there was no danger.
Also in 1959 there developed the first concerted
opposition to the USDA's pesticide programs. All the
major conservation organizations cooperated in opposing
the fire ant eradication program which was being conducted
23in the southeastern United States.
In 1959 the 1947 FIFRA was amended to cover several
new types of agricultural chemicals which had come into
widespread use after 1947. The Act now included within
its coverage nematicides, defoliants, desiccants, and
24
plant regulators.
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Pesticide politics in the sixties . Late in 1962 Rachel
Carson's Silent Spring was published. Carson's book
claimed that pesticides were being used excessively and
without proper consideration of their possible effects on
wildlife or humans. She described, in language that the
nonscientist could understand, many of the technical
aspects of pesticide pollution, such as the tendency
of some stable chemicals to concentrate in food chains.
Carson did not call for a ban on pesticides. What she
criticized was their use without adequate advance investi-
gation of their effects on soil, water, wildlife and
26
man.
The response to Silent Spring was extensive and
emotional. Opinions were sharply polarized and the
book was widely read and discussed. It was argued that
it was unscientific and biased, and that it represented
an anti-progress, defeatist philosophy. This point of
view was put forth most vociferously by those associated
with agricultural and agrichemical interests and by their
academic consultants. On the other hand, many independent
scientists and persons associated with conservationist
and environmental groups praised the author for her timely
27
warning
.
Silent Spring educated the public concerning the
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dangers of pesticides. Its educational influence was
tremendous, but its significance was not solely related
to the pesticide issue. The interest aroused by this
book in environmental contamination by pesticides led
to interests in other forms of pollution. When it had
been demonstrated that one aspect of modern technology
(pesticides) had been a source of environmental pollution,
it soon occurred to many authors and scientists to ex-
amine the possibility that other aspects of modern
technology were polluting the environment. While dis-
cussion of the causal significance of this book must be
essentially speculative, at least one author has noted
that, "The contemporary environmental movement as an
active political force in some senses had its birth with
28
the publication of Silent Spring . . . .
"
The success and influence of the book was un-
doubtedly due in great part to its quality, but also
important was the context of issues and events which
were felt to be important at the time it was published.
Many new chemicals dangerous to man had appeared on the
market since 1947. The concern over aminotriazole and
DES, and opposition to the USDA's fire ant program have
been mentioned. In 1962 the tragic effects of thalido-
mide on the babies of mothers who had taken the drug
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directed attention to the teratogenic effects of chemi-
cals. There was also concern over the effects of con-
tinued development on wilderness areas and the question
of radioactive fallout was an active issue. Finally,
there were several well publicized events such as a fish
29kill on the Mississippi River. Within the context of
these events and issues. Silent Spring acted as a catalyst
to focus attention on the pesticide question and on
environmental issues in general.
Ms. Carson's book led President Kennedy to ask the
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) to prepare
30
a report on the use of pesticides. The report was
published in 1963. Among its most significant recommen-
dations were the following:
1. The FDA should proceed as rapidly as possible
with its current review of tolerances for
pesticide residues on food and the experimental
studies on which they are based.
2. More research on the effects of pesticides on
wildlife should be conducted.
3. The toxicity studies upon which registration
and tolerances are based should be more com-
plete and of higher quality.
4. There should be an orderly reduction in the use
89
of persistent pesticides with a goal of
eliminating their use.
5. The "protest registrations" allowed by the
311947 FIFRA should be eliminated.
President Kennedy directed the responsible agencies
to implement the recommendations in the report including
the preparation of legislative proposals to be submitted
32
to Congress.
In response to the PSAC report in 1964, an existing
committee was reconstituted as the Federal Committee on
Pest Control (FCPC) in order to coordinate pest control
research and programs. The committee was the result of
a formal agreement between the Department of Agriculture,
Interior, and Health, Education and Welfare. It was to
pay special attention to pesticide registration and the
setting of tolerances. If scientists from the respective
Departments could not reach agreement on a matter, it
would be referred to the Department Secretaries for final
33
action.
During the 1960 's there were several attempts to
enact legislation which would provide more stringent
regulation of pesticides. Most of these attempts failed.
In 1965 Senator Ribicoff introduced an unsuccessful bill
which would have tightened regulatory controls over the
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manufacturers of pesticides. other unsuccessful bills
called for closer control over the use of pesticides in
programs funded by the Federal government and for the
banning of long-lived insecticides.^^ For example in
1969, Senator Gaylord Nelson introduced a package of
eight bills to prohibit the interstate sale and shipment
of eight pesticides in the chlorinated hydrocarbon
family: aldrin, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endrin,
heptachlor, lindane, and toxaphene . "^^
A series of attempt was made to give the Department
of Interior a statutory voice in the registration of
pesticides. During each Congress of the 1960 's legis-
lation was introduced which would have given the Depart-
ment authority to provide information to be included
on labels. In 1964 a bill passed the House which would
have
:
1. Increased USDI research
2. Ordered the Secretary of Interior to transmit
information to the Secretary of Agriculture
who would include the information on pesticide
labels
3. Authorized the USDI to distribute to interested
persons information about the effects of
36pesticides
.
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The strength of the agricultural interests in
Congress can be seen in the fact that the Senate de-
leted all but part one of the above provisions before
passing its version and in the fact that a final bill
never got through conference. The USDA's dominant role
in the regulation of pesticides was not to be success-
fully challenged.
Some legislative change was, however, inevitable
given the attention focused on pesticides by Rachel
Carson's book and the President's Science Advisory
Commission report. In 1964 amendments to the 1947
FIFRA were adopted which strengthened the statutory
. 37basis for controlling pesticides. Protest regis-
tration was eliminated. Manufacturers would no longer
be allowed to sell pesticides which were not registered
in interstate commerce. The new bill provided manu-
facturers who disagreed with the pesticide registration
decisions of the Agriculture Department's Pesticides
Registration Division, the right to request a hearing
or the creation of a science advisory committee to
decide on the registration, or both a hearing and a
committee. Any person "adversely affected" could
challenge in court the decisions made under the Act.
Furthermore, procedures for expediting the suspension
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of marketing of previously registered pesticides which
38were found to be unsafe were authorized.
The legislation was not adequate to provide strin-
gent control of pesticides. For example intrastate
commerce was not regulated. Nevertheless it did provide
the basis for at least a significant degree of regulation
by the USDA. However, although the statutory basis for
providing at least some protection for the environment
now existed, the law was enforced with little enthusiasm
or vigor by the USDA.
During the 1960 "s research on pesticides increased
greatly. The increase in research was accompanied by
the establishment of journals for the dissemination of
39
research results.
During the second half of the 1960 's there were
several congressional hearings, congressional committee
reports and reports by scientific panels. In 1965,
another report was put out by the President's Science
Advisory Committee. The report, Restoring the Quality
of Our Environment considered pesticides along with other
aspects of pollution. Several recommendations were
made, the most important being that increased attention
be given to "persistent" pesticides and that the Depart-
ment of Agriculture take steps to encourage a reduction
40
in insecticide use.
In 1966, a report by the Senate Committee on
Government Operations stressed the point that pesticide
risks should be weighed against benefits. The report
made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening
the pesticide regulatory system, improving coordination
of Federal programs affecting the environment, protecting
human health, and providing a more adequate basis for
future national policy in environmental management/"^
Also in 1966 a report by the staff of the House
Appropriations Committee suggested that Ms. Carson's
book had been one sided and had unnecessarily caused
public concern over the effects of pesticides on
42
health. Among the things the staff had been in-
structed to examine was whether or not regulations
were needed to control irresponsible actions, state-
j. ^ . . . 43ments and criticisms of agricultural pesticides.
In 1964 the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare contracted with the Bionetics Laboratory for a
long range study of the chronic effects of a large number
of pesticides. The results of this study began to become
available in 1966 and the last sutdies were completed
around 1970. These studies had a significant effect on
later policy. The acute effects of pesticides had been
well known and were usually obvious to someone witnessing
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a case of pesticide poisoning. The chronic effects were
much less studied and understood. The most serious and
important long term effect was the tendency of some
pesticides to cause cancer. The results of the Bionetics
study were often not conclusive due to disagreement on
testing methodologies and the interpretation of results.
However they did focus attention on the problem of the
44
chronic effects of agricultural chemicals.
In April 1969, a Commission (the Mrak Commission)
was appointed by the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare and charged with the responsibility of gathering
all available evidence on the benefits and risks of using
pesticides, evaluating this evidence thoroughly and re-
porting its findings and recommendations. The report
produced in December 1969 by this prestigious commission
was the most comprehensive one produced on the subject
up to that time. It organized and evaluated the available
information about pesticides including data on carcino-
genicity, mutagenicity, teratogenicity and the effects of
45
pesticides on nontarget organisms other than man.
The Commission concluded that there was adequate
evidence concerning potential hazards to the environment
and human health to require corrective action. It
suggested that such action be taken immediately to prevent
further environmental contamination from pesticide, and
to protect human health. it reco^nended that human ex-
posure to potentially hazardous pesticides be minimized
and it set forth a number of specific suggested policy
Changes designed to provide more effective and stringent
regulation of pesticides and more consideration of their
effects on human health Amnnrr ^c^j-uxi. ong the several specific
recommendations were:
1. Eliminating within two years all uses of DDT
except those essential to human health and
welfare
2. Improving research on all methods of pest con-
trol and on the adverse effects of pesticides
3. Providing incentives to industry to encourage
the development of better pesticides/^
During this period there was considerable criticism
of the USDA for not providing more effective pesticide
regulation. Two GAO reports provided strong evidence
that the Department's regulatory efforts were extremely
weak. One report in 1968 found that there had been no
actions by the Department to report violators of FIFRA
for prosecution in 13 years even though, in some
47instances, prosecution appeared warranted. This was
true even in instances where repeated major violations
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Of the law were cited by the Department and when shippers
did not take satisfactory action to correct violations
or ignored Department notifications that prosecution was
being contemplated. The GAO found that Agriculture's
operating guidelines did not even include procedures for
determining when shippers which had apparently broken
the law would be reported to the Justice Department for48
prosecution.
A second GAO report in 1969 noted that the Department
registered lindane pellets (an insecticide) for use in
continuously vaporizing devices in restaurants and other
food handling businesses even though the Public Health
Service, the Food and Drug Administration and other
Federal, State and private organizations had long opposed
this use. These agencies had questioned the adequacy
of data used to prove that this use of lindane was safe.
The report criticized the Department for not either
resolving the question of safety or restricting this use
of lindane and it urged action to resolve the question
of safety.
The GAO reports were followed by oversight hearings
by a subcommittee of the House Government Operations
^ . ,
50
Committee (the Fountain hearings). The hearings showed
that the USDA's regulation of pesticides gave little
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emphasis to environmental safety. m accordance with a
prior agreement, the Department had submitted pesticide
registration applications to the Interior and Health,
Education and Welfare Departments for coimnent. However
it had ignored every objection put forth by these
Departments and it had never withheld a pesticide to
which they had objected.'' The report which followed
these hearings was very critical of the USDA.'^
In 1969 environmentalists, frustrated in their
attempts to protect the environment from pesticides
through legislative change, turned to the courts. The
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sued the USDA and DHEW
to force them to end the registration of DDT. The basis
of the suit was that DDT was an environmental hazard and,
as such, mislabeled according to the standards of FIFRa.
The USDA challenged the standing of the EDF to sue, but
the court decision accorded standing to private interest
53groups to seek judicial review. The possibility of
court action was a new pressure on pesticide decision
makers to carefully consider the environmental conse-
quences of their actions. If they did not, the courts
54
would perform this task for them.
98
1970-1972 A New Agency to Regulate, andA New Law to Administer "
Pesticide regulation goes to the EPA . The events of the
1960's had indicated that the Department of Agriculture
was not likely to provide enthusiastic protection of
public health or the environment through the enforcement
of FIFRA. In particular, the GAO reports of 1968 and
1969 and the 1969 report of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations had provided strong evidence that strin-
gent regulation of pesticides by the Department was
unlikely.
Although they have adverse effects, pesticides are
often an effective way to increase profits by reducing
losses from insects, weeds and other pests. A study
completed in 1975 indicates that farmers do tend to have
. . 55positive attitudes toward their use. In all of the
hearings held on pesticide legislation from 1971 to 1980,
farm groups almost always tended to oppose measures which
would provide more stringent regulation and to support
proposals which would lead to more lenient regulation.
We can describe farmers as a constituency which is
generally opposed to stringent regulation of pesticides.
The primary constituency of the USDA is the farmers.
In its regulation of pesticides, the Department tended
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strongly to represent only farmer.. t^h^ • ^ix r ers. The interests of
food consumers were represented by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare through its Food and Drug
Administration. The interests of those supporting the
preservation of wildlife were represented by the Depart-
ment Of the interior, but because the USDA retained
primary control over pesticide regulation, the interests
of agriculture were not balanced against those of public
health and the environment. Administrative changes had
attempted to give DHEW and Interior more influence over
pesticide regulatory decisions, but their recommendations
were often ignored and USDA retained most of its influence
over regulation. The 1964 Amendments had sought to pro-
vide more proteciton from the effects of pesticides, but
it now became apparent to many that, due to its philo-
sophical orientation and political constituency, the USDA
would never provide vigorous enforcement of any law reg-
ulating pesticides. By 1970, the logical choice for a
different agency to fulfill this function was the
Environmental Protection Agency which was established
in that year.
The Environmental Protection Agency began to
function on December 2, 1970. The new agency was formed
as the result not of legislation, but of an executive
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initiative. Among the EPA's responsibilities was the
regulation of pesticides. The Pesticides Regulation
Division of the USDA was transferred to the EPA as was
the tolerance setting office of the FDA. Also trans-
ferred was Interior's authority to do research on the
effects of pesticides on fish and wildlife. The EPA
was now the major regulator of pesticides. Regulation
was concentrated in one agency responsible to the
general public for the protection of the environment,
not to a particular segment of the public. Many of
the EPA personnel responsible for the regulation of
pesticides had been transferred from the Department of
Agriculture. These people brought with them attitudes
which generally tended to support the almost unrestricted
use of pesticides. They tended to be skeptical about
claims concerning environmental damage or threats to
public health. These attitudes eventually led to sub-
stantial internal conflict within the EPA especially
between these people and the lawyers charged with en-
57
forcement responsibilities.
1972; A major revision of FIFRA . The new agency brought
enthusiasm to its role of environmental protection but
the law with which it had to work was in need of
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revision. The 1947 fifra had been written at a time
before Silent SHrin^ and the ensuing wave of hearings,
coMnittee reports and scientific studies had brought
the environmental effects of pesticides to the public's
attention. it was a law designed primarily to protect
the farmer from defective products by ensuring that the
registered pesticide did what its label said it did.
The primary concern was that the registered product meet
the claims made in its label concerning the control of
pests. The focus of regulation was on the label, not
on the way in which the substance was used. in fact,
the use of a pesticide not in accordance with the label
was not illegal. Protection of the consumer was based
on strict adherence to the label directions. If an
economic poison was extremely dangerous when not used
in accordance with label directions, but comparatively
safe when used according to label directions, its sale
could not be banned. The problem was that many users
did not bother to read label instructions. Furthermore,
the label instructions were sometimes so complicated
that it was impossible for many poorly educated users
to understand them.
In this regard several courts held that misuse of
an otherwise properly labeled product could not be
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prevented by cancelling or suspending its registration.'
For example in Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. p.p. the
EPA tried to cancel the registration of a phosphorous
paste for use as a home roach and rat killer after
nationwide reports that its misuse had caused the deaths
of adults and children. The EPA contended that re-
gardless of the label contents, the product was too
dangerous to be sold because, "the general public is
incapable of handling these things and following di-
rections." In ruling against the EPA, the court pointed
out that the record showed a long history of safe use
of this product when used in accordance with the label.
It held that the manufacturer had made a prima facie
showing that the pesticide satisfied the standard of
the law for continued marketing. The court acknowledged
that the use of a safety standard was appropriate to
determine whether to allow the continued sale of a
product such as DDT which had a known potential for harm
even when used in compliance with the label, but it
decided that a different situation is presented when
the harm is entirely, or at least primarily, attribut-
able to the misuse of the product.
A pesticide could be removed from commerce only if
the Administrator of the Act found it to present an
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"iimninent hazard" to the public. The ter. "imminent
hazard" was not defined. Furthermore, there was no
provision requiring the administrator to publish guide-
lines specifying what environmental or human health
criteria would qualify a pesticide for registration.
This lack of definition and legislative provision for
rules led to several court cases. In the absence of
congressionally required guidelines, the courts began
to indicate that they would provide them in the course
of responding to the increasing number of appeals to
them. In comparison to Agency establishment of legis-
latively mandated rules this would have been an in-
efficient and often unpredictable process. One court's
decision might not always have been consistent with that
of preceding ones. Environmentalists and the pesticide
industry felt that judicial implementation of FIFRA was
a too unpredictable means of regulation
.
Thus it was felt by many that a totally new statutory
basis for regulating pesticides was needed. In February
1971 the Administration proposed legislation which would
completely revise the regulation of pesticides
. The
Council on Environmental Quality called revision of FIFRA
one of the top five environmental priorities of the
63year. After fifteen drafts, four congressional
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hearings, and almost two years, the Federal Environmental
Pesticide control Act of 1972 (FEPCA) became law on
64
October 21, 1972.
The 1972 FEPCA (also referred to as FIFRA) amended
and completely revised the old 1947 statute. The 1972
law was slightly revised in 1975, more substantially
revised in 1978, and again, slightly revised in 1980, but
its basic structure has not been changed and it is still
the fundamental framework for the regulation of pesti-
cides. Thus in order to provide an understanding of the
regulation of pesticides this law must be explained in
considerable detail. The new law, for the first time,
recognized the environment as a quality to be protected.
It regulated not only the contents of the pesticide
label, but also the use of the product. It was now
illegal to use a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with
the directions for its use on the label.
No pesticide could be sold either in interstate or
intrastate commerce unless it was registered with the
EPA. In order to be registered, the product had to
meet the claims which the manufacturer made for it con-
cerning its effectiveness in controlling pests. Further-
more the Administrator had to be assured that when the
product was used in accordance with widespread and
conunonly recognized practice it would not generally
cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."
Thus a pesticide which caused unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment if not used in strict accord-
ance with label instructions would not qualify for
registration if the instructions were not consistent
with "widespread and commonly recognized practice. "^^
The term "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment" was defined as "any unreasonable risk to
man or the environment, taking into account the economic,
social and environmental costs and benefits of the use
of any pesticide
." This term has been the focus of
much of the decisionmaking based on FIFRA, and it is
based on cost - benefit analysis. The participants in
the process of implementing FIFRA have tended to use the
word "risk" more often than "cost" although the latter
term is often used. Thus risk - benefit analysis is the
basis of registration decisions made under FIFRA.
As part of its registration a pesticide was to be
classified as "general use" or "restricted use." These
classifications applied not only to the pesticide, but to
its specific uses. Thus one pesticide might be classi-
fied for "general use" for all uses, another might be
classified as "general use" for use on one crop and
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"restricted use" on another crop. A "general use" pesti-
cide could be used by anyone.
"Restricted use" products
were, as the name implies, those substances which re-
quired caution and knowledge concerning their use. if a
product was classified as restricted because its use,
without additional regulatory restriction, would cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, it was
required:
1. That it be applied only by or under the direct
supervision of a certified applicator or
2. That its use be subject to such other re-
strictions as the Administrator may provide
by regulation.
If a pesticide was classified as restricted because its
acute dermal or inhalation toxicity presented a hazard
to the applicator or other persons, it could be applied
only by or under the direct supervision of a certified
applicator.
A certified applicator was one who was competent
with respect to the use and handling of pesticides
.
The law directed the Administrator to prescribe standards
for the certification of pesticide applicators. In
order for a state to certify, it had to submit a plan
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for this purpose which had to meet certain requirements
specified in the law and which had to be approved by
the Administrator. After approving a state plan, if the
Administrator determined that the state was not properly
administering its plan, he could withdraw approval.
'°
The original legislative proposal submitted by the
Administration to Congress contained three classifi-
cations: "general use," "restricted use," and "use by
permit only." The "use by permit only" classification
would have included products which tended to have a
long term adverse effect on the environment and were a
potential threat to human health. Their use would have
been restricted to situations of real need and would
have depended on the approval in writing of a pest
management consultant who possessed a state license
indicating that he had met certain standards approved
by the Administrator. Approval would be necessary for
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each application.
This provision would have been analogous to the
legal requirement that certain drugs with potentially
harmful side effects can only be obtained by pre-
scription from an expert (a physician) who is certified
as qualified to determine that they are needed. It
would have cut down on the unnecessary use of pesticides
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and encouraged the consideration of biological means of
control. If a satisfactory means of biological control
were available, a pest management consultant would
probably have refused a request for the use of a danger-
ous pesticide. By reducing the amount of dangerous
pesticides released into the environment, this provision
would have made FIFRA a much more effective means of
protecting the environment; however Congress deleted the
classification from the enacted legislation.
In order to prove that his pesticide product
warranted the claims made for it and did not cause an
unreasonable adverse effect on the environment, the
manufacturer had to submit data to the Administrator of
the EPA. The Administrator was required to publish
guidelines specifying the kinds of data which would be
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required. These guidelines were subject to revision
from time to time. They were quite extensive and the
completion of the many tests required to register a
product was very expensive. Testing was the responsi-
bility of the manufacturer. He could perform the tests
himself or pay a commercial laboratory to do the work.
The EPA's role was merely to check the completeness and
validity of the data.
A potential for conflict existed if a second manu-
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facturer wished to obtain for hi.self a registration for
a pesticide already registered by another manufacturer
under the law the second manufacturer had to perform all
of the tests which had already been performed by the
first registrant unless he wished to pay the first regis-
trant reasonable compensation for the use of his data.
Although in possession of the first registrant's data,
the Administrator could not use it to support a second
registration unless the second applicant offered to pay
a reasonable compensation for the use of the data, and
unless the data was not classified as a "trade secret."
If the parties could not agree on the amount and method
of payment, the Administrator was authorized to determine
a just figure. The Administrator's decision could be
appealed by the owner of the test data in federal
7*?73
district court.
The Administrator was not to make public or use for
registering a pesticide any information which in his
judgment related to trade secrets. However, if it was
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act, he
could reveal such information to any Federal agency
consulted, or at a public hearing, or in findings of
fact. If he wished to release any data for inspection
which the owner considered to be a "trade secret," he
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was required to notify the owner of the data in advance.
The owner could institute action in an appropriate
district court for a declaratory judgment as to whether
his information was subject to protection/^
The opportunity for litigation created by the pro-
visions for judicial review of the Administrator's
decisions on compensation for data and, in particular, on
trade secrets, was tremendous. In fact the large number
of cases brought under these provisions eventually be-
came one of several factors leading to a complete halt
in EPA pesticide registrations.
The registration of a pesticide had to be "cancelled"
if the registrant did not renew his registration every
five years. It was also required that registration be
cancelled if it appeared to the Administrator that a
pesticide or its labelling did not comply with the pro-
visions of the Act, or, when used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice, generally
caused unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
Prior to cancellation a hearing was required if the
registrant requested it, and a decision of the Adminis-
trator to cancel a registration following a hearing
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was judicially reviewable.
The cancellation process did not allow for the
Ill
Wdiate removal from commerce of a pesticide which
was causing significant damage. The hearing allowed
for by the provision for cancellation could take several
months and some of the hearings lasted for several years.
Therefore the law provided that if action was required
to prevent an "inuninent hazard" during the time required
for cancellation, the Administrator could "suspend" the
registration of a pesticide after an expedited hearing
on whether or not an imminent hazard existed. if the
Administrator determined that the danger posed by the
chemical in use permitted no delay at all, he could
suspend the registration of the chemical immediately
and hold a hearing on the suspension after taking the
action. Orders to suspend pesticides were judicially
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reviewable.
If the registration of a pesticide was first sus-
pended and then cancelled, the law provided that the
owner of any quantity of the product be compensated for
his loss unless he had knowledge of facts which would
have shown that the chemical did not meet the require-
ments of the Act for registration and continued there-
after to produce the substance. If the stocks of a
cancelled pesticide were large, this provision might cost
the government a great deal of money. Therefore the law
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provided that in lieu of oompensating owners for their
losses, the Administrator could provide a reasonable
time for the use of existing stocks until all stocks
were depleted. This money saving provision has proved
to be controversial. Environmentalists have maintained
that if a substance is dangerous enough to be suspended
and then cancelled, it is too harmful for existing stocks
to be sold.
The Act authorized the Administrator to make regu-
lations in order to carry out its provisions. Before
these regulations could be published, the views of the
Secretary of Agriculture had to be solicited. All
regulations were required to be in effect within four
years of the passage of the Act, but those providing for
registration and classification of pesticides were re-
quired to be promulgated within two years. After two
years, but within four years of the enactment of the
law, the Administrator was required to have completed
the reregistration and reclassification of pesticides
registered under the provisions of the pre-1972 law.^^
The new law provided numerous opportunities for
hearings and for judicial review. In the case of actual
controversy as to the validity of any order issued by
the Administrator following a public hearing, any person
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Who "will be adversely affected" by such order and who
had been a party to the proceedings could obtain judicial
review by filing in the United States court of appeals/'
The overall enforcement responsibility for the 1972
FIFRA rested with the Administrator of the EPA. His
agency registered pesticides and pesticide producing
establishments, oversaw the certification of applicators,
and evaluated the toxicity and safety of pesticides. m
order that EPA might enforce the Act, the law made a
number of demands on manufacturers. They were required
to keep records concerning their products and to submit
information concerning the amounts and types of chemicals
they produced. Provisions were made for the inspection
of manufacturing plants and new civil and criminal
penalties for violations of the law were established.
Any registrant who knowingly violated any provision of
the Act could, on conviction, be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year or
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both.
Considerable enforcement responsibility was pro-
vided by the Act for the states. States could train
and certify applicators of restricted pesticides if the
state plan for this purpose was approved by the Adminis-
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trator of the EPA. Most training of applicators is done
81
114
by the states. The states could regulate the sale and
use Of pesticides within their boundaries as long as the
regulation did not permit a sale or use prohibited by
the Federal Act. Also a state could register a pesti-
cide formulated for distribution and use within the
state to meet special local needs if certified to do so
by the EPA Administrator and if registration for such
use had not previously been denied by the Administrator.
This registration could be disapproved by the Adminis-
trator within 90 days.
The Administrator of the EPA was authorized to enter
into cooperative agreements with the states in order to
delegate to any state the authority to cooperate in the
enforcement of the Act.^^ m actual practice much en-
forcement authority has been delegated. The EPA has
focused on control over registration, classification,
labeling and evaluation of toxicity and safety. The
states have emphasized control over local distribution
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storage, use and disposal. Municipal and local govern-
ments play a minor role.
The act provided that the Administrator undertake
research as necessary to carry out the purposes of the
law. Priority was to be given to research in biologically
integrated alternatives for pest control. A specific
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research requirement was for a national plan for moni-
toring residues of pesticides in the environment."
This required monitoring in air, water, soil, plants,
man and animals.
During the two years in which the proposed bill was
revised in hearings it was the focus of extensive dis-
cussion. Discussion focused on several important topics.
Perhaps the most important was the scientific evidence
concerning the effects of pesticides. The experience
with DDT served as the primary basis for this discussion.
Evidence was presented which indicated that DDT was
harmful. Other evidence indicated that it was safe.
Other areas of discussion included the effects of
pesticides on farmworkers, alternatives to chemical
pesticides, the proposed "use by permit only" classifi-
cation, the use of data, the payment of indemnities for
unused stocks of cancelled pesticides, and "essentiality."
This last term refers to the proposal by some environ-
mentalists that if a request were made for the regis-
tration of a pesticide for a use for which there already
existed an adequate registered pesticide, the request
should be denied. This proposal, it was felt, would
limit the number of different types of pesticides in the
environment, and thus decrease the possibility of damage
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resulting from the use of a new chemical whose effects
were not as well understood as those of chemicals which
had been in use for a long time. The proposal that the
"essentiality" of a pesticide be considered as one of the
requirements for its registration was defeated.
in the passage of the bill, a conflict developed
between two Senate committees. a bill passed the House
in November 1971. The Senate Agriculture and Forestry
committee's Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and
General Legislation made a large number of amendments
to this bill and then referred it to the Senate Commerce
Committee's Subcommittee on the Environment. The Agri-
culture Committee is, and always has been, less than
enthusiastic about tight control over the use of pesti-
cides. On the other hand, the Subcommittee on the
Environment had an interest in environmental protection.
Thus the fact that the Commerce Subcommittee had a legis-
lative imput into the new legislation is important. This
committee made many amendments to the proposed legis-
lation. These amendments would have made the legislation
a much more effective means of protecting the environ-
ment, but the greatest number of them were not included
in the final bill. However, some of the amendments
were included in the final legislation. Others were
included but in a compromised form. For example one
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amendment proposed to raise the ™axi™™ civil penalty
fro™ a.OOO^to 510,000. The figure in the final bill
was $5,000. The .ost important Co^erce Subcon^ittee
amendments related to criteria for registration. The
Agriculture Subcommittee's bill had made the basic
criterion for registration of a pesticide and for other
actions under the Act, the requirement that the chemical
have no "substantial adverse effcr^t-^ ^.uou tfects on the environment."
The commerce Subcommittee substituted the phrase "un-
reasonable adverse effects on the environment" and this
phrase was included in the final bill." The Committee's
reasoning was that if a pesticide had a significant but
not "substantial" adverse eff&rt nn <-v,^ «dVA cibfe; rrec o the environment and
if the substance was of low utility, the EPA would be
powerless to stop its use. The new phrase allowed the
EPA to weigh the risks against the benefits of a pesti-
cide if an^ adverse effect was discovered. it was the
Subcommittee's intention that "... any adverse effect
ought not to be tolerated unless there are overriding
benefits from the use of a pesticide.
" The inclusion
of the new phrase was of great importance. Because it
is the basic criterion for registration, and classifi-
cation, disputes over registration, cancellation,
suspension and classification have centered over its
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meaning. it has meant a balancing of risks against
benefits, but how risks and benefits are defined and
where the proper balance lies, has been the subject of
lengthy debate.
After the Senate Commerce Subcommittee made its
amendments, the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee
prepared a supplementary report criticizing the Commerce
Committee proposals and explaining its opposition.^!
Eventually a compromise was worked out and the bill
passed the Senate. A Conference committee settled
House-Senate differences and the bill passed both
Houses and was signed into law.
The final legislation was a collection of compro-
mises. It did provide the framework for a significant
degree of regulation of pesticides. The amount of pro-
tection to man and the environment which its enforcement
would provide was insufficient to meet the goals of
"adequate" regulation set forth by this dissertation
and supported by many environmentalists. However the
law has led to the banning of all or most uses of a
considerable number of pesticides. While not adequate
from the environmental perspective, the law is also far
from useless. It has been the means of significant
progress in removing dangerous pesticides from commerce.
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The Administration of the Act by the EPA has often been
criticized by industry officials who feel that the
Agency is interpreting it too strictly and by environ-
mentalists who see the EPA as being too weak in its
enforcement. The law explicitly recognized the environ-
ment as an area in need of protection. it provided a
criterion (unreasonable adverse effects) and a structure
(guidelines for registration, hearings) for providing
that protection by removing at least a significant number
of chemicals from trade, a requirement was set forth
for at least some education for applicators of the most
dangerous poisons in the procedures for certifying
applicators of restricted pesticides. in the area of
enforcement, provisions such as the ones for inspecting
establishments and establishing penalties for violations
gave the EPA the means to enforce the law.
Probably the biggest weakness in the law was that
it did not provide any means to encourage the use of
ecologically sound Integrated Pest Management techniques.
It did fund research on IPM, but there were no provisions
to encourage its use. Retaining the "use by permit only"
classification of pesticides which was in the original
Administration bill and the establishment of pest control
districts under the supervision of a pest management
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consultant would have allowed for considerable imple-
mentation Of IPM. The pest management consultant could
have been directed to deny requests for use of pesticides
when a satisfactory ipm method was available.
The use of IPM often requires special "third
generation" pesticides such as viruses or bacteria. The
law made no specific provision for the registration of
these non-chemical pesticides.
Other weaknesses included the provisions for state
enforcement, the complexity of the law with its many
opportunities for rulemaking, hearings and judicial
review, the lack of a specific provision authorizing
citizens' suits, the lack of strict requirements for the
training of applicators of restricted chemicals, and the
provision for the payment of indemnity to owners of
substances whose registration was suspended and then
cancelled.
The amount of protection of human health and the
environment which the law did provide was due in general
to the political climate of the time and specifically to
the input of the Senate Subcommittee on the Environment.
As has been described, the subject of pesticides had
been brought to public attention primarily by Rachel
Carson's book in 1962. In subsequent years the focus
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provided by other books and by congressional and Admin-
istration attention in hearings and reports had kept the
issue alive. Furthermore, at the time of the law's
passage public opinion tended to strongly support efforts
to protect the environment
. The contribution of the
senate Commerce Subcommittee was significant as it pro-
vided a criterion for registration which was more likely
to lead to the banning of dangerous chemicals. Although
many of its proposals were not included in the final
legislation, the knowledge that this Subcommittee would
eventually have an input into the legislation framing
process probably did much to discourage the House and
Senate Agriculture Committees from deleting more of the
environmentally sound provisions from the original
Administration bill.
Thus the law did provide some measure of protection
for the environment. This protection was accompanied by
industry irritation. By 1973 as the public began to
realize that some environmental goals would necessitate
economic burdens, the initial enthusiasm for protection
of the environment diminished. When FIFRA was revised
in 1975, 1978 and 1980 the changes tended to weaken the
legislation. Indeed the history of Congressional over-
sight and revision of this law since 1972 is character-
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ized by legislative changes which have weakened its
effectiveness in protecting health and the environment
and by Congressional interference with responsible
administration of the law by the EPA.
1973-1975
: EPA Enf
and Congressional Rpa^<-i,^,r
F"s;^rI!'and''^^rfr,7y°?L'--.-r!""
,
£°£2£essional
^j-j-T-xcism. The passage of FIFRA in
1972 did not signal the end of controversy related to
pesticides. on May 4, 1973 the House Committee on
Agriculture held a short hearing to examine EPA imple-
mentation of FIFRA. The participants discussed such
issues as the proper means of compensating a pesticide
producer for the use of his health and safety test data
by another company, and other issues related to FIFRA
implementation. Much time was consumed, however, by
congressmen's lectures to EPA officials concerning what
the legislators felt to be the Agency's excessive zeal in
such areas as establishment of standards for exposure of
farmworkers and the control of DDT. The congressmen also
maintained that there were problems concerning control of
the gypsy moth, tussock moth and predators of livestock
which were, it was claimed, caused by the EPA's
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excessively stringent control of chemicals designed to
kill these pests.
A Clear effort to underline fipra was .ade in October
1973 When a House Agriculture subcozr^ittee held hearings
on a bill Which would have directed the Administrator to
approve the use of DDT to control the tussock moth, a
forest pest. Although DDT had already been banned for
most purposes, the Department of Agriculture had re-
quested an emergency exemption (which is permitted under
FIFRA) to use DDT to control the moth. This request had
been denied by the EPA, but after the House hearings
and the threat of legislation the Agency gave in and
approved a subsequent request. This decision and its
ecological consequences has been heavily criticized by
97 ^
environmentalists
.
A counterbalance to the Agriculture Committee was
the oversight hearings on the administration of FIFRA
held in August 1974 by the more environmentally oriented
Senate Subcommittee on Environment. Several environ-
mentalists testified criticizing the EPA's implementation
of FIFRA and the hearings were generally oriented toward
the environmental point of view. In fact no industry or
98farm group representatives testified.
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1975 Revision of FiFRA
By 1974 the EPA had either begun action against or
cancelled the registration of aldrin-dieldrin, mirex,
pesticides containing mercury, and DDT. in October 1974,
most uses of aldrin-dieldrin were suspended. in November,
it was announced that hearings would be held leading to
the possible cancellation of heptachlor and chlordane.
Environmentalists considered these five major en-
forcement actions in five years to be pitifully few and
suggested ways to simplify the cancellation and sus-
pension hearing processes; however, the EPA's actions
did indicate that the Agency intended to take some regu-
latory action in regard to pesticides and the reaction
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of farmers and industry was strong.
Thus by 1975 it had become apparent that the
direction of EPA's movement in regard to pesticides
would be toward a degree of regulation which was more
stringent than what was desired by many farmers, pesti-
cide industry executives and congressmen. Within the
Agency there were many people who did not favor the
strict regulation of chemicals. This attitude was
particularly prevalent among the transferees from the
Department of Agriculture who had been moved into the
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EPA in 1970 when the Agency took over the regulation of
pesticides, on the other hand there «ere many new
entrants in the Agency with a strong conrniitment to
environmental protection. The result of the interaction
of these groups, along with many organizational and
managerial problems encountered in administering a very
complex law, was a regulatory policy which fell con-
siderably Short Of the expectations of environmentalists,
but which was generally oriented toward environmental
protection.
Farmers tended to see regulation of pesticides as
an intrusion of naive and unfeeling bureaucrats and there
were numerous complaints by farmers concerning many
aspects of FIFRA and its enforcement. As one congress-
man put it, there are two aspects of government regulation
that cause problems in his district - OSHA and FIFRA.
Many of the alleged harmful effects of pesticides con-
cerned their possible carcinogenic properties. Since
the latent period for the development of cancer can be
as long as twenty years, and because only a fraction of
those exposed to a carcinogen will develop cancer, it was
difficult for farmers who had used suspect chemicals for
years to realize their potential harmful effects. Their
attitude could be summarized in the often heard statement.
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"If it's so harmful, why hasn't it hurt me, I've been
using it for years." There was also considerable
reaction among farmers against the training programs
Which were being established in each state for the
applicators of pesticides classified as "restricted."
under the 1972 law these
"certification" programs had
been mandated for those who would apply these more
dangerous chemicals, however many farmers saw the
program as an unreasonable governmental requirement,
and as inefficiently run by the EPA.l^^ The pressure
for less stringent certification requirements put on
congressmen from agricultural districts was quite strong.
Furthermore, during the 1972-1975 period the EPA
found itself in the middle of a number of pesticide-
related disputes including: the use of 2,4,5T, the
safest means of predator control, strobane residues in
food, the use of vinyl chloride as an inert ingredient
in pesticides, and the "Pesticide Hotline," a toll free
number set up by the Agency in 1975 so that citizens
could report incidents of pesticide misuse directly to
the Agency.
While farmers and the industry were unhappy with
what they considered to be EPA's overenthusiastic attempt
to protect the public, a series of reports by the General
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Accountin, o«ice <c.O, indicate, that it was not
.oing
enough.
. report issued in April 1373, notea, a^on,
other criticises, that while the
.gency had cancelled or
suspended the registration of certain pesticides con-
taxning 2,4,5T, mercury, and thalliu. sulphate, it had
allowed other pesticides containing the saee ingredients
and registered for the sa„e uses to stay on the
.arket.
The report recozmnended that the Agency suspend all
pesticides containing these ingredients beyond estab-
lished limits. It also criticized the Agency for a lack
or promptness in starting cancellation and suspension
hearings. Furthermore it suggested that it should make
every effort to have all pesticides found to be immi-
nently hazardous removed from the channels of trade.
A GAO report issued in May 1974, focused on the
EPA-s enforcement of FIFRA and found that the consumer
had not been adequately protected. It pointed out that
the Agency had not given its inspectors adequate quidance
concerning what pesticides to sample. As a result in-
spectors repeatedly sampled some pesticides but not
others. About 64 percent of the manufacturers in the
three EPA regions surveyed had not had any of their pro-
ducts sampled during the four and one half year period
examined. Customs had not reported the arrival of many
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Shipments Of i„po.ted pesticides and the Agency did not
adequately sample those reported. The report aiso found
that the Agency's biological laboratories could not test
most of the samples collected for safety and effective-
ness because of limitations of space, personnel and
equipment. Over an 18 month period, the Agency had
collected 9,344 samples, but had tested only 19 percent
for safety. Another criticism contained in the report
concerned testing. m order to register a new product,
the manufacturer is the party responsible for conducting
tests concerning safety and efficacy, however the Agency
does conduct some of its own tests. This is particularly
true for those categories of products with a histroy of
violations. The GAO criticized the Agency for not con-
ducting more tests on products of this nature. Finally,
the report mentioned other shortcomings including:
Agency failure to consider enforcement alternatives
such as cancelling registration and recalling products;
failure to notify manufacturers when tests indicated
that their products were defective; failure to act
against the manufacturers of defective products; failure
to notify the public about defective products; and failure
to make full use of data supplied by states which per-
tained to the Agency's market surveillance programs.
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A third GAO Report published in October 1974, con-
centrated on the safety of the pesticide
.aleic hydrazide
and concluded that the EPA should require additional re-
search on a registered pesticide when serious, unanswered
questions of safety arise.
^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^.^^^^
that the FDA had never tested foods for residues of
maleic hydrazide.
The GAO's criticism of the EPA was supplemented by
that of the environmental groups. In testimony before
Congressional committees they tended to support the
Agency for its sincere efforts to implement the law,
but they were, at the same time, critical of its per-
formance in many areas. Some areas of criticism were:
the handling of experimental permits and emergency
exemptions; inadequate protection of farmworkers; per-
mitting excessive pesticide residues in food; the quite
complicated hearings necessary to cancel or suspend a
pesticide registration; Agency failure to assign suffic-
ient personnel to these hearings; failure to suspend the
registration of more chemicals; failure to promulgate
prescriptive regulations to regulate pesticide disposal;
slowness in developing rules concerning child protective
packaging; and inadequate monitoring of pesticide
1106
accidents
.
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Thus while farm and industry groups protested the
stringency of federal pesticide regulation, information
provided by environmental groups and the GAO indicated
that the EPA's efforts had not been sufficient. m
particular, the GAO had published several reports indi-
cating that there were significant weaknesses in Agency
efforts to protect man and the environment from the
effects of harmful pesticides
. The reports did not
make any recommendations for major changes in the law,
but the information they provided would tend to suggest
that if any changes in the law were needed, they should
be changes oriented in the direction of a mandate from
Congress for more stringent and effective enforcement.
However the revision of FEPCA enacted by Congress in
November 1975 tended to weaken, rather than strengthen,
the Agency's ability to regulate pesticides.
ilZii FIFRA revised . On May 1, 1975 the Senate Sub-
committee on the Environment again held an oversight
hearing on EPA's implementation of FIFRA. The hearing
was very short and the discussion was environmentally
oriented with only EPA representatives and environ-
108
mentalists testifying. Due to the fact that the
authorization for FIFRA would expire fairly soon and the
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House and Senate Agriculture committees were planning to
hold hearings soon, it might have been appropriate for
the commerce subcommittee to hold more extensive hearings
and to comment substantially on the subject of pesticide
regulation. Had it done so the Senate subconHnittee would
have continued in the role it had assumed in 1972 of
providing an environmental counter- force against the
generally pro-industry and pro-farmer Agriculture
Committees. By 1975, however, there had been a disso-
lution of the national consensus that had, in 1972,
strongly supported environmental measures, and the sub-
committee evidently felt no strong pressure to take
more decisive action. Thus, unlike 1972, the 1975
revision of FIFRA fell solely within the jurisdiction of
the House and Senate Agriculture committees with no
substantial challenge or rivalry for input exerted by
any other committee.
In May 1975, the Senate Subcommittee on Agricul-
tural Research and General Legislation of the Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry and the House Committee on
Agriculture held hearings on FIFRA to consider the re-
authorization of the Act. The primary participants
in these hearings were farm, industry and environmental
groups and Administration (EPA) representatives.
ions
Among the participating farm and industrial group
the constant theme was that in balancing the risks and
benefits of pesticide use, the EPA had given too much
weight to health, safety and environmental considerat
and not enough to the needs of agriculture. Among the
environmental groups the message was the opposite. Each
group made known its criticisms, but except for the en-
vironmental groups, most did not advocate any changes
in the law. Instead they suggested that Congress give
the Agency clear instructions concerning its intent in
regard to the FIFRA legislation. The vehicle for these
instructions was to be the legislative committee reports
which were to be issued after the hearings.
In the hearings the farm groups focused on the prob-
lem of the certification of private applicators and in
particular, the requirement for private applicators to
pass a test. Under the 1972 FIFRA the EPA was directed
to "classify" all pesticides into one of two categories -
"restricted" or "general" use. The Act provided that
after the deadline date of October 21, 1976 general use
pesticides could be used by anyone and restricted chemi-
cals (which were more dangerous) could only be used by a
"certified" applicator. Applicators were to be certified
by the States in which they lived and each State was
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d.rected the Xaw to sub.it its pXan for certia=atio„
to the Administrator of the EP. for approval, unless the
Ad.„inistrator approved the state plan for certifying
applicators, the state was not authorized to certify
All certification plans were to be approved and all
pesticides were to be classified as "general" or
"restricted" use by October 21, 1976.^"
There were considerable administrative problems
associated with implementation of State certification
programs, but the biggest problem was the provisions
for testing of private applicators.
In their communications with the States concerning
what would be acceptable standards for the certification
of private applicators, EPA officials indicated that a
typically acceptable plan would include provision for
about one half day of classes and the subsequent admin-
istration of an oral or written test, so that it could be
determined that the trainee had retained sufficient in-
formation to qualify him to use restricted pesticides
.
The reaction against the idea of a test was strong and
widespread. Every group representing farm interests
which testified before the House and Senate committees
criticized this proposed requirement. It was seen as
an example of pervasive bureaucracy interfering with the
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freedom of the farmer who was characterized as an eco-
logically conscious individual who was always very
careful in the use of pesticides/'' The farmers claimed
that the EPA was administering the certification program
in an inefficient manner. They urged that the committees
in their reports direct it to clear up administrative
problems and to refrain from the inclusion of a test
in the standards for certification of private appli-
cators. Instead, they proposed that the reports instruct
the Agency that certification standards should be met
by a system of self-certification, that is by having
farmers complete a form at the time of purchase stating
that they understood the precautions necessary to handle
the pesticide being purchased. The idea of self-certifi-
cation was also supported by the National Association of
State Departments of Agriculture.
In their testimony all of the major industry groups
urged a simple extension of the Act; however they did
voice complaints which they urged Congress to resolve
through the legislative report. Major complaints were
that the EPA's testing requirements were too stringent
and that the Agency's planned procedure for carefully
examining suspicious chemicals was inefficient. Further-
ed it was urged that only a small percentage ofmor
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pesticides be classified as restricted. There was disa-
greement within the industry concerning the use by one
manufacturer of data concerning pesticide health and
safety which was generated by another manufacturer.'''
The environmentalists urged a number of reforms.
All of the environmental groups wanted repeal of the
indemnity provision of the law which required that if a
pesticide was suspended and then cancelled, the Admin-
istrator must either allow unused stocks of the chemical
to be used up, or pay owners of the pesticide an amount
of money equal to the cost of the unused stocks. It was
argued that the requirement to make a large indemnity
payment might discourage the EPA from suspending a pesti-
cide, or it at least might encourage the Agency to allow
the use of existing stocks of a suspended chemical which
should be removed immediately from commerce. All the
environmental groups also argued strongly for a stringent
system of applicator certification and against the concept
of self
- certification advocated by the farmers.''^
Other changes in the law sought by environmentalists
included: legislative imposition of a deadline for EPA
promulgation of regulations governing disposal of excess
pesticides; a congressionally mandated deadline for rules
concerning child protective packaging; a legal requirement
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that no pesticide Known to cause cancer in .an or ani.als
be registered; the stimulation of ipm development and
application through economic incentives and education-
and the inclusion of ipm principles in applicator certi-
fication training programs
/"^^
Environmentalists also proposed that Congress, with-
out enacting legal requirements, direct the Agency to do
a full literature search of health and safety data in
considering registration applications; to test all
supposedly "inert" pesticide ingredients; to develop a
workable reporting system for the collection of accident
or adverse reaction reports; and to make more stringent
the regulations concerning State registration of pesti-
cides for special local needs.
'''"^^
The Administration advocated a simple reauthori-
zation of the Act. In response to criticism of the
Agency the Administrator took a number of steps in the
months prior to the final congressional vote. In order
to ensure that he received the views of all interested
parties, he set up a Pesticide Policy Advisory Panel and
a State
- Federal Implementation Committee. He in-
structed EPA Regional Administrators to seek closer
cooperation with State agricultural officials, and he met
with interested groups such as the American Association
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Of Pesticide control Officials and the National Associ-
ation Of State Departments of Agriculture. m addition
he formed an EPA Task Force to evaluate and improve the
pesticide decision-making process
After the hearings, in August 1975 the Adminis-
trator decided to initiate proceedings to suspend the
registration of heptachlor and chlordane. This caused
a major reaction in Congress and among the chemical and
agricultural lobbies/'^ when the House Agriculture
committee held business meetings in September to come up
with a bill, and when the Senate Agriculture Subcommittee
held further hearings on FIFRA in October, the decision
must have weighed heavily on the minds of the legislators
because the industry and farm groups were given more by
the committees than they had asked for. Although these
groups had almost unanimously advocated a simple ex-
tension of funding for FIFRA, the House Committee on
Agriculture drew up a bill aimed at supporting the goals
of the farmers and industry. This bill included a re-
quirement for consultation with the Secretary of
Agriculture before issuing cancellation notices or
regulations; a requirement for the conducting of economic
analyses; a provision establishing a Scientific Advisory
Panel; a requirement that the Agency accept self-
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certification as a legitimate means of applicator certi-
fication and several other provisions. In the hearings
held in October before the Senate SubcoMaittee on
agricultural Research and General Legislation, the
environmentalists strongly criticised these provisions,
however, with only minor revisions, they were approved
by the committee and by Congress and signed into law
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on November 28, 1975.
The new law was very much in accord with the needs
of the farmers and industry. m the self-certification
provision the farmers had received a legislative change
for which they had hoped but had been afraid to ask.
The law included virtually nothing that the environ-
mentalists had wanted except a simple provision for the
providing of IPM educational materials to those who were
interested. it also included no provisions aimed at
correcting the problems noted by the GAO. Thus in
writing a law for industry and the farmers. Congress
had almost completely ignored the input of the environ-
mentalists and of its own GAO. As a basis for stringent
EPA regulation, the law had been weakened. A brief
outline will illustrate this point.
A primary provision of the revised law required the
EPA Administrator to perform economic analyses and to
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consult With the Secretary of Agriculture. Xn aeter.i„i„.
Whether to begin the process of suspending, cancelling or
Changing the classification of a registered pesticide the
Administrator was required to consider the effect of the
proposed action on the production and prices of agri-
cultural commodities, retail food prices, and otherwise
on the agricultural economy, if he decided to take action
to cancel, suspend or change a classification he was re-
quired to inform the Secretary of Agriculture of his in-
tent and to provide the Secretary with an analysis of the
impact the action would have on the agricultural economy.
The Secretary had to be informed and given a copy of the
economic analysis at least 60 days prior to the Adminis-
trator's planned action. The Secretary then had 30 days
in which to respond. The Administrator was required to
publish in the Federal Register: the original notice of
intent to cancel, suspend or change a classification;
the comments of the Secretary and the response of the
Administrator to the Secretary's comments. Not only was
an economic analysis required at the beginning of the
cancellation, suspension or reclassification process,
the law also specified that in taking any final action to
cancel or change the classification of a pesticide, the
economic impact of that action must be analyzed and
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published in the Federal Register
The legislation also provided that if the Adminis-
trator determined that suspension of a pesticide regis-
tration was necessary to prevent an inoninent hazard to
human health, he could waive the requirement of notice
to and consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture.
He could not waive the requirement if there existed only
an imminent hazard to the environment. Thus that portion
of the 1972 law which had provided for a quick sus-
pension process to deal with any "imminent hazard" was
now restricted to imminent hazards to human health.'''
The law also provided that all proposed and final
EPA pesticide regulations be submitted to the Secretary
of Agriculture for comment. The proposed or final reg-
ulation, the Secretary's comments and the Agency's reply
were then to be printed in the Federal Register. Pro-
posed and final regulations were also to be submitted to
the Agriculture Committees of Congress .
"'"'^
The new requirements for consultation with the
Secretary of Agriculture were the result of an original
proposal which would have given the Secretary the
authority to veto cancellation and suspension decisions
and new regulations made by the Administrator. This
proposal, introduced by Congressmen Poage and Wampler,
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had to be voted down once in coz^ittee and twice on the
floor Of the House, and the first House vote was
surprisingly close (167-175). if the measure had passed,
the authority of the Administrator to regulate pesti-
cides would have been almost completely undermined.'''
Another major change gave the farmers what they had
asked for concerning the training of private applicators
Of restricted use pesticides. The Congress charged the
law so that the EPA could not require that the States
make the taking of an examination a requirement for
private applicator certification. The certification
standard for a private applicator was to be deemed ful-
filled by his completing a certification form. The
Administrator was permitted to include a requirement
that this form contain an affirmation that the private
applicator had completed an approved training program,
so long as the program did not require the applicator to
take any examination to establish competency in the use
of a pesticide. If the individual States wanted to
require private applicators to take an examination they
could do so, but the EPA could not disapprove a State
Plan for the certification of private applicators be-
cause it lacked a requirement that a test be taken.
Thus a federal requirement for the testing of private
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applicators was precluded by law/"
^^ost all of the
States had been against the requirement for testing, so
™ost private applicators of restricted pesticides through-
out the country would be able to use these chemicals
without ever having passed a test to establish their
competence. m short, the farmers had gotten through
legislation what they had asked Congress to give them
through instructions to the EPA.
The 1975 law also set up a Scientific Advisory
Panel (SAP) consisting of seven members. The adminis-
trator was required to submit planned suspensions,
cancellations and reclassifications, and proposed and
final regulations to the panel for comment as to the
impact of the proposed action on health and the environ-
ment. The comments of the panel and the Adminis-
trator's reply were to be published in the Federal
Register. The same time requirements as provided
for the Administrator to inform the Secretary of Agri-
culture of these types of actions, and for the Sec-
retary to respond, applied to the Advisory Panel. in a
similar manner, if suspension was necessary in order to
prevent an imminent hazard to human health (but not to
the environment) the requirement for solicitation of the
126panel s comments was waived.
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The law did contain what appears to be a nod to
the environmentalists. it provided that in developing
the standards for the certification of applicators of
restricted pesticides, provisions should be included for
making instructional materials concerning ipm available
to interested individuals at their request. it also
required that these people be notified of the availability
of this material. The law specified, however, that
applicator certification standards could not require
that any individual receive instruction concerning IPM
techniques or be shown to be competent with respect to
their use."*-^^
The law also extended certain deadlines. The
deadlines for reregistration and reclassification of
pesticides registered under the pre-1972 FIFRA was
extended for one year to October 1977 as was the final
date for certifying applicators. The States were
given an extra year to submit plans for the certification
of applicators and any requirement that a pesticide be
registered for use only by a certified applicator was
put off for one year until October 1977. The deadline
for all regulations to be established under the law
was extended one year to October 1977. -"-^^
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Finally several other changes included: revised
rules for the handling of compensation for the use of
industry generated pesticide safety test data, a change
in the definition of "pesticide," and slightly revised
procedures concerning the issuing of experimental use
permits and emergency exemptions from the regulations
governing the use of pesticides
The basic thrust of the 1975 legislation was to
weaken FIFRA as a means of providing environmental pro-
tection. The law had been weakened in two ways. First
the provision for self-certification of applicators
allowed applicators of restricted pesticides to be
certified without ever passing a test to demonstrate
competence. Second, the combined effect of provisions
for consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture,
economic analyses, consultation with a Science Advisory
Panel, and informing the Agriculture committees about
rules was to make an already complicated law and
administrative process even more complicated. As
Congressman Brown of California noted in debate on
the House floor.
Despite the protestations of every member of
this House that we want a simple, economical
administration, we have put into this bill the
most complicated system of mandatory consultation
at every step of the regulatory process that can
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be imagined, which will =>^^ •
the time and the cos^ fh ^"I^^f^^^^bly to both
activities. ^ ^^^^ regulatory
it iTlL bfl??Ur' P--P°- Of putting
^^^1^ Some Critical Report.^ and
A Vetoed Veto
A restrained and disorganized EPA . By late 1975
Administrator Train was appealing to the 0MB for the
restoration of funds and positions which had been re-
duced in^OMB's revision of the budget for the entire
Agency. The Agency's budget problems, the fact that
Congress had recently weakened FIFRA, and the close
Congressional vote on the proposal to give the Secre-
tary of Agriculture veto power apparently weakened the
resolve of senior EPA officials. By 1976 the Agency had
become noticably more restrained, not only in the regu-
lation of pesticides but in other areas of regulation.
The Agency's restraint led to protest from its own
personnel. In February 1976, three of its pesticide
lawyers resigned in protest over its failure to take
effective action under its existing authority. The
lawyers felt that the Agency was clearly backing away
from a rigorous enforcement attitude. Some of the
particular actions protested were the removal of
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significant decision-making authority from the legal
staff and the institution of a costly and time con-
suming means of deciding whether or not to initiate
cancellation actions against pesticides suspected of
causing harm. This process, called the "Rebuttable
Presumption Against Registration" (or RPar) process,
was a very complicated administrative procedure which,
they felt, was designed to slow down the regulatory
132process
.
Two months later five EPA employees testified at
a Senate Subcommittee on Health hearing. They com-
plained about the Agency's failure to take action
against dangerous chemicals, its poor organization and
inadequate resources, and its failure to carefully
examine health and safety test data submitted for the
purpose of registering chemicals . -^^^
The Agency's restraint was examined in hearings held
in April 1976 by Congressman John E. Moss's Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigation. Congressman Moss noted
that: "In recent months a number of EPA decisions
betray a degree of restraint seemingly uncharacteristic
of an agency fully committed to an aggressive pursuit
of its statutory mandate to protect the public
134health. The Congressman suggested that the source
of this restraint might be executive branch pressure.
The year 1976 was marked by a legislative attempt
to modify FIFRA which was vetoed by President Ford, and
numerous hearings and governmental reports. Hearings
were held by: the House Subcormnittee on Conservation
Energy and Natural Resources of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations; the Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural
Research and General Legislation of the Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry; and the House Committee on
Agriculture. 137 The Senate Subcommittee on Health of
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Sub-
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Committee on the Judiciary held joint hearings, and the
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce dealt
with pesticides in two different sets of hearings.
A report dealing with pesticides along with other
areas of federal regulation was produced by the House
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and a
thorough report dealing only with pesticide regulation
was prepared by the House Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure
.
"''^^ An extensive GAO report was
produced in December 1975 and a shorter GAO report came
out the following month. "'"'^^ In February 1976 the
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National Academy of Sciences released a fi..« ^i-exeas a ve volume study
on present and alternative pest control technologies/''
Thus much information concerning the federal regu-
lation of pesticides was generated in 1976. The dominant
theme of most of these reports and hearings was that the
EPA's regulation of pesticides was too easy on the pesti-
cide industry and farmers, inadequate to protect public
health, poorly planned and managed, and inadequately
supported in terms of funds and personnel.
The National Academy of Sciences noted that the
pest control enterprise placed a billion pounds of toxic
materials into the environment each year, but it was not
known how much of each compound was used and where. The
Academy suggested that surveys of pesticide use be in-
creased and methodologies improved. "^"^^ It was also
pointed out that because insect resistance to insecticides
was growing, more attention should be paid by concerned
agencies to the development of alternative means of
pest control including integrated control strategies .
^"^^
The testimony of hearing witnesses criticized
Agency decisions to permit residues of what they con-
sidered dangerous pesticides to be left on food.""""^' The
use of risk - benefits analysis in making pesticide
registration decisions was criticized in the report of
149
the subcor^ittee on Oversight and Investigation. The
report also pointed out that the Agency's risk - benefit
calculations failed to take into account the costs of
cancer and the environmental degradation caused by145
pesticides.
A central focus of criticism was EPa-s management of
xts pesticide regulatory effort. Testimony indicating
poor organization and morale was presented in the Sub-
committee on Health hearings.''' a Senate hearing
investigating the kepone poisoning of pesticide pro-
duction plant workers uncovered inefficiency in the flow
Of data between the Agency and other agencies regulating
toxic chemicals. However the central management
problem was one which has persisted to the present day.
It concerned the EPA's handling of registration data,
under the 1972 FIFRA the Agency was required to promulgate
regulations providing for the registration and classifi-
cation of pesticides. The Act required that these regu-
lations be promulgated within two years, that is by
October 1974.148 r^^^ regulations were finalized ten
months late in August 1975. Thereafter all pesticides
would be registered under these new regulations. Under
these rules, manufacturers wishing to register a new
pesticide were required to submit to the Agency a fairly
150
extensive amount of test data concerning its efficacy,
its effects on the environment, and its effects on human
health. The types of tests which were required were
described in guidelines and the responsibility for con-
ducting these extensive and costly tests was assigned to
the manufacturer. He could perform the tests himself
or he could pay an independent laboratory to perform
the tests for him. Many manufacturers had a laboratory
do their testing.
The intent of FIFRA and the rules implementing it
was that the Agency would examine the test data which had
been submitted along with the application for a new
registration. if the data indicated that there was
little possibility that the chemical could have "un-
reasonable adverse effects" it would be registered. if
the chemical was found to have an unreasonable adverse
effect (that is, the costs of its use outweighed the
benefits) the application for registration would be
150
denied.
When the EPA became responsible for pesticides, it
inherited responsibility for thousands of chemicals which
had been registered with the Department of Agriculture
under less stringent regulations. The law required that
these and all pesticides registered before the effective
151
date Of the August 1975 regulations be reregistered on
the basis Of the new, raore stringent regulations. The
deadline established in the law for the completion of
this task, was October 1976.''' This deadline was ex-
tended to October 1977 by the 1975 revision to FIFRA.'"
The reregistration task was tremendous, the total
number of products in need of rereai<!t,-;>H-i^r, k •j^co registrat on being about
35,000. The extensive data supporting each of these
thousands of old pesticide registrations had to be care-
fully screened to see what tests would be needed to
conform to the new, more extensive data requirements and
to determine what tests would have to be done again
with newer, more accurate testing methods. This task
would have been difficult even if the records transferred
from USDA had been in order, but most of the millions of
documents received from Agriculture were unsorted.
It became increasingly apparent in 1976 that the
pesticide registration and reregistration effort was not
going well. The December 1975 GAO study noted that
registrants had not submitted required studies for many
registered pesticides. It also noted that the Agency
was not requiring the full range of data to support
registration because of limited staff and time. Data
not required included mutagenicity and environmental
chemistry studies. Becauc,^.cause of these and other problems
related to the administration of Pipp^ ^he report con-
eluded that " ,v
•
• .
the American consumer has not been
adequately protected from the potential hazards of
pesticide use
. . .
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Testimony of an EPA employee in April 1976 indi-
cated that the pressure to meet the reregistration
deadline was inhibiting a comprehensive evaluation of
safety. The reregistration process was like an assembly
line in which one felt that^under pressure there was not
time to ask many questions.''' This was confirmed by the
report of the Subcormnittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure in December 1976 which concluded that a de-
cision had been made within EPA that in reregistering
pesticides, the applicable test data would merely be
catalogued, and not checked for validity. if test data
was missing, the registrant was to be informed of what
data was needed and given an opportunity to submit it.
If all data was present the product was reregistered.
There was taking place no check of the quality of the
test data underlying reregistrations
. The report main-
tained that much of this data was poor in quality.''^
A report prepared in 1976 by a consultant to the EPA
looked at the quality of lab tests submitted to the
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Agency on 23 pesticides. The reviewer concluded that
most Of the data was bad and that perhaps one study was
satisfactory. ah this demonstrated that, at best,
the pesticide industry had not been submitting very
high quality data and that, consequently, much of the
data on which pesticides were registered (and thus
assumed to be safe) was poor in quality. The system of
registration was not providing the measure of safety
it was designed to provide and which it had appeared to
provide. In Senate hearings during 1976, Administrator
Train admitted in answering a question asked by Senator
Kennedy, that it was not known whether or not those
pesticides which had been approved were really safe.^^^
The Senate Subcommittee Report noted that the Agency
had insufficient resources to carry out reregistration
but faulted it for not telling Congress about the problem.
As early as 1973 the Registration Division of the Office
of Pesticide Programs had asked for 100 extra people to
complete reregistration, but the request was disapproved
by the 0MB. In the budget review for fiscal 1975 it was
decided that only 15 or 20 extra people would be
159
assigned. The net effect of the problems noted in
the report was "... the probability that many of these
pesticide products now on the market would be found to be
154
unsafe if EPA regulated pesticides the way it is required
to under the law.
"
The Agency did start a program to validate data
and another to audit safety test results. It also took
several other steps designed to correct its registration
difficulties but to this date, the registration and re-
registration of pesticides remains a problem/"
The essence of the reports and hearings looking at
pesticides in 1976 can be summarized in the conclusion
Of a House subcommittee report:
f^n?nA i""
its regulation of pesticides, EPA isaili g to perform its mandate to protect thepublic. EPA's developing pesticide program Lincreasingly solicitous of the pesticidi industryat the expense of the public health and well-
^ho""^*
is EPA' s job to protect and enhancet e quality of the environment. its permissive
regulation of pesticides threatens, instead, todegrade environmental quality.
A presidential veto. Thus the overwhelming tendency of
the reports and testimony in hearings in 1976 was to
support the assumption that in its regulation of pesti-
cides, the EPA was too easy on the industry. There was,
however, one exception to this tendency. The House
Committee on Agriculture provided strong criticism of
the Agency for being too stringent. The funding
authorization for FIFRA was going to terminate on
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March 31, 1977 so the Co^nittee held a short hearing in
April 1976 With the intention of extending the authori-
zation for six months. ,it was planned that possible
revisions to the law would be considered in more ex-
tensive hearings to be held at a later date.) The April
hearing focused merely on the extension of the authori-
zation and provided a forum in which Congressmen criti-
cized the Agency for: its policy on mirex, a chemical
used to control the fire ant; its regulation of 2,4,5T,
and its decision the previous year to ban the chemicals
heptachor and chlordane.^" One legislator also criti-
cized Deputy Assistant Administrator John Quarles for a
speech he had recently made in which he had noted that
American business had resources for lobbying superior to
164those of public interest groups.
The hearing produced a bill authorizing a six month
extension of FIFRA. No other changes in the basic legis-
lation were included. in the Committee's markup session
Congressman Dawson Mathis proposed an amendment to pro-
vide that no regulation under FIFRA issued by the EPA be
effective if either the House of Representatives or the
Senate voted to reject it. This "legislative veto"
amendment was defeated in the Committee 18 to 16.
"""^^
When the legislation came up on the House floor in
156
August, congressman Mathis again offered his a^end^ent
After floor debate in which Congressman Eckhardt pointed
out that such a measure would favor those who can afford
to maintain lobby groups in Washington, the measure passed
by a vote of 347 to 33. Two days later it passed the
senate without debate. on August 13, the President
vetoed the bill stating that it was unconstitutional
because
:
1. It was contrary to the general principle of
separation of power whereby Congress enacts
laws but the President and the agencies of
government execute them.
2. It violated Article I, section 7 of the
Constitution which requires that resolutions
having the force of law be sent to the Presi-
168dent for his signature or veto.
The President noted that the Congress had been con-
sidering bills of this kind in increasing number and
expressed the hope that it would pass a bill without a
legislative veto provision.
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1977-1978
; FIFRA Revi ^^r^ a^.
More criticism of pesticide l^,^
1978 there continued to be a high level of activity aimed
at generating information about pesticides and their regu-
lation, in addition to the legislative hearings on the
revision of FIFRA, hearings were held by a Senate Agri-
culture subcommittee on the safety of food which con-
tained residues of agricultural chemicals
/"^^
This
subcommittee also held hearings on integrated pest manage-
ment and worker safety in pesticide production
Senator Edward Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health and Scien-
tific Research held hearings which included a look at
pesticide residues in breast milk and a House subcommittee
under Congressman John E. Moss examined pesticide residues
in food. The results of a GAO study which followed up
the earlier GAO report of December 1975 were reported to
173Congressman Moss's subcommittee in testimony. The
study concluded that problems noted in the earlier report
concerning the EPA's regulation of pesticide residues in
food had, for the most part, not been corrected. a
short GAO report in April, 1978 indicated that the EPA
was not properly enforcing the requirement of FIFRA that
it notify foreign governments when a pesticide registration
158
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was cancelled.
A lengthy GAO report produced in January 1978
focused on special pesticide registration, that is, regis-
tration under those sections of fifra which allow for:
1. "Experimental Use Permits" which authorize the
use of an unregistered pesticide under con-
trolled conditions in order to acquire test
data needed to register it.
2. "Emergency Exemptions" which are granted to
state and federal agencies in order to meet
emergency conditions such as the uncontrolled
outbreak of a pest. An emergency exemption
allows the federal or state agency to use an
unregistered pesticide or a registered pesti-
cide for a use for which it is not normally
registered.
3. State registrations. Under certain circum-
stances the states were permitted to register
pesticides for special local needs. These
registrations could be disapproved by the
176
EPA.
The report concluded that all three programs were
poorly administered and described many deficiencies.
For example it was found that the Agency took too long
159
to process applications for experimental use permits and
emergency exemptions and that emergency exemption re-
quests were often approved for use in non-emergency
situations. it was reported that states had misused
their registration authority by registering ingredients
that the EPA had previously suspended or cancelled and
by registering pesticides that the Agency had ordered
them not to register because of unreasonable adverse
effects or the lack of safety or efficacy data.^^^
In late 1977 the National Academy of Sciences
released a report titled Pesticide Decision Making
The report, which was part of a series of reports done
for the EPA, focused in particular on the Agency's
scientific strengths and weaknesses. Its main theme was
that more and better science was needed. it called for
more scientists in top level positions and better coordi-
nation of research. A number of administrative changes
were recommended, many of them having to do with infor-
mation management. Finally it suggested a number of
changes concerning the making of decisions and the
accumulation of information on which decisions were
based. It recommended more cooperation with the USDA
and argued that some scientific studies required by the
Agency were not always necessary. It also suggested that
160
the National Pesticide Monitoring Program, which monitors
the levels of chemical residues in the environment, should
be better led and coordinated by the EPa/'' epa admin-
istrator Douglas Costle reacted quickly to the report by
beginning immediately the development of a plan to imple-
^ 180ment its recommendations.
FIFRA revised. Bv 1977 stai-*= r^-F^-; ^-i i , .y x:7//, rate officials were asking for
181more authority to regulate pesticides. This and
several other issues shaped the discussion of fifra re-
vision. The most important of these issues, by far, was
the problem of reregistration and many were calling for
legislative action to resolve this problem. The report
by Senator Kennedy's subcommittee had slowed down an
already slow process because now, instead of just checking
for the presence of pesticide testing data, reviewers
were having to check the data for validity. Furthermore,
by 1977 a substantial number of disagreements had arisen
concerning the use of one manufacturer's safety testing
data by another. Under the law a company wishing to
register a pesticide could either do all of the required
testing itself or, if another company had already regis-
tered the same chemical, refer to the data of that company
and pay it reasonable compensation for the use of its
161
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data. However that data which was defined as a "trade
secret" could not be considered by the EPA in support of
another company's registration unless permission to do so
was given by the data originator The problem was that
Congress had not clearly defined the term "trade secret."
Thus some data developers were claiming that all of their
health and safety data were trade secrets. By June 1977,
fifteen plaintiffs had filed suit in federal courts to
prevent the EPA from disclosing data which the companies
claimed were trade secrets.''' Because of this logjam of
litigation, the need to carefully check the validity of
data, and EPA mismanagement, the reregistration process
was at a standstill and both farmers and industry looked
to Congress to get the process moving.
Legislation to reauthorize funding for FIFRA and to
make a number of changes to the law was examined in
hearings in 1977. a bill passed the Senate in July
and a different bill passed the House in October.
"^'^
The House bill included, again, a provision for legis-
lative veto of EPA rules which was added on the House
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floor. The conferees could not agree and did not reach
agreement until July 1978 after they had met eight times.
The conference bill, which deleted the legislative veto,
was passed and became law the following September.
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AS a basis for regulation which would protect public
health and the environment while allowing for a reasonable
level Of agricultural activity, the law was weakened.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the new law
was the^provision for conditional registration of pesti-
cides. This meant that new pesticides and new uses of
already registered pesticides could be registered by the
Agency if some of the data which had been required to
support registration was missing. The missing data would
have to be submitted to the Agency within a reasonable
period of time. The Agency argued that conditional regis-
tration would not permit the use of unsafe chemicals.
Environmentalists argued against conditional registration
claiming that the completion of all tests was the only way
to ensure that a substance was safe.^^^ m the debate
on the passage of the legislation Congressman John Moss
argued strongly against conditional registration. Moss
claimed that allowing it might permit the sale of unsafe
pesticides which would leave harmful residues on food.
Pesticide residues on food was a subject under the juris-
diction of Moss's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gation so the Congressman tried to have FIFRA referred to
his subcommittee, but the subcommittee never reviewed the
190
law.
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The other main aspect of the bill which weakened it
was its assignment of primary enforcement responsibility
for pesticide use violations to the states/'^ Henceforth
the EPA would continue such activities as approving or
disapproving application for registration of pesticides
and setting tolerances for the maximum allowable pesti-
cide residues on food, but the states would have primary
responsibility for such use violations as the use of an
unregistered pesticide or the use of a restricted pesti-
cide by someone who was not a certified applicator. The
assignment of responsibility to the states had to be
approved by the Administrator who was required to de-
termine that the laws, regulations and procedures of each
state were adequate. Assignment of primary enforcement
responsibility to the states was sure to lead to less
stringent regulation. In their hearing testimony state
officials have usually advocated less stringent regu-
lation and have often referred to, what they consider,
the EPA's excessive degree of regulation .
"^^^
Continuing the trend begun in 1975, the Congress
also added a number of minor changes to the law which
tended to make the Agency's job more difficult. If looked
at individually these changes were not particularly
significant, but when considered with the 1975 amendments
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and in the context of an already very complex law, the
Changes tended to add considerably to the Agency's worK
burden. Thus the Administrator was not permitted to
begin pre-cancellation proceedings unless a validated
test indicated possible harmful effects/" m forming
regulations the Agency was directed to consider the
effects Of the regulations on producion and prices."'
Before cancelling a pesticide the Administrator was re-
quired to consider restricting its use as an alternative to
cancellation. Finally, he was required to solicit from
the Agency's Science Advisory Panel guidelines for im-
proving the Agency's scientific analyses."^
Although the law was weakened, the movement was not
completely in that direction: For example the statute
clarified the point that experimental use permits could
only be issued if needed to accumulate information re-
quired to support registration. a provision relating
to trade secrets made it easier for the public to inspect
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safety data. Another provision was designed to ensure
that the foreign purchaser of an unregistered pesticide
understood that the chemical was not registered for use
1 an
in the United States.
A number of other changes had little to do with
stringency of regulation and pertained to administrative
-tters. Changes were
.ade which facilitated a new
syste. of^pesticide registration called generic regis-
tration. The Agency hoped that this system would
help it to Clear up its backlog of registrations.
Another change allowed the Agency to waive testing re-
quirements pertaining to pesticide efficacy thereby
permitting it to concentrate on h^^n-n ^
201 ealth and environmental
data. The very large problem of compensation by one
manufacturer for the use of another's health and en-
vironmental testing data was addressed by changes in the
law Which altered the standards for compensation and by
a new, more precise definition of trade secrets.
This part of the legislation was the result of much
effort, the problem of compensation for the use of data
having been almost the only topic discussed at the House
hearings in April and June of 1977.^°^
In revising fifra. Congress had paid only slight
attention to the suggestions of the environmental groups.
As has been pointed out, the law was strengthened in
some relatively minor ways but no changes which would
have made it substantially more environmentally oriented
were adopted. Furthermore the change which defined trade
secrets was aimed at least as much at permitting the
Administrator to get on with the registration of pesti-
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cides as it was with meeting the demands of environ-
mentalists that they be allowed to inspect industry
generated safety data. On the controversial issues on
Which industry and far. groups took a strong stand, the
environmentalists consistently lost. For example
conditional registration was approved over their ob-
jections. Furthermore many suggestions made by these
groups Which might have improved the regulation of pesti-
cides were not even seriously considered. Their concerns
never even became issues debated and examined by the
legislators. Some of the ignored recommendations were:
1. Repealing the FIFRA provision requiring that
the government pay an indemnity to owners of
pesticides whose registration was cancelled, if
the government did not allow the sale of ex-
204istmg stocks.
2. Consideration of the testing of so-called
"inert" ingredients in pesticides. These in-
gredients normally have no pesticidal effect
but it has been argued that some may be harmful
205
to humans
.
3. Consideration of swifter ways to revoke the
registration of dangerous pesticides including
ways to expedite the Agency's pre-cancellation
167
screening (or rpar) process and the final
206
cancellation process.
4. Consideration of the establishment of public
testing laboratories to which manufacturers
could submit their products to be tested for
a fee.
5. consideration of steps to more strongly support
the development of Integrated Pest Management
208
technology.
6. Providing a clear directive from the Congress
to the EPA that it should give the highest
priority to the protection of human health and
209
environmental quality.
In revising the law in 1978 Congress weakened it
substantially and strengthened it only slightly. The
movement in the direction of less environmental pro-
tection was marked by an occasional minor victory for
the environmentalists, but the general trend was toward
a weaker law.
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1979-1980 Legislative VP-hn
and jviore Scientific Input
Another change to ftfpa. The legislative authorization
for FIFRA has always been for a relatively short period
of time. It was scheduled to expire in September 1979
so new reauthorizing legislation was needed. Legis-
lation amending FIFRA was passed by the House in 1979,
but because of a disagreement with the Senate, no law
was enacted that year. In 1980 after considerable
efforts an amendment was finally passed.
The most important topics of discussion during
this period were: the requirements for the protection
of test data, stricter state requirements, the spraying of
mirex for control of the fire ant, the legislative veto,
and the question of how much scientific input to FIFRA
was needed.
Disputes continued concerning the compensation of
companies which produced pesticide safety testing data
needed for registration by other companies desiring to
refer to the safety data in order to register their own
identical products. Furthermore there continued to be
disagreement concerning what data was a trade secret.
All this was complicated by the new system of handling
169
em
pesticide registration begun by the EPA. The lawsuits
generated by these problems threatened to significantly
slow down the registration of pesticides.'" An attempt
was made to provide a legislative solution to the probl
of compensation for the use of data, but at the last
minute, the^industry coalition supporting the change
broke down.
California enacted some pesticide regulatory
measures which were stronger than the federal pesticide
requirements. This was an unusual event because state
regulation is, as a rule, weak and very much dominated
by farming interests. The unusual development in Cali-
fornia was accompanied by an unusual ideological shift
on the part of some industry people and legislators
away from an avid state's rights stance. In their
testimony at hearings on FIFRA several industry people
complained about the California regulations and suggested
that Congress review the division of authority between
the state and federal governments, however the legis-
lators did not find the time to become involved with
212
this problem.
In 1979, the full Agriculture Committee added a
provision to the proposed FIFRA amendment which would
have allowed the use of the pesticide mirex to control
170
the fire ant. The registration of mirex had been
cancelled by the EPA because it felt that the risk
presented by this chemical to human health outweighed
the benefits of its use. The proposed legislation was
an attempt by its sponsors to override the risk - benefit
decision making delegated by FIFRA to the EPA. in place
of the Agency's complicated decision making process, which
involved both a political judgment and the consideration
of volumes of scientific data, the Congress would have
made an almost purely political decision. There had been
no hearings held on the subject, so there had been com-
paratively little Congressional discussion of the scien-
tific aspects of the problem. if passed, the mirex
provision would have set a precedent for legislative
intervention in any Agency pesticide decision. The
measure was defeated, but only after an extensive and
sometimes emotional debate on the House floor and the
213threat of an Administration veto. Although it was
defeated, its support by the full House Agriculture
Committee indicated the Committee's willingness to
intervene in EPA risk - benefit decision making on the
side of the farmer and manufacturer and against the
public health.
The problem of scientific input into EPA decisions
171
was extensively discussed. This problem involves two
opposing needs. On the one hand decisions must be
grounded as firmly as possible in an accurate under-
standing of the relevant scientific facts. This supports
the making of fair decisions which are defensible in
court. On the other hand, the protection of public
health and the environment requires timely decisions.
One rarely sees a scientific study related to pesticides
which does not suggest that more studies are needed, but
spending large amounts of time waiting for more studies
to be completed or complying with many complicated pro-
cedural requirements for peer review and consultation
may delay a needed regulatory action. In fact it can be
argued (and it is argued throughout this dissertation)
that one way of weakening the law is to place so many
procedural requirements (both administrative and
scientific) on its administrators that they are able
to accomplish less, given the finite resources of money
and personnel available to them.
In 1980 Congress added two more requirements to the
already complicated FIFRA regulatory mechanism. The
event that precipitated this action was the suspension
of the herbicide 2,4,5T in February 1979 after an epi-
demiological study indicated that 2,4,5T might be the
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cause of miscarriages
. Congressman William C.
Wampler argued that the Agency's decision was based on
a poor study and should have been reviewed by a panel
of scientists. The outgrowth of his concern was an
amendment which required that the Agency's Science
Advisory Panel review all suspensions of pesticide regis-
trations after they became effective, and a requirement
that the Administrator provide for peer review of all
major scientific studies conducted under FIFRA.^'"'^
Congressman Wampler had wanted the peer review provision
to apply to "all" scientific studies, however his origi-
nal proposal was modified to meet the objections of some
216
committee members.
The subject of legislative veto again arose. A
provision in the FIFRA reauthorization bill which pro-
vided for a veto by either House of Congress of any EPA
regulation promulgated under FIFRA was approved in the
House Agriculture Committee and passed by the House in
217
1979. Its presence in the bill led to a disagreement
with the Senate which stood firmly against it. It was
not possible to reach an agreement in the House - Senate
Conference and so the authorizing legislation for FIFRA
expired in September 1979. The regulation of pesticides
continued, however, because sufficient funds were
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appropriated. The inability to reach agreement with the
Senate led to the introduction of a new proposed re-
authorization of FIFRA in the House in 1980 which did not
contain a legislative veto provision. This bill was
approved by the full Agriculture committee, but defeated
on the House floor by the advocates of legislative
218
veto. Several days later the same bill passed when a
219legislative veto provision was added. The final bill
included a compromise with the Senate which required that
both Houses (not just one) disapprove regulations. The
compormise also provided for the judicial review of the
220
constitutionality of this provision.
To summarize, the final bill reauthorizing FIFRA
signed by the President in December 1980 contained
provisions for: legislative veto, peer review of major
scientific studies, and Science Advisory Panel review of
pesticide registration suspensions. The bill authorized
funds only to September 1981 in accordance with the
Agriculture Committee's wish to authorize only for one
221
year at a time. On signing the bill the President
noted his opinion that the legislative veto provision was
unconstitutional. He further stated that the executive
branch would not consider an expression of disapproval
222
under this provision to be legally binding.
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Again the amendment to FIFRA and the House and
Senate Agriculture Committee hearings preceding its
passage paid little attention to much useful information
generated in reports and in other congressional com-
mittees. This information indicated that the EPA was
doing a less than satisfactory job of protecting the
public health. Three GAO reports had uncovered major
problems in: the export of pesticides, the examination
of domestic meat and imported foods for illegal pesticide
residues, the registration of pesticides, decision-
making on hazardous chemicals, and the use of laboratory
inspection results. Hearings held by a subcommittee
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
had uncovered serious problems concerning the pesticide
exposure of farmworkers, the exposure of residents of
rural communities to pesticide spray drift from nearby
fields, and the adverse health effects resulting from
224
this exposure.
FIFRA in 1980
.
In summary pesticide regulation from
1910 to 1980 has moved from an area of almost exclusive
concern with protection of the farmer consumer from
defective products to a struggle between environmental
interests on the one hand, and farm and pesticide manu-
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facturing interests on the other. The turning points
in this policy evolution were in 1970 when the EPA took
over administration of FIFRA from the USDA and in 1972
with the passage of the new FIFRA. These events were
preceded by years of reports, hearings and books de-
scribing the harmful affects of pesticides.
The USDA had been an organization primarily organ-
ized to support its farmer constituents who had little
interest in stringent pesticide regulation. Consequently
it was not surprising that it provided a much less than
enthusiastic regulatory effort. The EPA was an organ-
ization devoted primarily to environmental protection,
but this orientation was severely inhibited by the many
technical pesticide experts within the Agency who had
been transferred there from Agriculture, and by Congress.
While the environmentally oriented Agency had be-
come the primary regulator of pesticides, the farmer
oriented Agriculture committees of Congress had retained
primary control over FIFRA. These committees had
weakened the proposed 1972 FIFRA, successfully supported
weakening amendments in 1975, 1978, and 1980, and
exerted constant Congressional pressure on the EPA.
This pressure was facilitated by authorizing money for
relatively short periods of time, thus assuring that
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Agency officials would have to frequently justify thei:
actions in hearings.
The law had been weakened both by passage of specifi
provisions, such as conditional registration or giving
the states primary enforcement responsibility for use
violations, and by adding many complicating procedural
requirements to an already very complicated piece of
legislation. Some small environmental tokens, such as
the provision of IPM educational materials, were also
included in the revisions.
The law as it has evolved up to 1980 does contain,
with all its weaknesses, a criterion and a structure for
removing at least the most harmful pesticides from use.
A more environmentally oriented and efficient EPA might
have provided more stringent regulation utilizing this
structure, but without provisions, such as establishing
pest control districts, aimed at reducing the overall use
of pesticides, FIFRA can (even with the best adminis-
225tration) provide only limited environmental protection.
This complicated legal structure permits the removal from
commerce of only a few harmful chemicals at a time.
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dangerous chemicals would be a "use by permit only"
classification of pesticides.
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CHAPTER IV
CONGRESS AND THE REGULATION OF PESTICIDES
Depoliticizinq FIFRA
The last chapter has pointed out that the probl
of pesticides was one of the basic issues on which the
new environmental movement was based. Why is it no
longer one of the more important environmental issues?
Certainly of importance is the fact that some of the
most harmful chemicals have been banned or severely
restricted in the uses which are authorized. Further-
more, although public interest in the environment
remains high, many would argue that it is not as ex-
tensive or intense as it was ten years ago. Of signifi
cant importance, however, was the passage of the 1972
revision of FIFRA. The pressures which began in 1962
with Rachel Carson's book and continued in the several
reports and hearings and in a growing, strong, environ-
mental movement had demanded a politically significant
move on pesticides. This resulted in the 1972 legis-
lation. The wording of the law and the EPA's early
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banning of a few chemicals under its authority led many
to conclude that the pesticide problem had been resolved.
It was time to move on to other issues such as toxic
substances control and hazardous waste regulation.
Meanwhile the House Agriculture Committee, a
committee which one of its members has described to
the writer as stacked with people who are pro-agriculture
producers, maintained control over the authorization
and oversight of FIFRA, a law which was now too environ-
mentally oriented, as far as most of the committee was
concerned, and which the EPA enforced too enthus-
iastically. The task for the Agriculture Committee was
to do something about this situation without igniting
the flame of public interest which had supported the
passage of the 1972 FIFRA. An attempt to repeal FIFRA
or transfer regulatory authority back to the USDA would
have risked presenting the environmentalists with a clear
issue which, the past had indicated, would probably have
constituted a strong focal point for grass roots
activity and which, therefore, would never pass Congress.
Thus the committee needed to weaken FIFRA without
calling attention to the fact that it was being weakened.
This chapter will argue that the committee has done this
by attempting to depoliticize
, as far as possible its
198
revision and oversight of fifra. Considering politics
as conflict over the allocation of values, it will be
argued that the conmittee has tried to remove the pesti-
cides issue from the real, of conflict. It has gone about
this in basically two ways:
1. By reducing the visibility of the changes made in
FIFRA and
2. To the extent that it has not been able to reduce
the visibility of change, by providing a fairly
consistent set of explanations for its actions.
The visibility of change has been reduced by making
many small changes in the law rather than a few large
ones, by constructing many of these changes so that
the law has been made needlessly complex, and by
weakening the law by interfering with efforts to
enforce it. The most important explanation the
committee members have tended to provide centers on
the concept of rationality. Changes in the law are
rarely described as value choices, the implications
of which will affect one group at the expense of
another, they are "rational" procedures designed to
increase the scientific quality of the regulatory
process. These types of explanation tend to make
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changes seem less political in nature and more neutral
and thus they tend to remove the issue from conflict.
All this will be explained and criticized in the
following pages, but first some background information
will be provided. We will describe the primary partici-
pants in the legislative revision process. These in-
clude: the producers of pesticides, the primary users
of the chemicals, the promoters of agriculture, the
EPA, the USDA, the General Accounting Office, industries
adversely affected by pesticides (such as fisheries or
bee keeping) and the public interest groups. The
relative influence of these groups will be explained.
After this the role of public opinion will be described.
Then we will examine the relative influence of the
several congressional committees which deal with pesti-
cides. This description will include an explanation
of the attitudes of the House Agriculture Committee,
the committee which exerts the most control over FIFRA.
This committee exerts so much influence that most of
this chapter will focus on it. When the committee
being referred to is not specifically named, the ref-
erence is to the House Agriculture Committee.
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The Participants
The producers and the users
. The congressional politics
of pesticides involves the interaction of a number of
groups. First there are the pesticide manufacturers
represented as individual companies, and in associations
The most important association is the National Agri-
cultural Chemicals Association (NACA)
, followed by the
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association, the
Pesticide Formulators Association, and the United
Pesticide Formulators and Distributors Association. The
manufacturers are very influential in the shaping of
pesticide policy. They realize that some form of regu-
lation is politically inevitable, but they support less
stringent enforcement of FIFRA and revisions to the law
which tend to weaken it.
Second are the several different types of users
of pesticide products. The most important users are
farmers, represented by such groups as the American
Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange, and many
organizations devoted to the promotion of a single crop,
such as the National Cotton Council of America and the
Minnesota Soybean Growers Association. Then there are
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groups which provide pest control services for far„,ers
such as the National Agricultural Aviation Association.
Also there are nursery users, forest product users,
and florists, each represented by their own associ-
ations. Finally, the pest exterminating companies
are represented by their association, the National
Pest Control Association, and by individual companies
such as Orkin Exterminating and Terminex International
Inc
.
The users have an interest in maintaining a wide
variety of chemicals for pest control with as few
restrictions on the applicator as possible. They are,
for the most part, unconcerned about the potential
adverse effects of pesticides, and therefore they almost
always support the goals of the chemical companies. The
attitudes of most users seem to coincide with that of
farmers (by far the largest users). A survey of Yakima
County, Washington farmers in 1975 indicated that
farmers highly favor the use of pesticides in agri-
culture and are not concerned with the possible negative
consequences of pesticide use."^ The two variables most
closely correlated with these attitudes were gross farm
income and the source of total net income. As gross
farm income increased, favorable attitudes increased.
while concern over negative consequences decreased.
Those earning more of their net income outside farming
favored the use of pesticides less than those whose
major source of income was farming. Farmers earning
the major percentage of their net income outside agri-
culture were found to be more concerned with the dangers
of using pesticides.
Friends of the farmer. Next there are the promoters of
agriculture. These groups tend to advocate less strin-
gent regulation as a means of ensuring high agricultural
productivity. They include: the USDA which almost
always testifies at FIFRA hearings; various state de-
partments of agriculture; the National Association of
State Departments of Agriculture; the Association of
American Pesticide Control Officials; individual ex-
perts from the Land-Grant Colleges, such as plant
pathologists and entomologists; the American Registry
of Professional Entomologists; the Entomological
Society of America; the State Cooperative Extension
Services; the buyers and processors of crops, such as
the National Canners Association; and at least two
organizations, the Agricultural Research Institute
(ARI) and the Council for Agricultural Science and
Technology (CAST) , which provide information on this
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and other issues and which receive a substantial pro-
portion of their support from industry.^
The pesticide manufacturers, the user groups, and
the promoters of agriculture all generate pressure
exerted toward more lenient regulation. They are so
similar in their positions that for convenience when
discussing the political forces influencing policy, the
term "industry" will normally be used to refer to this
complex of groups. This is more convenient than re-
ferring to a manufacturer-user group-promoter of agri-
culture complex. When referring only to the pesticide
manufacturers a term other than "industry", such as
producers or manufacturers, will be used if the meaning
is not clear in the context.
Other participants
.
EPA officials testify at almost all
FIFRA related hearings. Not infrequently a General
Accounting Office spokesman outlines the results of an
investigation. Occasionally there are representatives
from an industry which is particularly vulnerable to the
unwise use of pesticides, for example the producers of
honey. These types of industries are not, however,
frequent participants in the proceedings.
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The public interest groups
. Finally, there are the
public interest groups. The most active public interest
groups concerned with pesticide regulation on a national
scale have been: the National Audobon Society, Friends
of the Earth, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Rachel Carson Council and the Environmental Defense
Fund. until recently the Environmental Defense Fund was
probably the most active of these, but it has now shifted
its attention to other environmental matters. other
groups which have dealt with the issue, but less con-
sistently, include the Sierra Club, the National Wild-
life Federation, Rural America and the Public Citizens
Health Research Group. More stringent regulation is
also advocated by groups representing farm laborers,
such as the United Farm Workers and the Migrant Legal
Action Program. There are also many state and local
groups around the country which focus attention at
those levels.
The chief strength of the public interest groups
lies in public opinion. The chief weaknesses arise
from lack of money and the consequent inability to hire
people and mobilize resources in order to organize and
disseminate political and technical information.
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Resources, information and the quality nf
vironmental issues usually involve a great deal of
technical information. Keeping up with this information
is a full time occupation and a lack of money means that
the environmental groups can hire fewer people to keep
informed and present useful testimony.^ Environmental-
ists are spread so thin that sometimes they do not even
testify at hearings or public meetings concerned with
pesticide regulation. For example at the Senate Hearings
on FIFRA in 1977, the National Wildlife Federation sub-
mitted its testimony by letter because time constraints
4prevented its representative from attending. At a
public meeting held by an EPA panel in October 198 0 to
discuss rules for testing biorational pesticides, there
was heavy participation by industry, but no questions or
comments by members of environmental or public interest
5
groups. Furthermore, when environmentalists do testify
the quality of the testimony is often not as good as that
of industry. It tends to be shorter and to miss im-
portant facets of the issue. For example in the House
hearings on FIFRA held in April and June 1977, the EDF
and National Audobon Society presented no position on
"registrations for minor use" an important topic dis-
6
cussed at the hearings. In general there is no
2comprehensive effort to thoroughly analyze each impor-
tant topic discussed at the hearings.
All this does not seem to be the result of lack of
effort. It is because there are too few environ-
mentalists trying to do too much with too few resources.
The lack of scientific resources is particularly evident
The industry has a strong scientific infrastructure. it
supports many scientists who do research and it has many
lobbyists who are skilled at transmitting the results
of this research to Congress and describing research
results in the most favorable light. The environ-
mentalists are very limited in their ability to support
research. Environmentally oriented research does go
on in universities, foundations, and government agencies
but the environmentalists do not have the resources to
thoroughly analyze this research and present the re-
sults to legislators and administrative decision-makers
7
in a systematic, rigorous manner. While the industry
often summons experts to support its point of view, it
is a rare event when the environmentalists can present
a scientist to testify. (This question of scientific
input to FIFRA will be more extensively dealt with in
a later chapter)
.
Having said all this, the quality of the environ-
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one con-
mentalists testimony is surprisingly good when
siders the amount of people working on the issue, however
it does not compare favorably to that of industry.
Although there are sometimes exceptions, the environ-
mentalists generally have not had the initiative in
pesticide policymaking. They have tended more to comment
on the issues brought up by others rather than to set
forth issues themselves. When they have tried to create
issues, such as repeal of the indemnity provision of
FIFRA, legislators tend to politely ignore them.
One reason that they are ignored is that they are
greatly outnumbered. A description of those testifying
or submitting correspondence which was included in the
record of three House Agriculture Committee hearings
(two in 1977, and one in 1980) provides a good summary
of the alignment of forces. Advocating more environ-
mentally oriented regulation were: seven environmental
organizations, the National Fisheries Institute, Rural
America, and the American Honey Producers Association.
Advocating less stringent regulation were: seven
associations of pesticide producers, twenty-one chemical
companies, eight exterminating companies, fifteen associ-
ations of growers and marketers (such as the American
Farm Bureau Federation and the National Cotton Council
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of America)
,
five groups representing other users of
pesticides (such as the Society of American Florists
and the National Pest Control Association), the National
Canners Association, the National Agricultural Aviation
Association, the Experiment Station Committee on Organi-
zation and Policy, the Agricultural Research Institute,
the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology,
nine agricultural or pest control experts, four state
officials, the State Cooperative Extension Service, a
pest control advisors association, the Association of
American Pesticide Control officials, the National
Association of State Departments of Agriculture, and
the American Registry of Professional Entomologists.
Given this arrangement of forces, and the higher
quality of industry testimony. Agriculture Committee
hearings on FIFRA are generally an industry dominated
event. Industry representatives are confident, self-
assured, well dressed and well informed. At the hearings
which the writer attended most of the first two rows of
seats were occupied by industry people, while the en-
vironmentalists sat further back. The environmentalists
are almost always treated with courtesy by the legis-
lators, but questions asked at the end of testimony are
usually not as numerous as those asked of industry.
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At times, there is an air of condescension as in the
following exchange between Congressman Volkmer and
Linda Billings of the Sierra Club. Volkmer was criti-
cizing the pesticide applicator training program:
volkmer: Ms Billings I am very interested inthis problem. We are trying to train peopleto do something they already know. ^ ^
^
Do you have a degree?
Billings: Yes; I do.
Volkmer: What is that degree in"?
Billings: Political Science.
Volkmer: Do you know how to add and subtract":'Billings: Yes.
Volkmer: If somebody came to you and said thatyou had to go to a course and sit and listenfor three hours to know how to add and sub-tract for you to continue with your employ-
ment, would you think that is silly:'
Billings: I would question whether we are comparingthe right thing here. 9 ^
It is unlikely that an industry representative would
ever be asked if he could add or subtract.
Public opinion
. Public opinion on a national level
concerning the particular issue of pesticides is diffi-
cult to assess. There are, however, several recent
polls which indicate that the public is still interested
in maintaining a clean environment. These polls define
the environment in the broad sense and do not treat the
issue of pesticides in particular. A 1981 New York
Times/CBS News Poll of 1479 voting age Americans indi-
cated that 67 percent of respondents wanted to maintain
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present^environmental laws even at a cost in economic
growth. A recent Harris survey showed that 86 percent
of those interviewed opposed making the Clean Air Act
less strict. a poll conducted in California, the
state with the most stringent pesticide regulations
in the country, did examine attitudes toward pesticides.
It indicated that two-thirds of those questioned be-
lieved that the use of chemical pesticides by California
growers presents a danger to their health. Of this
two-thirds, four-fifths said they were willing to pay
more for fruits and vegetables grown without pesticides
. ''"^
If the feelings of Californians are an indication of
the national attitude, and if the opinions expressed on
the environment in general apply in particular to pesti-
cides, then there is considerable public support for
protection of the environment from the harmful effects
of pesticides.
The problem occurs in translating generalized
beliefs into support for specific policy proposals.
The pesticide issue is an extremely complicated one, not
only politically, but technically. For example bal-
ancing of the costs and benefits of a pesticide's use
involves the consideration of the possible carcino-
genicity of the substance and scientific debates
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concerning what type of evidence is acceptable proof of
carcinogenicity. it is also likely to involve com-
plicated arguments concerning the relation of the chemi-
cal to productivity and the effect on the agricultural
economy of its banning. The scientific debate on any
controversial pesticide quickly becomes so complicated
that it is difficult for even concerned segments of
the public to know what their interests are. Con-
straints of time and the need for specialized knowledge
prevent even the interested, well educated citizen from
being entirely informed about all aspects of the issue.
Thus public input is very indirect and generalized,
taking the form of broadly defined and unspecific value
preferences. It is a latent force which congressmen,
administrators and industry groups try not to arouse
while environmental groups try to mobilize it as much
as possible. Given the demands of this complicated
policy area, most pesticide policy is initiated by
experts, experts in the scientific aspects of the
problem and experts in the political and administrative
aspects. These people devote very much of their time
to the subject and consequently develop enough knowledge
to deal with it competently.
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Committees Involved In Pesticide Reanl.^H on
The agriculture committees
. in the legislative revision
of FIFRA there is little initiative from the Office of
the President. The EPA does make some recommendations
for changes in the law, but most of the initiative is
with Congress,
The primary committees having legislative and over-
sight jurisdiction over FIFRA are the House and Senate
Agriculture committees. ^ Of these the House Committee
takes considerably more interest in FIFRA and is more
familiar with the problems associated with the law. For
this reason this description will focus most on the
House Committee; however the Senate Committee does pay
a substantial amount of attention to pesticide regu-
lation. While the Senate Committee is slightly more
sympathetic to environmental concerns, both committees
pay relatively little attention to the environmental
problems associated with pesticides. They are pri-
marily interested in ensuring that farmers have available
to them as many pesticides as possible with as few re-
strictions as possible. In order to realize these
goals they generally tend to support legislative re-
visions which weaken FIFRA. They also strongly oppose
the vigorous enforcement of the law. Very often when
the EPA takes a strong enforcement action, the cozr^ittees
let their displeasure be known.
interviews with several House Agriculture Committee
congressmen and their staff and examination of the
records of hearings and floor debates from 1972 to 1980
indicate several important attitudes which tend to be
found among committee members. Most important, as has
been said, they are interested in meeting the demands
of their farm constituents for minimum regulation of
pesticides. Farmers are interested primarily in having
an unrestricted supply of as many different pesticides
as possible available to them to meet their crop pro-
tection needs. When the EPA removes a pesticide from
commerce because it is carcinogenic, farmers do not
tend to look on this action as an attempt to protect
their health. They see it as the removal of a product
which they may need in the future to control a pest
against which other chemicals are less effective. When
the EPA began to enforce that section of FIFRA which
required applicators of the more dangerous "restricted"
pesticides to be competent in their use, the farmers
reacted strongly to the Agency's proposal for testing
to determine competence. They did not see testing as
2as
au
a means of ensuring that they or their employees we
not harmed by the misuse of pesticides, they saw it
government interference in their lives and another bure
oratic nuisance to be dealt with. These attitudes make
farmers the allies of the pesticide manufacturers and
the Agriculture Committees are quite sympathetic to
both groups.
The EPA has been far from vigorous or efficient in
its enforcement of FIFRA. On the other hand, it would
be inaccurate to describe it as merely fulfilling a
symbolic function. The Agency does, from time to time,
make a strong enforcement move. This action has earned
for it the strong opposition of the House Agriculture
Committee. Members of the Committee see the EPA's
enforcement of FIFRA as being arbitrary and capricious.
Most committee members do not seem to be as in-
terested in FIFRA as in other pieces of legislation.
The law is extremely complex and the public is not
particularly aware of its existence. Many of those
interviewed wanted to know why the author was interested
in FIFRA. The attitude of most committee members can be
seen in Congressman Findley's characterization of the
law as, "one of the most thankless tasks in the House
14
of Representatives."
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The House committee members and their staff do not
seem to have much understanding of the concerns and
theoretical assumptions which form the basis of the
environmental movement. For example most of those
interviewed could not mention one book on the environ-
ment that they had ever read. Environmentalists are
seen as another interest group participating in the
political process. There is very little understanding
of the environmental perspective as a way of conceptual-
izing and approaching solutions to a number of technical
pollution problems. There are a very few members who
are exceptions to this generalization, Congressman
George Brown of California being the most notable.
Brown has often spoken out against the weakening of
FIFRA.
The Committee is much more supportive of legislation
which tends to weaken FIFRA than is the rest of the
House. Research done in Congress from 1973 to 1978
indicates that a substantial level of political support
for environmental legislation exists and that it has
remained stable and not diminished in the face of eco-
15
nomic problems and energy shortages. However most
congressmen know very little about FIFRA and have little
motivation to try to understand this complex legislation.
Thus, although environmentally oriented legislators do
become involved in the politics of pifra, this law tends
to be the object of comparatively less attention on
their part. This lack of attention and the attitudes
of the Agriculture Committee members have ensured that
the changes to FIFRA from 1972 to 1980 have weakened
the law. The Agriculture Committees have also made it
difficult for the EPA to enforce the law. it has often
been suggested that a primary reason for the weakness
of FIFRA and the poor enforcement of it is that the
Agriculture Committees, rather than committees pri-
marily concerned with protection of public health or
1
6
the environment, have primary jurisdiction.
Other committees. There are several other committees
in Congress which have an interest in pesticides and
which occasionally hold hearings and issue reports
on pesticide regulation. These committees provide a
counter-weight to the Agriculture Committees but this
weight is not sufficient to even approach a balance in
influence. Their interest is often enthusiastic but
it is not consistent and hearings are held irregularly.
As already mentioned, the Subcommittee on the
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Environment of the Senate Co^ittee on Coi^erce provided
a considerable environmentally oriented influence in
framing the 1972 FIFRA. The Subcommittee contributed
an opposing viewpoint to the farmer oriented Agriculture
Committee. The Environment Subcommittee continued its
interest in FIFRA until 1975, holding hearings in 1974
and 1975. it held no hearings after 1975.
The gap in the environmental lines left by the
Subcommittee on the Environment was somewhat filled,
though to a lesser degree, by Senator Edward Kennedy's
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee's
hearings in 1976 on the testing of pesticides and other
chemicals led to the establishment of the EPA's labora-
18
tory audit system. The staff report produced in 1976
led to substantial changes in registration procedures
which were aimed at ensuring that the public was pro-
19
tected. In 1978 Senator Kennedy requested that the
GAO study the EPA's pesticide program. The result was
a study which criticized the EPA's management of the
20
program.
Also worthy of mention is the Senate Subcommittee
on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
which is also under Kennedy and which jointly sponsored
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the just mentioned hearings on chemical testing with
the Administrative Practice and Procedure Subcommittee.
In remarks during the debate on the revision of FIFRA
in 1977, Senator Kennedy announced that as Chairman of
this subcommittee he would "continue our intensive
inquiry into the EPA's effort to regulate pesticides
The inquiry has not been too intensive. Neither the
Health or Administrative Practice and Procedure Sub-
committee has held a hearing or made a significant policy
move on pesticides since 1976.
On the House side there was no effective voice on
pesticides except Agriculture until about 1976. Then
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
under Congressman John E. Moss of California, and later
under Bob Echardt of Texas, began to take an interest.
The committee claims jurisdiction because the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, which regulates pesticide resi-
dues in food, is under its jurisdiction. The committee
has held two hearings which dealt with pesticides among
other subjects and two hearings which dealt exclusively
22
with pesticides.
The House Subcommittee on Conservation, Energy and
Natural Resources of the Committee on Government
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Operations held hearings on the EPA's implementation of
FIFRA in 1976, however this was the only time that
hearings were held by this subcommittee.^^
Again it is important to emphasize that these
committees are not as active as the Agriculture Com-
mittees in conducting hearings or on the floor of the
legislative bodies. Furthermore, their hearings and
reports are generally not followed by concrete legis-
lative proposals aimed at substantially strengthening
FIFRA, and their members usually do not offer substantial
opposition in floor debates to amendments which would
weaken FIFRA. An exception is the strong opposition
offered by Representative Moss, Chairman of the Over-
sight and Investigation Subcommittee, in the House debate
in 1977 over proposed changes to FIFRA. Moss objected
strongly to the proposed provision allowing for con-
24
ditional registration. This provision allowed for
the registration of a pesticide even if all of the
safety testing data normally required for testing was
not accumulated. Thus a manufacturer who had done a
substantial amount of testing of his product, but who
had not completed all tests could be allowed to
"conditionally" register the product and sell it in
commerce.
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MOSS Objected that this might allow the exposure
of the public to a dangerous pesticide, the harmful
aspects Of which had not yet been indicated by testing.
His strongest objection was that his subcommittee had
carefully examined the concept of conditional regis-
tration and determined that its enactment would inter-
fere with his subcorr^ittee's ability to protect the
public from harmful pesticide residues.
Mr. MOSS felt so strongly about conditional regis-
tration that he included in the Congressional Record a
letter he had written to the Chairman of the House Agri-
culture Committee so that the public could know, "what
information the Agriculture Committee had in hand when
25
It reported the bill." The information which the
Agriculture Committee had was the opinion of two high
EPA officials who questioned the wisdom of conditional
registration. One of the officials, Edwin L. Johnson,
the Deputy Assistant Administrator For Pesticide Programs,
was quoted as saying that under conditional registration
the Administrator would not be able to make the determi-
nation required by FIFRA that a pesticide would perform
its function without any unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment. Congressman Moss lost his battle
over conditional registration. As usually happens in
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both the House and Senate, the legislators accepted
the Agriculture Committee recommendations.
The Appropriations Subcommittees also cover the
subject of pesticides, but usually they do so in the
context of looking at the entire EPA budget. There is
not time to look carefully at the subject and so the
questions asked in hearings tend to cover only a few
aspects of pesticide regulation. The relevant sub-
committees are the House Subcommittee on HUD- Independent
Agencies and the Senate counterpart of the same name.
Before 1975 jurisdiction was under the House and Senate
Subcommittees on Agricultural and Environmental and
Consumer Protection Appropriations. Under Congressman
Jamie L. Whitten of Mississippi the House Subcommittee
on Agricultural and Environmental and Consumer Protection
paid a little more attention to pesticides than the
Appropriations Subcommittees have normally tended to do.
Congressman Whitten has written a book which can be
described as a pro-pesticide answer to Rachel Carson's
26
Silent Spring
. The book emphasizes the advantages
of pesticides and disputes much of the evidence con-
cerning their harmful effects. Mr. Whitten 's committee
staff has written reports on the subject and he has
taken the opportunity of hearings to criticize such EPA
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decisions as the restriction of ODT." Nevertheless even
Mr. Whitten has not dealt with the subject in nearly as
thorough and consistent a Manner as the legislative
co^nittees. The appropriations hearings do not provide
a forum conducive to a substantial examination of the
topic
.
Congress: Weakening the Law
Since 1972 Congress has tended to impede the strict
regulation of pesticides in two ways:
1. By weakening the law.
2. By interfering with the EPA's efforts to
enforce the law.
The shortcomings of the 1972 law have been dis-
cussed, but this legislation did provide the basis for
some protection of the environment and it was sub-
stantially stronger than what remained of FIFRA in 1980
after three revisions. Shortly after passing the 1972
legislation, many Agriculture Committee members realized
that they had approved what was (from their point of
view) an excessively strong law which was being enforced
by what they saw as an excessively pro-environmental EPA.
They responded to this realization by weakening the law
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and by interfering with the EPA's attempts to enforce it.
AS the previous description of Senator Kennedy's and
other committees' work indicates there has been represen-
tation for the environmental point of view, but the
greater influence of the Agriculture committees has led
to the resolution of congressional conflict in the
direction noted.
In the last chapter the specific provisions which
tended to weaken the law were discussed. We will here
describe first the meaning of these provisions as ways
of directly weakening FIFRA and then the way in which
the Congress has indirectly weakened the law, that is
by interfering with the EPA's enforcement efforts.
Congress has gone about the business of directly
weakening FIFRA by making many small changes, rather
than substantial revisions, and by increasing the com-
plexity of the legislation. In order to justify these
actions, the legislators have provided a fairly consistent
set of explanations. We will deal first with the expla-
nations describing what they are and critically analyzing
them. We will then describe the process of change.
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Explanations
.
The most consistently offered reasons for
legislative revisions tending to weaken the law have
been
:
1. That the law and the EPA's administration of
it have failed to adequately consider the needs
of agriculture and the economy.
2. That the proposed revisions are attempts to
increase the rationality and scientific content
of the process.
The Agriculture Committee hearings on FIFRA are
full of references made by congressmen to the effects
of FIFRA and the Agency's implementation of this law on
agriculture and the economy. The harmful effects of un-
restricted use of pesticides are rarely mentioned. An
example of the attitudes expressed by many members can be
seen in Congressman Steven Symms
' s statement to Deputy
Administrator John Quarles during hearings on FIFRA in
1975:
It seems as if you think nothing of imposing re-
strictions on the private sector of the economy.
The Government moves merrily down the road with
no concern about what happens to the consumers,
the housing market and to all the other conse-
quences. The Government makes some capricious
rulings . ^°
The dominant way of looking at this problem is
through the perspective of risk-benefit analysis, a
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concept Which is an integral part of the language of
pesticide regulation. Legislators echo the demands of
farmers and producers that the risks of pesticide use
must be weighed against the benefits, among the most
important of which are the increased yields which, they
argue, are attributable to pesticide use. Risk-benefit
analyses are often referred to. Many of these analyses
tend to stress the effects which the banning of a pesti-
cide would have on the agricultural economy. They are
based on agricultural science and economics and are thus
a form of the dominant terms used in the discussion of
pesticides
- "rationality" and "science."
In justifying their weakening amendments, many
congressmen claim that the EPA fails to make adequate
use of science in making its pest control decisions.
A new procedure required by a legislative change will
increase the rationality of the decision making process
by providing an opportunity for more scientific input.
The record of the hearings of the Agriculture committees
is filled with references to the need for more scientific
input into the pesticide regulation process.
Thus in discussing FIFRA legislators make frequent
references to two closely related concepts - "rationality"
and "science." These concepts are rarely if ever
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specifically defined. They are used most often in a
context Which indicates that they refer to the most
efficient means of producing effective regulation, but
the explicit meanings of the terms are almost never
described. One group's view of what constitutes effect
regulation may be quite different from that of another
group. Thus legislators who use the term "rationality"
in referring to a proposed amendment may be speaking
about something quite different from what others might
consider rational. For example Congressman William
Wampler sponsored a provision in the 1980 revision of
FIFRA which provided for scientific peer review of EPA
suspensions of pesticide registrations.^^ In supporting
his proposal Wampler claimed that he was addressing the
necessity for careful review of the scientific basis for
30
the Agency's decisions. He claimed this even though
the EPA official most responsible for pesticides, Mr.
Jellinek, had opposed the amendment because he felt that
it was unnecessary, redundant, and would add, "...
another provision for reviewing Agency decisions on top
of a whole series of review provisions that already exist
3
1
and that we have discussed at some length."
Often even if we interpret the term "rationality"
in a very broad sense, the ways in which the legislators
ive
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use this term seem quite inconsistent with their actions.
For example the desire of Congressman Wampler and his
Agriculture Coimnittee colleagues for rationality in
decision making and maximum scientific input does not
square well with their support of an amendment to FIFRA
to allow the use of the pesticide, Mirex. This chemical
was introduced in 1960 and applied throughout the South
to control the fire ant.^^ ^^^^ Commission
recommended termination of the use of Mirex on the basis
of a positive cancer test conducted by the National
Cancer Institute. In 1978, a second National Cancer
Institute study confirmed the carcinogenic potential
of this chemical. Mirex persists in the environment for
dozens of years. It tends to accumulate in food chains
and it is present in the tissue of approximately one in
every five persons in the states where it was heavily
used.
The EPA has an elaborate hearing procedure which it
must follow in cancelling a pesticide. This procedure
allows for maximum input of information, especially
scientific information, about the risks of the substance
in question to human health or the environment and its
benefits in controlling pests. The EPA hearing process
for Mirex was lengthy and thorough and resulted in a
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decision to cooperate with its manufacturer in phasing33
out its use.
on May 3, 1979 by a vote of 22-11 the full Agri-
culture cormnittee adopted an amendment which allowed
the use of Mirex with certain restrictions in the years
1979 and 1980. This was done without even considering
this issue in the committee hearings which had just
been held. The committee thus voted to bypass the
scientific and economic expertise of the EPA and to
make a decision which it normally delegated to those with
technical expertise. The vote of 22-11 was hardly close,
but there were some members who objected that dis-
regarding the normal procedures was unjustifiable and
could set a dangerous precedent. The significance of
this vote was summarized in a letter from Administrator
Costle to Committee Chairman Foley protesting the
amendment
:
One of the concerns expressed time and time againby the members at this year's FIFRA oversighthearings was the need for sound scientific basesfor our decisions and the desirability of consulting
with the Scientific Advisory Panel and other outside
scientists prior to taking regulatory action. Yet
the full committee voted to reintroduce Mirex across
the South without hearing even five minutes of testi-
mony from scientists about the risks and benefits of
that chemical. By contrast the three year hearing
conducted by EPA prior to the cancellation of Mirex
took over 12,000 pages of testimony from experts in
economics, agriculture, entomology and the many
scientific disciplines which contribute to risk
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assessment. The Committee's action ^•precedent and suggests thL n^^^ ^ ^ disturbing
now be governed bv otL^ Pesticide regulation may
Of pesticides!34''^
^'^^^^ approval or disapproval
The Mirex amendment was defeated on the House floor,
most probably because it was a change from the normal
tactic of weakening FIFRA through many small changes.
This would have been a big change and a substantial
precedent. its discussion brought the normally quiet
issue of pesticides to the public's attention. The
Washington Star printed an editorial which described
the proposal as unworthy of Congress and verging on
irresponsibility. ^ The debate on Mirex was lengthy
and those opposing the measure included such environ-
mentally oriented legislators as Andrew Maguire, Henry
TV r, 36A. Waxman, and George Brown. Thus the Committee had
gone a little too far, but although the measure was
defeated in the full House, the Committee's vote on
Mirex provided a strong example of its attitude con-
cerning scientific input and the need to make FIFRA
more "rational."
Another indication of the Committee's commitment
to rationality is its almost complete inattention to
the series of GAO reports and reports produced by other
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co^^ittees. Most of these reports, which were su^narized
in the previous chapter, have shown how pesticide regu-
lation was less than adequate to protect public health.
In its revisions of FIFRA, the Comaittee addressed very
few Of the issues raised in these reports. Furthermore,
the reports were rarely even discussed in the Con^ittee's
hearings
.
It appears that what most Agriculture committee
members consider to be rational pesticide regulation is
that which is more or less consistent with the interests
of the manufacturers and pesticide user groups. By
avoiding discussion of what is meant by rational regu-
lation, the decision makers avoid the need to make
explicit the value choices which their actions are
tending to support. A careful analysis of who is winning
and who is losing is replaced by appeals to "rationality"
and "science," two symbols which are probably more dear
to many than "Mom" and "Apple Pie." The replacement of
value choices with symbols with high appeal tends to
reduce the level of conflict.
The legislators often say that science should be
used in order to make decisions more reasonable, but
the question, "What is reasonable?" is rarely asked.
Used in this way rationality is a means to an end which
rarely discussed. Because the goals of rational
procedures are rarely discussed, the procedures tend to
become symbolic activities which provide the appearance
Of responsible decision making while actually making it
more difficult for the EPA to responsibly administer
FIFRA. Many of the FIFRA procedural requirements added
by Congress have the effect of making the law more
complicated, but not necessarily a more effective means
of protecting public health or the environment. This
has been pointed out by both EPA officials and congress-
instead of taking an explicit stand concerning
which interests should gain or lose in the continuing
struggle over pesticide regulation. Congress obscures
its value choices behind a facade of supposedly neutral,
rational procedures which, by slowing down the pesticide
regulatory process, have the effect of advancing the
interests and supporting the values of the pesticide
industry.
Many small changes
.
Because public attitudes concerning
the environment have tended to remain positive, it has
not been politically possible to weaken FIFRA in one
dramatic move such as a complete revision of the law
or a transfer of enforcement authority to the generally
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pro-pesticide USDA. Such a .ove would constitute a
Clear and observable political value choice. it would
provide a clear challenge to the environmentalists and
it would give the. a dramatic means of rallying grass
roots support. The projected damage to the environment
from an obviously substantial weakening of the law would
be a rallying point as it was in the case of Mirex. Thus
the means of weakening FIFRA can not be too overt. it
must be through discouraging stringent enforcement by
the EPA and through many small changes in the law which
give the appearance of more fairly balancing risks and
benefits and increasing the rationality of the decision
making process. Some of these changes, such as con-
ditional registration, have the effect of weakening the
law directly. others, such as the requirement to
consult the Secretary of Agriculture and the requirement
for peer review, make the law less effective by making
it more complex and thus adding to the administrative
burden of the EPA in dealing with an already complex
law.
A requirement that the Administrator must consult
with the Secretary of Agriculture before making a can-
cellation decision is not likely to provide the basis of
a substantial environmental lobbying and letter writing
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campaign. However this requirement constitutes a con-
siderable administrative burden when considered in
combination with other changes made to the law from
1975 to 1980. These inclnri<=.clude the requirement for peer
review; the requirement for the Administrator to
publish in the Federal Register an analysis of the effect
of a pesticide cancellation decision on the agricultural
economy; the requirement that the Administrator consult
with the Secretary of Agriculture before issuing pro-
posed or final regulations;"^^ the requirement that if
the Secretary comments on proposed or final regulations,
the Administrator must comment on the Secretary's
reply and publish this in the Federal Register; the
requirement for the Administrator to analyze the effects
of regulations on the agricultural economy; the
requirement that all rules and regulations be referred
45
to Congress for review; the requirement for the EPA
to set up a Science Advisory Panel; the requirement
for the Agency to establish rules regarding conflict
of interest for the Panel members, and to submit can-
cellation and classification decisions and proposed and
final rule changes to the Panel for comment; the
requirement that the Administrator solicit from the
Science Advisory Panel comments and recommendations for
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operating guidelines ai.ed at improving the quality of
the scientific analyses
.ade by EPA personnel which lead
to decisions made by the Administrator;*^ the re-
quirement that the Administrator respond to these com-
ments and evaluations and publish this response in the
Federal Register;" the requirement that the Adminis-
trator coordinate with the Secretary of Agriculture in
identifying pests that must be brought under control ;=0
and the requirement that the EPA perform several
Studies
.
^'^
These complicating changes have been described in
detail in the previous chapter. if each one is con-
sidered alone or even if three or four are considered
together they seem to be changes about which environ-
mentalists should be concerned, but not alarmed. However
if they are all considered together they comprise a
substantial weakening of the law. They are an extra
administrative burden added to a law which the last
chapter has shown to be extremely complicated. in
dealing with the subject of pesticides a substantial
amount of legislative and administrative complexity
is probably necessary; however FIFRA was already a
quite complicated law before Congress started adding new
requirements to it in 1975, and the EPA had already set
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up some quite complicated procedures in order to
administer the law tk^T:ne . The new requirements put an extra
burden on an EPA which was already understaffed."
When asked in 1979 why the EPA had not removed
more potentially dangerous pesticides from coirroerce,
EPA Assistant Administrator for ToKic Substances Steven
Jellinek replied that:
Congress has added more and more procedural re-
fo^':SditLn°l'^"—llation prLesfSat c^llr additio a layers of agricultural and scien-tific review and economic impact analyses. 53^
These changes in the law which increase its com-
plexity are supplemented by many small changes such as
conditional registration, no testing for certified
applicators, and assignment of primary enforcement
responsibility to the states. These changes weaken
the law but do not necessarily make it more complex.
When considered with the other changes which weaken
the law by making it complex, their total effect is to
make FIFRA a substantially less effective piece of
legislation.
Congressional interference with enforcement
. We come now
to the subject of congressional interference with the
EPA's administration of FIFRA. Before proceeding we
should discuss the type of "interference" which is being
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criticized. The perspective underlying this disser-
tation maintains that "interference" is quite appropriate
if its aim is to eliminate inefficiency or corruption or
to encourage an agency to enforce a law which it has
neglected. What seems less than acceptable is congress-
ional interference with Agency attempts to enforce the
law as it is written. Citizens who might be concerned
about whether or not the government is protecting them
against the dangers of pesticides can be referred to
the several pages in the U.S. Code which constitute
FIFRA. The legislators can alleviate concern by pointing
to FIFRA as a sound law which will provide substantial
protection of human health and the environment. The
weaknesses of this law have been extensively discussed,
but it has also been pointed out that the law, as
written, does provide some environmental protection.
Without enforcement, however, the law is only several
pages in the Code
. It attains a reality as an operative
means of protecting the public only in its enforcement.
By making it difficult for the EPA to enforce the law
Congress has weakened its substance. Each effort to
interfere with enforcement makes the law less a real,
meaningful instrument of protection and more a few pages
to which the legislators can point as an indication that
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an is well. interference is a less visible means of
weakening pipra than the repeal of specific provisions.
Efforts at interference might take the form of criticism
in the hearings or a phone call to the Administrator.
These are less likely to be seen by reporters and thus
be described in the press.
Congress tends to interfere with the EPA's en-
forcement efforts in two ways:
1. By reacting strongly to enforcement actions or
steps which would make enforcement more effic-
ient.
2. By attempting to pressure the Agency into
making the types of risk-benefit decisions
which favor the interests of farmers and pesti-
cide manufacturers.
The second of these is the most common. Most
decisions which the EPA makes on the cancellation or
use of pesticides involve a balancing of the risks and
benefits of the pesticide in question. The law delegates
the authority to make these risk-benefit decisions to the
Agency because it has the scientific resources and ex-
pertise necessary to do this. The legislators often,
however, apply heavy pressure on the Agency to make
the right decisions. Usually the "right" decisions are
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those Which favor the interests of the pesticide manu-
facturers and farmers rather than the environmentalists.
The legislators are able to interfere because of
the constant possibility that they could pass legis-
lation which would weaken FIFRA. Normally money is
authorized for only about 12 months/^ The short
periods of authorization and relatively frequent hearings
associated with reauthorization fortify congressional
control
.
Just as when changing the structure of the law, the
legislators never go too far when interfering with its
enforcement. No regulation of pesticides at all might
lead to a substantial public reaction and result in
demands for stronger legislation.
DDT and the tussock moth
. Two examples illustrate the
just described pattern of congressional interference:
the first concerns a risk-benefit decision, the control
of the tussock moth in the Northwest part of the country;
the second involves the establishment of a "hotline" by
the EPA in an attempt to make enforcement more efficient.
The tussock moth is native to Western forests. Its
larvae feed on the needles of Douglas firs and true firs
56
sometimes stripping and killing them. Many trees.
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however, survive their attack. Outbreaks of this pest
periodically occur in Western forests and in the early
1970
-s one such outbreak occurred in Washington and
Oregon. m order to control the moth many, including
the logging industry, logging industry workers, U.S.
Forest Service administrators, and local politicians,
advocated the use of DDT. others, including environ-
mental groups and many forest entomology researchers,
opposed this use.
Most uses of DDT had been banned by the Adminis-
trator of the EPA in 1972. However section 18 of FIFRA
permits the Administrator to exempt any Federal or
state agency from any provision of the Act if he de-
termines that emergency conditions exist which require
such an exemption. m March 1973 the Forest Service
and the states of Washington and Oregon filed requests
with the EPA for the selective emergency use of DDT to
control the moth. After considering the risks and
benefits of the proposed action, the EPA decided in
April to disapprove the requests. This decision pre-
cipitated extensive and vigorous political opposition.
It was now too late to spray during the 1973 season, but
political efforts focused on coercing the Agency into
permitting spraying during the 1974 season. The fact
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that DDT was also useful in controlling the gypsy „oth.
Which is found in Eastern forests, also helped to gen-
erate opposition.
in House Agriculture Committee hearings in 1973
Which were held to review the progress of the EPA in
implementing the 1972 FIFRA, the EPA's decision on
DDT was strongly criticized by Representative George A.
Goodling whose attitude was shared by many Co™,ittee
members
.
Mr. Goodling. Just before I came here, this wasplaced on my desk, the U.S. Departi;ent of
"^^'-''''i c""^
^^^^^ ^^^^ Forest Service.Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agri-
culture denied use of DDT for its control oftussock moth in Oregon and Washington todayFocuses Its attention on other controlpossibilities.
"
Can you give us a reason why this request wasdenied?
Mr. Dominick (of the EPA). I certainly can MrGoodling.
Mr. Goodling. I want the real reasons, not
emotional reasons. Most of your darn reasons
are emotional, I am sorry to say, rather than
scientific. But go ahead and aive me your
reasons for this.
Mr. Dominick. Well that is your opinion, Mr.
Goodling
.
5 8Mr. Goodling. I am sticking to my opinion too.
This was the tone of the many criticisms of the Agency
being made at this time.
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Later there was made the usual appeal to science.
Mr. Goodling. When your ruling came into beinqyou did not take the scientific avenue on DDT
know ?f ^''^ emotional angle, and you anS 1
'
It, and the world knows it. You listened
to scie^^Ists???"'"''^'^ ^^^^^^^
In October 1973 the Subcommittee on Forests of the
House Committee on Agriculture held hearings on a bill
which would have directed the EPA Administrator to
approve registration applications filed by the USDA for
the use of DDT on forests and other agricultural lands
if, in the opinion of the Secretary of Agriculture, this
chemical was required for the control of and protection
60
against insect infestations. This bill was aimed at
permitting the use of DDT to control the tussock moth
61
and the gypsy moth. At the hearings the EPA was
62
again heavily criticized.
The bill discussed at these hearings was not the
only one introduced. From July 18th to October 11,
1973, at least eight bills dealing with the EPA's
63
regulation of DDT were introduced in Congress. Also
there were threats to introduce legislation which would
have returned the regulation and registration of pesti-
64
cides to the USDA.
There was also pressure applied from sources other
than Congress. The Secretary of Agriculture promised
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to use his influence to make DDT available for 1974 and
the Secretary of the Interior stated his intention to
try to obtain permission to use the chemical on Indian
lands which his Department oversees. Also the
Pacific Legal Foundation filed suits in Federal District
court in November 1973 in an attempt to force the Agency
to allow the use of DDT. (The Foundation is a non-
profit legal foundation which is opposed to those who,
in its view, use environmental considerations, under the
guise of protecting the environment, to stop needed
social and economic activities.)
In January 1974 the Forest Service and the states
of Washington and Oregon again asked for permission to
use DDT. Under intense political pressure, the EPA gave
in and approved the emergency exemption request the
next month. The results were the expenditure of at
least three million dollars in spraying DDT (at a
time when the moth population was suffering a natural
collapse) and significant damage to the environment.
66
The pesticide hotline
. In May 1975 the EPA established
a toll free "Pesticide Hotline" telephone number so
that those wishing to report a violation of FIFRA, such
as the misuse of a pesticide, could call the Agency.
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It was felt that this might be a particularly useful
means of communication for migrant farmworkers who
might wish to complain about an illegal use of pesti-
cides which resulted in damage to their health. Many
of these workers are illiterate and not familiar with
the procedures necessary to make complaints.^' The
number was also intended to be a source of data on the
scope of misuse. Furthermore it was intended to be a
means of providing the public with free safety infor-
mation concerning the use of pesticides
.
The House Agriculture Committee found out about
the existence of the hotline during the 1975 hearings
on the proposed revision of FIFRA. The reaction was
vigorous and emotional. Representative Steven Symms
referred to the "Gestapo-like tactics" of the EPA.^^
Some members threatened to completely cut off funding
70
for FIFRA. The hotline was described as an "informant
system," a "civil rights" issue, and as smacking of
71
"vigilantism. " it was alleged that advertising the
project tended to "
. . . stir up complaints and en-
courage Americans to tattle on their neighbors rather
72
than provide information." in short, the hotline
became a rallying point for criticisms of the EPA.
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This was the attitude of the majority of the
conunittee but a small minority defended the innovation.
Congressman George Brown said that police departments
have often found that only by citizen participation
in reporting violations of the law, can the law be
73
adequately enforced. Congressman Matthew McHugh
noted that elimination of the hotline would remove the
only means available for migrant workers to communicate
74
with the Agency.
The hotline was to be administered by a non-govern-
mental group, the National Farmworker Information
Clearinghouse. in radio advertisements announcing the
telephone number the Agency included some unsubstantiated
statistics on the numbers of farmworkers made ill and
killed by pesticides. In response to congressional
criticism, the Agency repudiated the unsubstantiated
statistics and took over the administration of the hotline
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from the private group. It continued, however, to
operate the hotline in the face of persistent congress-
ional criticism. In its defense, the Agency cited legal
precedents and pointed out that other agencies including
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Bureau of
Mines, the Internal Revenue Service and the Drug En-
forcement Administration, use telephone reporting systems
to Obtain information about violations/' The criticise
however, continued.
At the same time that the cormnittee was criticizing
the hotline it was examining the proposed 1975 revisions
to FIFRA. The proposal which would have weakened the
law the most was the granting of veto power to the
Secretary of Agriculture. To quickly review this pro-
posal, it would have given the Secretary of Agriculture
the authority to veto EPA cancellations or suspensions
of pesticide registrations and any regulations made by
the Administrator under the authority given to him by
FIFRA. This would have meant that the authority of the
Administrator to regulate pesticides would have been
significantly undermined. He would have been prevented
from taking any significant regulatory action without
the consent of the Secretary. The regulation of pesti-
cides had been transferred to the EPA from the Agricultur
Department because of Agriculture's poor record of
enforcement and generally uncritical acceptance of
pesticides. Thus the granting of veto power to the
Agriculture Secretary would have meant a substantial
weakening of FIFRA. This proposal was, at the time,
being seriously considered by the committee and the
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lengthy EPA arguments against it indicate that the
possibility of its becoming law was taken quite ser-
iously by the Agency.
on July 18, 1975 in a letter to the Chairman of
the Committee, EPA Deputy Administrator John Quarles
said that he saw a tremendous need for communication
with those affected by FIFRA, and that the hotline was
a desirable means of maintaining this communication.
For this reason the hotline would be continued.
^"^
Eleven days later, on July 29, 1975, EPA Administrator
Russell Train appeared before the Committee. He con-
cluded a lengthy statement in opposition to the pro-
posed Secretary of Agriculture veto by announcing that
in order to not allow a
.
. .
fairly minor matter to continue to exacer-bate relationships between the Agency and the
committee and the communications between us when
we have a lot more important things to discuss
and deal with, I will tell you here today that
we are eliminating the whole hotline for any
purpose whatsoever
.
Evidently Train felt that it was necessary to offer
this concession to the Committee in order to respond to
the criticism and to avoid the substantial weakening of
FIFRA which the Agriculture Secretary's veto would have
provided.
247
in dealing with FIFRa, congressmen confront many
complicated questions. The law itself is extremely
complicated and many of the scientific and technical
questions related to its revision are quxte complex.
Often the legislators, who must also deal with many
other legislative matters, find it a very difficult
law to understand. The hotline was a simple matter
that became known just at the time that the Agriculture
Committees were struggling with the revision of FIFRA.
The simple nature of this issue and the time at which
it became known were probably favorable to the pesticide
industry's interest in seeing FIFRA enforcement weakened.
Bob Hamman of Ciba-Geigy, headed the Regulatory Committee
of the National Agricultural Chemicals Association at
the time. According to him:
The hotline couldn't have come at a more opportunetime. The regulations on registration and classi-fication are so complicated that it is difficultfor members of Congress to understand. But they
could understand the hotline ... .79
The hotline indicates the Committee's attitude
toward real enforcement of FIFRA. The existence of a
publicized toll free number might have substantially
enhanced the efficiency of the Agency's enforcement
efforts, especially by increasing the opportunity for
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poorly educated or illiterate workers to co^icate
with it. This effort to put teeth into the EPa's regu-
latory plans had to be stopped.
Criticizing the hotline on the basis of the fact
that it would have strengthened the Agency's regulatory
ability would, or course, have been politically im-
possible. Thus criticisms tended to portray it as
"vigilantism," a "civil rights issue," "a constitutional
issue," "encouraging Americans to 'tattle' on their
neighbors." It is interesting that in an interview
with the writer in 1981, six years later, a legis-
lator still referred to the hotline as "tattling."
These descriptions of the hotline seem quite different
from commonly accepted descriptions of drug enforcement
telephone numbers or cooperative community efforts to
communicate with police departments in reporting crime.
These seem most often to be praised as public spirited
citizen involvement in maintaining the well being of
the community. Congressman Brown in stating his support
for the hotline pointed out the fundamental reason for
objections to it.
The problem with this program is that a lot of
people don't agree with the law and, hence, they
don't like to have it reported when there are
violations of it. Therefore, they raise all
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anrso°o„!""''°"^ ""^""^ constitutionality
The tussock moth and pesticide hotline issues are
merely two examples of congressional pressure on the
EPA aimed at a lenient interpretation of FIFRA. The
frequent hearings on FIFRA are full of complaints and
strong criticism of the Agency. Some of the most often
mentioned issues have been the ban on DDT, the use of
Mirex to control the fire ant, the use of the herbicide
812,4,5T, and the problem of predator control.
Summary. Congress has removed FIFRA from politics by
reducing the visibility of changes made and by providing
a consistent set of explanations for its actions.
Visibility has been reduced by making small changes,
many of which have made the law needlessly complex, and
by pressuring the EPA to enforce the law in a more lenient
manner. Explanations for these actions have emphasized
the importance of "rationality" and "science." Examples
of congressional action and inaction have been presented
in order to argue that these terms are used more as
symbols to justify actions which tend to favor the
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interests of industry rai-h*:^!- 4-v.=r, ^s. c atner than as descriptions of
commonly understood legislative goals.
The public interest groups face superior forces in
their attempts to influence legislation and regulation.
Not only are their resources inferior, but they face the
difficult task of educating their primary sources of
support, the public, about a very complicated issue
which involves many scientific unknowns such as the
relation of chemicals to the initiation of cancer.
Also of importance is their failure to criticize more
vigorously many of the weakening changes which have been
made in the name of rationality and science and their
failure to appreciate and more vigorously criticize
the economic influence of the industry on the scientific
input to pesticide regulation.
This question of scientific input has also been
largely ignored by Congress. If the legislators really
wanted to make pesticide regulation more rational and
scientific (in the sense of regulation based on more
accurate knowledge of the risks and benefits of pesticides
to the public) they would examine the economic influence
of the pesticide industry on: what types of research
get done, how the results of research are interpreted,
and the way in which the results of research are communi-
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cated to the public and legislative decisionmakers.
These kinds of questions, which are more or less
ignored by both environmentalists and the Congress,
are fundamental to the legislative and regulatory
processes. The kinds of scientific input to which
decisionmakers are exposed have a large influence on
the types of decisions which will be made.
The subjective character of much of the interpre-
tation of scientific data, the conflicting scientific
theories and their implications for legislation and
regulation, and the economic influence of the industry
in all this constitutes what is, in essence, a scientific
political process, a political process underlying the
political process, a less observable sphere of politics
which directly affects the more easily observable sphere.
The next three chapters will examine this subject.
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CHAPTER V
TESTING FOR SAFETY
A Science Baa^d Language
In dealing with FIFRA, legislators speak the
language of rational decision making, heavily based
on science. Hearings are held in order to weigh all
the evidence and to get all the needed information,
scientists are invited to testify because of their
expert knowledge, and the law is revised in order to
allow for more scientific input. All this gives the
appearance that the legislative changes to FIFRA are
based on a careful consideration of the available
scientific evidence. In reality congressional failure
to even address most of the problems with FIFRA noted
in the many reports described in Chapter Three, indi-
cates that much information necessary for rational
decision making is ignored. The ignoring of so much
reliable information suggests that most congressmen
do not even begin to objectively consider the available
scientific and other evidence in order to base their
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political value decisions on a reasonably sound basis of
knowledge. Of course most legislators are scientific
laymen and none have the time to master all the relevant
information, but there is not even an attempt to approxi-
mate an Objective perspective. Much of the information
that is ignored is in easy to read, concise form (such
as GAO reports) and .ell known to many persons interested
in pesticide policy. instead of attempting to achieve
an objective understanding, the legislators look sub-
jectively at the facts and selectively take note, in
their speech and action, of those aspects of the avail-
able data which support their value choices.
There are many scientists whose opinions provide
strong support for the value choices of legislators.
Many of these experts are financially supported or
assisted by the industry. There are also many scientists
whose opinions are in direct contradiction, but this
latter group is more or less ignored. Congressmen tend
to selectively choose their scientists, theories and
reports. Thus in the area of pesticide policy, science
is less a tool for objective assessments of reality and
more a means of mobilizing support for political goals.
This does not mean that it is not important. For those
legislators intent on weakening FIFRA, it is a source
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Of support for decisions which
.ight otherwise prove to
be unpopular. Por EPA administrators it is the basis
Of registration decisions. The relatively few legis-
lators Who attempt to objectively assess the pesticide
issue try to base their decisions on an accurate under-
standing Of the scientific dimensions of the issue. For
these lawmakers it is often difficult to obtain accurate,
unbiased scientific information. There are many scien-
tific unknowns in this area of policy and the scientific
data related to the examination of the unknowns is ex-
tremely voluminous and complicated. There are many
scientists who interpret the available evidence in such
a way as to support, more or less, the environmentalist's
policy perspective. Many other scientists interpret the
data in such a way as to support the industry position.
No attempt will be made here to prove on scientific
grounds that one side's opinion is more valid than the
other's. That would be an endless excercise as is the
debate between the two groups. What is argued in this
and the next two chapters is that the pesticide manu-
facturers exert a very significant amount of influence
in the mobilization of science in support of their view-
point and interests. Exactly how much influence is
exerted is difficult to determine because of the
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extensiveness of the industry relation to science. How-
ever the evidence indicates that this influence is quite
significant.
Some have accused the industry of intentionally
distorting scientific data in order to support its own
interests. Evidence of intentional distortion exists,
but what is most important about the industry relation
to science is the effect which this economic relation-
ship tends to produce even if we assume that all re-
searchers are honest. This dissertation will argue that
the economic relationship of the industry to much of
the scientific infrastructure which produces scientific
data related to the safety of pesticides is incon-
sistent with the public's interest in having all of this
infrastructure produce as accurate as possible assess-
ments of the effects of pesticides on human health and
the environment. The industry's primary interest is in
making a profit, not in safeguarding public health. A
great deal of evidence indicates that, at the least, in
areas of real controversy in which honest people differ
on principles of science, the pesticide manufacturers
exert very significant influence. At other times the
results of research are distorted, that is, they are
interpreted in ways which most scientists would consider
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to be in error. This distortion is, evidentl,, so.eti^es
deliberate and so^eti^es, perhaps, the unconscious result
of such pressures as the economic need to get a new
product on the market. Distortion of data does not
involve honest opinions concerning the applicability
Of scientific principles, it involves sloppy lab work,
the reporting of nonexistent data, and some fraud. The
extent to which fraud is involved is extremely difficult
to determine, but the evidence suMnarizad in the following
pages suggests that it i «? ai- ic= ^ii x. r IS, t the least, quite signifi-
cant, one problem with determining fraud is that it is
often quite difficult to distinguish it from unintention-
al errors, or for that matter, to distinguish fraud or
unintentional errors from legitimate differences of
scientific opinion.
This chapter and the two following it will explore
the relation of the industry to the scientific infra-
structure which produces the information used by
administrative decisionmakers when deciding on whether or
not to register a pesticide, and by legislative decision-
makers who are considering revisions of FIFRA. This
chapter will look more extensively at a subject already
touched on in Chapter III, that is how pesticides are
tested prior to registration. The next chapter will look
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at the relation of the industry to the academic scien-
tific co^unity. The Chapter after that win eKa.ine the
industry's relation to cancer testing.
This chapter win describe the statutory require-
ments for pesticide testing and then describe the
testing situation as it has evolved since 1972.
Requirements for Testing .n^ pj-oblems
Testing requirements. fifra requires that all pesti-
cides be registered. m order to register a pesticide
(or to reregister one that was registered under the
pre-1975 rules) many tests related primarily to the
safety of the product must be conducted. These costly
procedures include tests for acute toxicity and for
carcinogenicity. Tests must also be submitted to the
Agency so that it can set "tolerances" of maximum
pesticide residues permitted on foods in accordance with
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. These tests are the
basis of the EPA's judgement that registered pesticides
are safe. They are also often referred to by legis-
lators as indications that a specific pesticide is not
harmful. The responsibility for conducting pesticide
testing is placed on the manufacturer. The role of the
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EPA is merely to specify in published guidelines what
tests are necessary and to check submitted test results
for completeness and validity. ^ This procedure is
similar to the requirements of the PDA in its regulation
of drugs, and some of the problems encountered by the
EPA in the regulation of pesticides are similar to
those experienced by the FDA. From the beginning, much
of the industry testing has been, at best, sloppy and
the EPA monitoring of the quality of this testing has
been poor.
Early indications of problpm^ There were around
35,000 pesticides which had been registered prior to
the stricter rules for registration which had been
mandated by the 1972 FIFRA and which became effective
in 1975. These chemicals had to be reregistered by
the EPA. The reregistration effort involved, primarily,
collecting and cataloguing the test data related to
each product, determining what data was needed to meet
the new, stricter standards and informing registrants of
the new data needs. It did not, for the most part,
involve checking the data on hand for validity. Most
of the products being reregistered had been previously
registered by the USDA and the data proving their safety
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was assumed by the EPA to be valid. ^ it was assumed to
be valid even though considerable evidence had suggested
otherwise. m 1969 a DHEW Coimnission reviewed seventeen
industrially sponsored studies on the carcinogenicity
of DDT. It concluded that fourteen of the studies were
so inherently defective that they precluded any possible
determination of carcinogenicity . ^ In 1971, an Agency
review of data used to register the pesticide Aldrin/
Dieldrin indicated deficiencies which eventually led to
the removal of the product from the market in 1977.^
A review in 1974 of the data supporting the safety of
Heptachlor/Chlordane revealed that this chemical had
the potential for causing cancer.^ Most uses of this
product were suspended in 1975. In both reviews it
was found that the initial histologic examinations were,
at best, extremely conservative. The independent re-
viewing pathologists diagnosed many more cancerous and
precancerous tumors in the test animals than did the
original laboratory pathologists.^
Kennedy and others discover the problem
. In January 1976
Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health held hearings
which investigated the testing practices of pesticide
•7
and drug companies. In preparation for the hearings
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four EPA scientists reviewed a sampling of the safety
testing data in EPA files which had been used to support
registrations. Their review discovered faulty and in-
complete data.« in the hearing, EPA Deputy Administrator
John Quarles testified that serious problems might exist
concerning the safety testing data and he announced that
a more extensive review of the data would be commenced.^
The issue of the data gained more attention. m the
same month as the Kennedy hearings the GAO issued a letter
report to Administrator Train criticizing the Agency for
having no program to check the validity of data and
pointing out that other agencies did have such programs.
In February and March a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations included an examination
of the problem in its hearings. In April the review
promised by Administrator Quarles was completed. The
reviewing independent scientist, Dr. Melvin Reuber,
examined twenty-five studies which had been submitted
to the Agency to support the registration of twenty-
three pesticides. He found that of the twenty-five
studies, one was satisfactory. The others were in his
words, "uniformly bad."
There were basially two categories. One in which
enough data may have been submitted, but had not
been properly analyzed to draw any conclusions; and
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Evidence continued to accumulate. Most of this
evidence indicated that the industry testing of pesti-
cides as called for by FIFRA was leading to poor results
and that the EPA had done a very poor job of monitoring
the quality of this testing. An EPA sampling of corres-
pondence files in preparation for further hearings held
by Kennedy showed that FDA and EPA scientists in prior
reviews (some dating back to the early 1950 's) had dis-
covered deficiencies in the data similar to those found
by Reuber. This was reported to the Kennedy subcom-
mittee in the hearings which were held in April as a
follow-up to the January hearings . '^
In December 1976, the staff of Kennedy's subcommittee
issued a report which included a description of the data
issue. It noted that much of the data was poor in
quality and that the EPA had not done much to audit the
laboratories which produced it.""-^ it blamed the Agency
for poor administration and concluded that probably
many of the pesticide products on the market would be
found to be unsafe if the EPA regulated pesticides in
the way it is required to under the law."*"^
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industrial Bio^.
,,3 biggest revelations concerning
the inadequacy of the data and the extent of this problen
were the result of the investigation of Industrial Bio-
Test Laboratories (IBT)
. This laboratory was, at the
time, the nation's largest comneroial toxicologioal
testing company. Commercial laboratories are hired by
many pesticide companies to do the testing required by
the EPA for their products. They are also hired by drug
and cosmetic companies to meet the FDA's testing require-
ments for their products. Industrial Bio-Test has per-
formed very many studies on not only pesticides, but
also drugs, cosmetics and other chemicals in order to
fulfill the statutory requirements of testing for these
chemicals. In 1975 an official of the FDA in checking
a tip that there were problems with tests submitted by a
drug manufacturer mistakenly pulled a file on IBT. In
reading the file he found enough problems to warrant an
inspection." In April 1976 and again in June the FDA
inspected the laboratory and found "very serious irregu-
larities."^^ on April 13, 1977 Federal inspectors
arrived at Northbrook, Illinois so that they could again
inspect the laboratory. The next morning they were met
by A. J. Frisque, the President of IBT, who told them,
"Gentlemen, I am very sorry. There has been an un-
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fortunate misunderstanding; all of our records were
destroyed last night.
Between 1976 and 1978, much of the IBT data which
was not destroyed was audited. ^1 These audits were done
cooperatively by the FDA and EPA and covered both drugs
and pesticides. The results of the audits indicated
many problems. For example poor record keeping raised
doubts that test animals did in fact receive test
material at the proper dosage. m many studies few, if
any, observations of the animals were performed during the
course of the studies even though such observations were
called for in the protocol. ^2 All damaged tissue in test
animals was not examined, but it was reported to be
examined. A study which was actually run for eighteen
months was reported as twenty- four months long.^^ gxtra
animals may have been kept for the entire length of some
studies and poor animal identification methods existed.
These problems allowed for the possibility that selective
substitution of animals was made at the time the animals
24were killed. Poor record keeping also led to animals
which had been reported as dead, being reported as alive
later
,
a claim the FDA inspectors were unwilling to
believe. In a hearing held by Senator Kennedy's sub-
committee in July 1976 Dr. M. Adrian Gross of the FDA
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testified.
Dr. Gross: With reference to pathology operations,
many animals died several times.
senator Kennedy: What do you mean died several
times?
Dr. Gross: Well, at least that is what the records
indicate. We do not believe they actually
died several times, yet this is what the
company records indicate.
In August 1977 the EPA announced that thirty-one
pesticide companies had been asked to audit and certify
the accuracy of tests performed by IBT. a total of 123
pesticide products and 160 tolerance levels for residues
on food were covered in this request. The Agency said
that it would not cancel the registration of these pro-
ducts even though their claims of safety had been shown
to be based on invalid tests. Thus as the Administrator
of the EPA has admitted, it is unknown whether or not
these products, which are registered under FIFRA and
sold legally, are safe.^^ Finally in July 1980, the
Agency announced that in cases where virtually the entire
data base was invalid and there was a strong possibility
of substantial health risk, it would consider cancel-
2 8lation. This, however, left open the possibility that
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unsafe chemicals would be registered. if some, but not
"Virtually all," of the data supporting a registration
was invalid, it was possible that dangerous properties of
the chemical had not been detected. m any event all of
the pesticides involved are still registered
. The
final note on Industrial Bio-Test is that recently four
top officials of the company were indicted for allegedly
falsifying health tests conducted between 1970 and 1977
on pesticides and drugs.
IBT an isolated case? The EPA has maintained that the
IBT problem is an isolated case, however, in addition to
that which has already been discussed, there is signifi-
cant evidence to dispute this claim. Samuel S. Epstein
is a professor of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
who has, over the last seventeen years, become involved
in a wide range of issues related to chemicals for con-
gressional committees. Federal agencies, and the media.
This involvement has given him the opportunity to examine
raw data submitted to agencies and decisionmaking bodies.
Dr. Epstein's experience has led him to conclude that
testing data is not sound, valid, honest, or directed
toward the public interest. According to him:
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Escalating evidence shows that constraints on dat;,
la^io^y^suppr^^If^r^^nd'r^'^ interpretation? ^tntpu-
are co^onp^fac^l!^°-e??fl!nhe'° ^^^^t^'^^
Is-L^nTils^rva^Jo^-^ ; ii^i—
affected. 33
-^^^erests are directly or indirectly
Epstein emphasizes that:
We are not dealing with aberrant exceptions- we arPdealing with the rule rather than the exception. 34^
The most common problem, he notes, is the poor
quality of industrially generated data.^^
In February 1976 in testimony before a subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations, three
former EPA attorneys who had recently resigned in protest
over the Agency's poor enforcement of FIFRA claimed that
the recent Senate hearings on laboratory testing had only
scratched the surface. They maintained that, "...
examples of inaccurate and sloppy data in EPA files are
legion," and that, "... the data underlying the regis-
tration of a substantial number of widely used pesticides
do not support their safety as required by law."^^ They
pointed out that in the three regulatory actions taken
by the Agency against DDT, Aldrin/Dieldrin , and Hepta-
chlor/Chlordane, the evidence which proved the chemicals
to be hazardous was based largely upon independent review
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Of data submitted by industry in order to support claims
Of safety. '
The GAO letter report of January 1976 revealed that
while many EPA people thought that submitted data was
accurate and reliable, other Agency officials said that
reports were oversummarized, attempted to lead reviewers
to favorable conclusions, and could contain false data
that EPA might accept. Furthermore, the report of
senator Kennedy's subco^nittee criticized the Agency for
ignoring early and repeated warnings that the data it
was relying on was faulty and incomplete
.
This evidence supports the contention that problems
with laboratory data are commonplace, but the laboratory
testing problem is not one particular to pesticides.
For example data indicating adverse effects has been
distorted or suppressed for vinyl chloride, Red-40, (a
food dye), Nitrilotriacetic Acid (NTA)
,
benzene, MER/29,
Dornwall, Aldactone and Aspartame.
The EPA: An Unenthusiastic Auditor
The EPA did initiate a joint audit program in 1977
with the FDA, however given the past performance of the
Agency and the views of many Agency people it does not
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see. that the au^it p.o,ra™ „UI p„viae vigorous moni-
toring Of test results. The G.o report of January 197S
Which aescribea the concerns of so„e
.gency personnel
about the quality of data also related that
.any EPA
people said that the data was accurate and reliable.
A memo summarizing a 1976 epa ci-^-f^ty ci xy/b EPA staff meeting notes strong
criticism Of Dr. Reuber's findings that submitted tests
were deficient/^ m a recent interview an EPA official
told the author that he believed that most of the industry
data was good. He did not feel that in reregistering
pesticides it was necessary for the Agency to validate
the data. Attitudes such as this seem common at the EPA
even in the face of some of the evidence just described.
Another indication of the Agency's attitude toward
auditing can be seen in the fact that it was more or less
pushed into it. Despite the early findings on DDT,
Aldrin/Dieldrin, and Heptachlor/Chlordane
, and the early
discoveries of inadequate data by EPA scientists it was
not until the GAO suggested an audit program that the
Agency began one.^^ The GAO suggestion was politically
difficult to resist in the face of the FDA discoveries
at Industrial Bio-Test, the findings of Dr. Reuber and
other EPA scientists, and Senator Kennedy's hearings
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and report.
The Agency's actions in relation to the laboratory
data problem have appeared to be motivated by an attempt
to avoid conflict, to scale down the size of the problem,
and to prevent developments which might fuel controversy.
If a vigorous inspection program were to find that even
more data was invalid, political pressure from such
actors as Senator Kennedy and his subcommittee would
probably be exerted in the direction of a demand for
suspension of the registration of pesticides whose safety
had not been determined. This would lead to industry
complaints and industry lobbying with the Agriculture
committees, a much more influential force in pesticide
policy. The Agency would then be faced with the diffi-
cult choice of permitting more and more chemicals whose
data bases had been shown to be invalid to remain on the
market, or risking a loss of funds and passage of yet
another amendment weakening FIFRA. In the face of these
considerations the divergence of opinion between such
scientists as Dr. Reuber and Dr. Epstein on the one hand,
and many EPA officials on the other, is more easily
understood. It is, evidently, perceived by EPA officials
that it is in their interest to avoid conflict and
maintain a stable regulatory environment. If this is
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true, it is not lively that a vigorous auditing program
Will be run by the Agency.
Economic Influences.on_Sci^^
Have the laboratories of the testing companies and
chemical companies intentionally manipulated the data
or are the distortions inadvertent? Some of the evidence
just examined would seem to suggest that outright, in-
tentional manipulation is a not uncommon occurrence. One
company has entered a "no-contest" plea to a charge
(made by the EPA) that it withheld research results
which indicated that two of its pesticide products might
cause cancer. Perhaps more common, however, is the
subjective interpretation of data in terms favorable to
industry. Some of the tests, particularly those for
carcinogenicity, are based on scientific theories that
are not completely proven. since the nature of cancer
and the mechanism of its causation is still not thoroughly
understood, the interpretation of tests for carcinogen-
icity involves a certain degree of subjective judgement
concerning the meaning of collected data. Very often it
appears that if the data has not been intentionally
manipulated, at the least, the subjective judgement of
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exer-
the scientist conducting the experiment has been
cised in such a way as to favor very much the interests
Of the manufacturers at the expense of the general pub-
lic. The exercise of judgement in this manner may be
an unconscious process influenced by the economic struc-
ture within which the judgement is made. Whether it is
an unconscious process or an intentional distortion it
certainly is consistent with the economic interests of
both the manufacturers and the laboratories.
Under the present testing system, the economic
interest of the testing laboratory is in arriving at
results which prove the safety of the client's products
at the least cost to the laboratory. it seems unlikely
that the management of a testing laboratory will be
unmindful of the need to secure future testing contracts
when testing a client's product. Conflicts of interest
are inherent in the process. The supposedly neutral
testing laboratory is dependent on the owner of the
product being tested for future business. The pressures
on scientists working in pesticide company laboratories
are even more apparent. Within this system of economic
interests it seems that the exercise of subjective judge-
ment is very often influenced (perhaps unconsciously) in
such a way as to favor the economic interests of the
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companies rather than the interests of public health
or the environment.
Another factor influencing judgement is the need
to save time and money. it is faster and cheaper for a
laboratory to cover up mistakes than to repeat costly
tests. This motivation would appear to explain many
of the deficiencies found in the data.
Whether the data is intentionally manipulated or
unconsciously interpreted in a manner consistent with
the economic interests of the manufacturers, the end
result is that science is interpreted in a way that is in
their interests. It is distorted away from its supposed
objective of describing the truth toward supporting the
special interests of the companies by legitimatizing
their products. Even if we assume that the theoretical
assumptions underlying the laboratory scientists'
interpretations are sincerely believed by them, the
process still distorts science because the many scientists
who believe theories which would lead to much different
interpretations of the data are excluded from the process.
The interpretations of test data offered by the companies
strongly suggest that in hiring scientists and contracting
for laboratory work, the pesticide companies can and do
pick their scientists carefully. They do not tend to hire
282
scientists who believe theories which would lead them
to regard many controversial substances as carcinogenic.
They hire scientists whose assumptions concerning carcin-
ogenicity lead them to believe that they are not carcino-
genic. Thus the testing of chemicals to support the
registration of pesticides tends to be done not by
scientists with different points of view, but by those
whose point of view coincides with the manufacturer's
interests. Reality thus tends to be viewed from only
one scientific perspective. other perspectives which
might offer a more thorough understanding are excluded.
Other Ways To Do Testing
There have been several suggestions made which
would alter the institutional basis within which testing
is accomplished. The main thrust of these proposals is
that testing should be either supervised or conducted by
a party whose primary motivation is in protecting the
public interest rather than maximizing profits. For
example testing might be ultimately funded by industry,
but the actual assignment of testing contracts made by a
government agency. The agency could contract with private
laboratories to do testing, audit the performance of the
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laboratories, and charge the pesticide companies a fee
to cover its costs (including the costs of the testing
contract)
.
The results of tests would be reported to
the Agency and the private laboratories would not be
told whose product they were testing. This would
eliminate the economic incentive for the laboratories
to find results favorable to industry. Contracts would
be assigned on the basis of past performance (determined
through audits) rather than on the basis of past toxi-
cological results favorable to industry. Responsibility
on the part of the laboratories could be further en-
couraged by making them liable for any damages which
resulted to the public as a result of negligence in the
testing process. Another proposal that has been made is
for government agencies to do all testing.
These types of reform would bring about a funda-
mental change in the economic relation of the pesticide
(and drug) companies to those doing the testing of their
products. Probably because of this consequence, they
have never been seriously considered even though there
have been efforts made to introduce them. In the 197 6
Kennedy Subcommittee hearings Senator Gaylord Nelson dis-
cussed the very similar problem of testing drugs. The
Senator noted that the problem had existed for a long
284
time and that his proposed bill for reform had never been
seriously considered.
We introduced it seven years aqo in IQfiQ t.tintroduced it in 1971. \e int^od^Ld' t-in""'
far ;ndorse ^h^' " ^'"^^^ ^^^^^^ thisr e t e concept or the idea or beexcited or interested in it.
So it ends up languishing here.^^
Instead of seriously considering the changing of
the economic basis of testing, most congressional
criticism has admonished the EPA to do a better job
of checking the validity of the data. Given the under-
staffing of the EPA, its tendency to avoid controversy,
and its past history in regard to this issue, this
approach is not likely to solve the problem.
To summarize the argument being made this far,
regulators seeking accurate information about pesticides
and their effects will not confront a body of knowledge
founded on an unbiased search for the facts. The evidence
strongly indicates that pesticide manufacturers exert a
very significant amount of influence in the mobilization
of testing science in support of their viewpoint and
interests. This is one aspect of the influence exerted
by the companies. Basically this influence is exerted in
two ways: first, by submitting their own test data to
support the registration of new pesticides and the
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reregistration of old ones, and second, by mobilizing
many of the other information generating resources of
pesticide related science to their advantage. We have
just dealt with the first of these and „e will now deal
with the second. A primary focus of the manufacturers
in this area is in the land grant universities.
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CHAPTER VI
INDUSTRY AND ACADEME
There has in recent years been an increase in
financial support from business for higher education.
In the last few years, universities have received the
largest increase in financial support from business
since 1920.1 Substantial support from industry is not,
however, a new trend in the schools of agriculture.
The manufacturers of pesticides, along with other
agribusiness concerns, have long had a close relation
with the colleges of agriculture of the land grant
universities and their associated experiment stations
and extension services. The land grant colleges are
the locus of a great deal of research concerning agri-
culture, and most pest control recommendations emanate
from here.^
A recent book for managers entitled The
Regulation Game instructs businessmen on how to
co-opt university based experts.
Regulatory policy is increasingly made with
participation of experts, especially academics.
A regulated firm or industry should be prepared
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whenever possible to co-opt these experts Th^o
for the experts themselves must not recognize
of'actioL^^'^ '"^'^ objectivitranrfreedom
This generalization is true of agriculture but
probably less applicable there than to other disciplines
in the university. The ties between the schools of
agriculture and agribusiness are so extensive that a
minimum of "finesse" is needed in co-opting university
scientists. Indeed it is more accurate to describe
agribusiness as a part of the land grant community
rather than a wealthy client. The greatest impact is
exerted through research investments and through fre-
quent contacts with research staff. Continued university
support for industry is maintained by grants for research
and scholarships, by lending political support for in-
creases in funds to the schools, and by a similarity of
attitudes and objectives."^
The Entomologists
In order to describe the relation of industry to
the agricultural colleges, we will first focus on one
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discipline within the colleges, entomology. We will
then examine the relation of the industry to an agri-
cultural university, the University of California being
the example selected.
Finally we will look at a group of scientists who
provide information about agricultural issues.
The entomology profession is important because
entomologists are probably the most directly concerned
with the making of recommendations on how to control
plant pests. A similar relation to industry can also
be seen, however, in such disciplines as plant pathology,
weed science, forestry and agronomy.^ The professional
organization of the entomologists is the Entomological
Society of America (ESA)
. The original ESA was founded
in 1906 and it was dominated by academic scientists
primarily interested in basic research. The original
members were biologists working on insects, taxonomists,
morphologists
,
physiologists, zoogeographers and
ecologists
.
In 1952 the ESA merged with the American Association
of Economic Entomologists. This group had been formed
in 1889 essentially as an organization for entomologists
working in the new agricultural experiment stations. It
included chemists, toxicologists and others primarily
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concerned with the destruction of insects. The merger
was evidently based on a desire for strength in numbers
and a bigger financial basis, and a desire to link basic
and applied research more closely. The merger was not,
however, approved unanimously by the original ESA
membership. It caused the resignation of a group of
basic biologists and led others to boycott meetings.
Since that time the dominant voice in the ESA has seemed
to be the economic entomologists.^
With the discovery during World War II of the in-
secticidal properties of DDT the pesticide industry
expanded greatly. DDT was inexpensive, long-lasting,
broadly toxic and worked better as an insect killer than
anything that had ever been used."^ DDT also raised the
status of entomologists. Chemical companies focused
substantial attention on them in an effort to gain
recommendations for their products.^ According to the
late Robert van den Bosch who was a well known ento-
mologist at the University of California,
Entomologists and other pest-control specialists
were sucked into the vortex and for a couple ofdecades became so engrossed in developing, pro-ducing and assessing the new pesticides that they
forgot that pest control is essentially an eco-
logical matter. Thus, virtually an entire gen-
eration of researchers and teachers came to
equate pest management with chemical control.
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The uncritical attitude of the ESA toward pesti-
cides is reflected in its choice of speakers at its
national meetings. m his book Th^Pesticid^^^^
published in 1978, van den Bosch points out that since
the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson's Silen^^^^,
not one strong critic of the pest-control status quo has
spoken before a plenary session of the Society or par-
ticipated in one of its major symposia. instead they
hear such speakers as the president of the National
Agricultural Chemical Association (NACA)
, the chief
Washington lobbyist for NACA, and Congressman Jamie
Whitten, a good friend of agribusiness 10
Similarity of opinion. The close relation between many
entomologists and the pesticide manufacturers is not
merely the result of industry money. There seems to
be a similarity of opinion, a shared way of looking at
things which forms an important part of the basis of this
relationship.
Several writers have attempted to understand the
philosophical perspective of those scientists who more
or less uncritically advocate the use of pesticides.
Roland Clement paraphrasing A. N. Whitehead, describes
a narrow positivism which focuses on imminent hazards
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to man without considering long term effects. The
Positivist is too modest to go searching for connections
that have not appeared. He simply states what he sees
and only what he sees. The rigid assumption of their
modesty is that we already know what "system" is. what
our systems cannot organize, nothing can organize. The
physical sciences deal in "types of things" (atoms,
molecules) and are thus typological, but when life^
enters, every organism and every ecosystem has a history
that continually modifies it and makes it at least
somewhat unique. The exact replication of experimental
reactions which the chemist considers his test of truth
becomes only somewhat attainable where unique things
(rather than types of things) are involved. Another
way of saying this is that biological experimentation
often can not be as conclusive as physical experimen-
tation because the variables involved are so numerous,
they are not all thoroughly understood and sometimes
are not even known.
Modesty in searching for connections has led to a
reductionist tendency to search for answers only within
one's own discipline. The specialist is often not
interested in looking outside his area of knowledge
into such areas as ecology, a field which makes use of
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knowledge from several disciplines. Thus Frank Egler, a
plant ecologist, has complained that the agricultural,
forestry, and horicultural sciences are, "thought to be
completely independent of the rest of the ecosystem
13
• •
"This way of thinking," he maintains, "is
precisely at the root of the entire pesticide-ecosystem
problem." The problem is not only one of not looking
outside one's own discipline but also one of emphasizing
a short term view rather than a long term one.^^
What are some of the "connections which have not
yet appeared" which the positivisfs modesty handicaps
his ability to appreciate. They include the long term
effects of pesticides on wildlife, insect predators,
ecosystems and man. A primary effect on man is the
alleged carcinogenicity of many pesticides. The process
of cancer causation is not thoroughly understood and the
assumption of many agricultural scientists in approaching
this body of incomplete knowledge is that until a pesti-
cide is completely proven to be carcinogenic, it is not.
This perspective combines nicely with the inter-
ests of industry. Lacking an ecological perspective,
university scientists who might otherwise be interested
in studying the harmful effects of a pesticide or an
ecologically sound means of pest control, are available
297
to study and support industry products. There is no
liSE^^Jll^mrz. The entomologists, along with other
agriculturally related disciplines, receive substantial
amounts Of .oney from agribusiness. Many professors
receive grants from the chemical companies for research
on the donor's proprietary materials." often these
grants are comparatively small, but they provide the
companies a substantial return. For example a grant
for $2,000 may be made to test a product. It may cost
more than $2,000 to do the tests so the university
subsidizes the rest of the work. The university pays
the salary of the researcher and the cost of maintaining
the laboratory and support facilities, such as the li-
brary, which the researcher uses.
In addition to supplying money directly, industry
lobbyists are quite active in lobbying for increased
funds for many land grant programs.
Close ties are maintained between industry and the
ESA. The Society's "Sustaining Associates" include a
substantial number of agrichemical companies. They
aid the Society by paying inflated annual dues, helping
to pay for distinguished speakers, and advertising in
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the society's journal. At meetings of the ESA, company
hospitality suites entertain members and some are taken
out to dinner. 1^ Meritorious researchers or farm ad-
visors are given full expense packages to attend
meetings. others receive paid fishing trips and hunting
holidays. Some are even awarded overseas trips.
Another industry financial influence is the award.
Deserving scientists receive cash awards for their
contribution to research. For example at the ESA's
annual meeting two top awards are the CIBA-GEIGY
(founder's) award and the Velsicol (Bussart) awards
which include cash prizes. CIBA-GEIGY and Velsicol are
important agrichemical producers. An article in the
November 1979 issue of Farm Chemicals
, an agrichemical
trade magazine, describes an award given to Dr. Thomas
Jukes, a professor-in-residence of medical physics,
lecturer in nutritional sciences, and research biochemist
at the University of California Space Sciences Laboratory
at Berkeley. Although Jukes is not an entomologist, the
article suggests the role of awards in agribusiness
involvement in university research. It reports that
the award for Advancement or Application of Agricultural
and Food Chemistry was presented at the 1979 annual
meeting of the American Chemical Society (ACS) . Jukes
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was given a plaque and a cash award of $2,000. The
award was presented by ACS
• s Division of Agricultural
and Food Chemistry and sponsored by International
Flavors and Fragrances Inc. it honors an outstanding
research scientist who has contributed to man's knowledge
of food and agriculture. According to the article:
Juk^^'^h^^^K
^°table research contributions.es has been recognized for his leadership roletakenm countering the irrational concern ofcertain groups over food additives and residuesof pesticides, antibiotics, and other chemicalsby in3ecting a note of balance in the discussions
.
Support for pesticides. The combination of industry
money and a lack of ecological perspective has led to
a tendency within entomology to emphasize the use of
pesticides at the expense of more environmentally
sound means of pest control. The emphasis on chemicals
is so heavy that Robert Metcalf, a well known ento-
mologist, has complained that his profession is, "seen
by many as a farm chemicals auxiliary
. Support
for the use of pesticides is sometimes enforced by
pressure within the university and within the discipline.
In his book, van den Bosch describes a number of
examples. He relates how an entomologist at Louisiana
State University was subjected to pressure exerted by
a chemical company through the university administration
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.n an effort to suppress his discovery that the company's
insecticide had lost its effectiveness against the boll
weevil. Another researcher was pressured by Mississippi
State university administrators to cease his opposition
to the fire ant eradication program. ^3 Perhaps most
revealing is his description of his attempt to enlist
the support of some fellow entomologists in the hearings
which were held by the EPA when it was considering
whether or not to ban DDT. Van den Bosch called, "about
a half dozen" entomologists, "who expressed their
concern over DDT, felt that it should be banned, and
indicated a willingness to talk with Charley (Charles
Wurster, a scientist representing the Environmental
Defense Fund) about the possibility of testifying in
the DDT hearings." These men, van den Bosch maintains,
were old acquaintances who were enthusiastic about
integrated pest management and who had strongly ex-
pressed a resolve to, "turn the pest-control scene
around .
"
When I talked to them on the phone, they were
really charged up with a willingness to voice
their anti-DDT convictions on behalf of Charlie
Wurster and EDF.24
However, by the time Wurster called them they didn't
want to have a thing to do with the DDT hearings.
Wurster reported to van den Bosch that each man had
expressed fear either of administrative reprisals or
of threats to existing or proposed research grants.
The University nf California
A concrete illustration of the effects of agri-
business influence on agricultural research can be
seen in author Paul Barnetfs description of the
university of California. California uses about
20 percent of the pesticides used in the United States.
The University's scientists have had a crucial role in
shaping the state's pest control system. They research
the effectiveness of new chemicals, and farm advisors
from the University's Cooperative Extension Service
recommend to growers which products to use. Many
University graduates become farmers, chemical salesmen
and government officials.
Pesticide manufacturers provide strong support
for the University's agricultural programs. In fiscal
year 1978-1979, companies that manufacture pesticides
gave 420 gifts worth $689,000 to the University's
division of Agriculture. This money was used to support
the work of research personnel and farm advisors.
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What is the effect of this economic relationship?
According to Al Meyerhoff, an attorney for California
Rural Legal Assistance, there is no consideration of
the social impact of research. m his opinion research
at the university is for sale to the highest donor.
support for this view is offered by Barnett who cites
a 1975 survey of the twenty-five departments in the
College of Agriculture on the Davis Campus. The
survey attempted to determine the factors which can
influence the choice of research topics. The most
popular response was, "money can influence what research
gets done."^0 if this is correct then the $689,000
donated by the chemical companies must have a signifi-
cant effect in influencing researchers to do work on
pesticides. This ties up University resources which
might have been used for research on more environmentally
sound means of pest control.
Pest control recommendations made by the University
strongly emphasize chemicals. An analysis by the Coop-
erative Extension Service of 4300 of its published pest
control recommendations found that ninety-three percent
were for chemical control. The remaining seven percent
were for more environmentally sound means of control.
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Heavy industry support influences not only what
gets studied, but what does not. The University has a
program to provide information to the EPA about the
risks and benefits of pesticides Th=PH a . The program is based
on a number of committees which are formed to provide
the EPA with information about pesticides. Many of the
scientists appointed to the committees receive grants
from pesticide manufacturers. The program reports
mostly on the benefits of pesticides and, according
to the testimony of its director, does not tend to
examine adverse effects.
We are gathering largely benefits data
.
tn rJ ^P^^ ^^^^ ^ chemicali California, how important it is, and why weneed to keep it. if we came by information
showing a greater risk than EPA knew about,then we'd send it to them. We haven't donethat though because we don't get that type ofinformation. 32
Those who receive industry money often support their
benefactors in testimony or advice given to regulatory
agencies. Barnett provides several examples. An
environmental toxicologist who has received $24,900 in
gifts from Dow Chemical Company, the manufacturer of
2,4,5T, has supported continued use of this product
before the state and federal government. A University
of California/Davis entomologist supported an emergency
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exemption from registration requirements for Mesurol a
product Of Chemagro, a pesticide manufactuer that has
given him eighteen gifts worth $17,975. a farm advisor
asked for special local needs registrations for Benlate
and Captan. This advisor has received $12,800 in
thirteen grants from companies that sell these pro-
ducts.
DBCP. The case of Dibromochloropropane (DBCP) is a
particularly vivid example of the effects of the
university-industry relationship. m this case university
researchers failed to inform workers and regulatory
agencies of important findings and failed to conduct
further research which would have shown the extent of
environmental contamination resulting from this chemical.
DBCP is a soil fumigant which was used by farmers
to kill nematodes, worms that eat root tips. It was
used mostly in California and Hawaii and, to a lesser
extent, by soybean farmers in the Middle West. The only
domestic producers of DBCP were the Dow Chemical Company
and the Shell Oil Company, but about seventy-five
chemical companies would buy the product and blend it
with other materials to make various pesticide
34products. About twelve to fifteen million pounds
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were produced annually.
For about a year, beginning in 1976, the workers in
one section of the Occidental Chemical Company plant at
Lathrop, California were concerned about the fact that
none of them were having children. They would discuss
this problem during their lunch breaks at the factory
where they blended DBCP with other ingredients to produce
a final product. Finally, during the summer of 1977
six of them decided to be tested for fertility. All six
had very low sperm counts or none at all. This finding
led to more tests. It was found that sixty-two of
eighty-six Dow employees at a plant outside Magnolia,
Arkansas had abnormally low or nonexistent sperm counts.
Subsequent analysis has confirmed the correlation be-
tween exposure to DBCP and lower sperm counts and
sterility.
The evidence concerning its damaging effects led
Dow Chemical to halt the production of DBCP in August
1977, and to recall all stocks of the chemical later
37that month. The product was banned in California, and
in September the Federal government moved to suspend its
use on nineteen vegetable crops and limit worker
3 8
exposure. Later it was discovered that DBCP con-
tamination was widespread. It was determined that it
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had been present in fruit and vegetable crops, that it
persisted in soil for more than a year, and that there
was widespread contamination of water. California
officials discovered that 155,000 people had been
drinking water contaminated by DBCP and they ordered
more than forty municipal wells shut down/°
Why did such extensive exposure of the population
occur within a regulatory system which is supposed to
protect the public from this type of exposure? The
primary reason is that the Federal government was never
notified of the results of several tests completed
years earlier.
Perhaps the most important test was supervised by
Dr. Charles Hine of the University of California in 1958.
Hine tested rats for the effects of exposure to DBCP at
various concentrations. At a level as low as five parts
per million (ppm) he found that in half the animals
tested the effects varied from degeneration of testicular
epithelium with atrophy to complete degeneration with
complete azoospermia (absence of spermatoza in the
semen). At higher concentrations of the chemical, the
41effects were more severe. This test was an indication
that DBCP might harm workers exposed to it. Dr. Hine did
not inform the workers or government officials. He also
did not conduct further tests to determine if there
existed a level of exposure which was safe/^
In October 1977, the California Department of In-
dustrial Relations held hearings on OBCP to investigate
why such a harmful substance had been overlooked and
allowed on the market. Dr. Hine was among the witnesses
He testified that although he had been employed by the
University and used its laboratory when he did his work
in 1958, the work was supported by a grant from Shell
and reported to them on a confidential basis. The
lowest level of exposure at which he had tested his
rats was five ppm. Therefore he did not know what would
happen at lower levels of exposure. He assumed, however
that exposure at one ppm would be a "no effect" level
(a level of exposure at which no harm occurs) although
he had no data to prove this. Hine recommended this
level to Shell, but also recommended further studies.
When Shell said they would not be necessary, he dropped
the subject. In the hearings he expressed the opinion
that he should have continued testing in order to
determine what level of exposure was safe."*"^ "I think
we should have gone to a no-effect level and I admit
44the error in this thing." He agreed with the hearing
officer that his research priorities were set by a
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"market place concept," and that they were a matter of,
"who is going to come up with the money to do what
you've considered objective research. "^^
The one who has come up with the money for a
substantial portion of Dr. Hine
• s career has been the
Shell Chemical Corporation. since 1947, Shell has
contributed approximately $400,000 to his university
research projects. He also receives consulting fees
from Shell. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union
has filed suit against Dr. Hine and the Shell Chemical
Company. The suit, which was filed on behalf of twenty
workers sterilized by DBCP, claims that the workers
were harmed because he suppressed evidence that the
chemical damaged the testicles of experimental rats.^^
The results of the study supervised by Hine and
one done by Dow scientists which indicated a similar
effect were published in 1961, however the workers and
appropriate government agencies were not notified.
Commenting on these studies in 1979, Dr. Marvin S.
Legator of the Department of Preventive Medicine and
Community Health, University of Texas Medical Branch
referred to a problem of "the nonutilization of data."
Writing in the Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences he said:
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and'reporting of^n'exf 1 conducting
by two of thi ?fr^Lr ^^^""^ toxicological study
sLte:,\'he'toSogic:P?indjr' "^^^^^
disregarded by the'^^oS^orf'Sf'??e lllV^'^^.^'j
stSdi^S o?f ""^^^ the lo^est^ieve?"
investigation^"
was clearly evident in this
undersiind ^^^"^ "'^^^ bewildering to
workers to ^^^^^^^^^ have exposed its
t^chec\'?hfe f^cnrthls'cr' • ^^^-Pting
exposed employees?58 hemical on the
Dr. Hine was not the only university scientist who
ignored the adverse effects of DBCP. m 1965 a nema-
tologist at the University of California/Davis reported
to the administration that studies had shown that
tomato seedlings absorb DBCP through their roots and
translocate it upwards. This result was never published
because, according to the investigator, "that wasn't
our purpose. We were just testing DBCP movement in
49
soil." Not knowing of the studies, the Food and Drug
Administration assumed that no residue would appear in
produce because DBCP is applied to the soil, not the
plant. The analysis of the movement in soil was also
less than adequate. Tests indicated that DBCP was highly
soluble in water and had a low affinity for soil, but
the researchers at California did not try to see how
deeply the chemical would leach. They only checked to
see what would happen after one irrigation. Now after
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twenty years of use, the chemical has evidently leached
down hundreds of feet to contaminate ground water
supplies. 51 other university scientists who have re-
ceived grants from the manufacturers of DBCP have opposed
the banning of it.^^
In the case of DBCP the University's relationship
with industry has led to nonreporting of important re-
sults and a failure to thoroughly investigate questions
of environmental contamination. The University acted
more like a loyal friend of industry than a protector
of public health. Information indicating the dangerous
aspects of the chemical was available in 1961. More
information concerning the likely extent of DBCP
pollution became apparent during the 1960 's, but uni-
versity researchers continued to support its use.
The Council for Agricultural Science and Technology
There are several associations of industry supported
scientists which appear to be neutral institutions dedi-
cated to the task of transmitting scientific information
to policy makers and the public in a balanced, fair
manner, but which actually provide information which is
biased toward the industry point of view. The most active
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Of these organizations is the Council for Agricultural
science and Technology (CAST) which was established in
May, 1972. According to its president, CAST was organized
to get scientific facts about food and agriculture to
the government, the media, and the public as an aid to
understanding and rational decision making.
The leadership of CAST describes it as a consortium
of twenty-five scientific societies. These societies
represent various agricultural sciences. Some of them
include: the Weed Science Society of America, the
Society of Nematologists, the Crop Science Society of
America, the Soil Science Society of America, the
Poultry Science Association, the American Dairy Science
Association, the American Society for Horticultural
Science, and the American Society of Agronomy. in
addition to the societies, more than two hundred agri-
business corporations and industrial trade associations
also belong. There are also over three thousand indi-
vidual members, three associate society members, and 120
subscriber members (libraries and information centers
across the country). CAST is based at Iowa State
University in Ames and it is governed primarily by the
societies which belong to it.^^
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^^i££2£t^£25Li£ldu^ CAST receives substantial support
from industry. The twenty-five scientific societies that
belong pay annual dues of up to five thousand dollars
depending on the number of their members who are in the
agricultural sciences. Then there are the approximately
115 supporting members. These are agribusiness corp-
orations which pay up to five thousand dollars per year
based on the amount of sales of agricultural products.
They are manufacturers of pesticides, herbicides, ferti-
lizers, additives and other chemicals which are the sub-
ject of CAST reports. The supporting members include such
companies as American Cyanamid, Dow Chemical, Inter-
national Multifoods, Mobile Chemical Company, Ozark
Fertilizer, and Stauffer Chemical Company.
There are about 125 sustaining members which are
mostly agricultural trade associations. They pay annual
dues of fifty dollars for regional groups and one hundred
dollars for national groups. The sustaining members
include such organizations as the American Meat Insti-
tute, the Potash Institute, the National Canners Assoc-
iation, and the National Pest Control Association.
Another source of income for CAST is "grants-in aid"
from such organizations as the National Agricultural
Chemicals Association, Merck and Company, and Ralston
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Purina. in 1978, the supporting and sustaining
.embers
and grants-in aid provided $166,500 of CAST's $292,500
operating budget, or almost 57 percent. The 25 scien-
tific societies provided only $36,000 or 12 percent. The
remaining $90,000 (31 percent of the total) came from
individual members, bank interest and sales of a CAST di-
rectory of agricultural scientists. Industry support,
however, is greater than the 57 percent figure just cited.
There are industry sponsored projects and events staged to
publicize CAST reports favorable to its point of view.
For example Dow Chemical sponsored a press conference
and Capitol Hill briefing on September 6, 1978 on CAST's
phenoxy herbicide report which found Dow's product
2,4,5-T of no risk to humans. The National Agricultural
Chemicals Association has sponsored at least five annual
national food safety phone-ins. (The one held in 1977
cost NACA at least forty thousand dollars.) Another
example is the production of a fifty second television
newsclip sponsored by the Fertilizer Institute which
featured a CAST scientist describing the risk to the
earth's ozone layer presented by nitrogen fertilizers.
Although sponsored by industry, these projects and
events appeared in CAST's name, not in the name of the
58industrial sponsor.
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2AST^£E££ts. CAST writes letters to editors and sends
press releases to reporters around the country. its
main activity is the preparation of reports on contro-
versial issues. These reports tend to deemphasize the
possible dangers of using agricultural chemicals. CAST
reports have defended the use of the herbicide 2 , 4 , 5T and
other pesticides. One report criticized the EPa's basic
assumptions used in banning pesticides. Some reports
have favored the use of chemical fertilizer over microbial
soil nutrients, and agricultural practices resulting in
the presence of estrogens in feed have been defended.
CAST reports are not original scientific research. They
are usually either a synthesis of facts about a current
issue or a review of the scientific content of a public
document. The reports are presented in the form of
neutral views but they are biased toward the industry
perspective with controversial issues presented as being
concluded.
CAST reports are prepared by task forces whose
chairmen and members are nominated by the Board of
Directors and approved by the Executive Vice President.
The task force members do not include scientific
dissenters or persons known to have "extreme" views
on an issue. James Witt, an agricultural chemist at
Oregon State University, has criticized CAST for its
policy Of systematically excluding dissenters from the
scientific debate. ^1 witt maintains that an extremist to
CAST is "anything left of neutral. "^^ He argues that a
balanced task force is the only way to circumvent indi-
vidual prejudices and deter critics:
lherT^%lL^T h l^Z ^nti-pesticide spokesmen in
anvn Vhl h ^^^P^ honest; that's the
"
vil the hammer beats against .... They canbe there to rub your nose in some facts you'vemanaged to ignore. 63 ^
However Charles Black, who is the Executive Vice
President of CAST and who must approve all task force
members, disagrees. Black maintains that there is no
need for "extremists."
They just cause trouble. They're unwilling to
compromise, to listen, to allow as to how anyonebut themselves can have a point of view.^'^
Task forces lack not only dissenters, they lack
members of important scientific disciplines related to
the issues being studied. Toxicologists
, biomedical
researchers, and epidemiologists are missing from many
task forces which deal with issues requiring human risk
assessment. This leaves agronomists, plant pathologists,
and animal scientists to make statements about human
health which they may be poorly qualified to make. The
result of this is that many CAST reports easily dismiss
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problems Which puzzle clinical researchers. An example
of this is the question of whether or not there is a
threshold or "no effect" level for carcinogens. Some
researchers think that there may exist a level of
exposure to a carcinogen so low that no cancer is
caused. others maintain that exposure to any amount
may cause cancer. This controversial issue is presented
in some CAST documents as if it were an established fact
that a threshold level does exist.
Other questionable aspects of CAST reports include
the speed with which they are completed (as short as six
weeks) and the fact that they do not allow for the in-
clusion of a minority opinion as part of the final report,
Furthermore, the reports are not noted for their
accuracy or completeness.^^ Writing in the Bulletin of
the Entomological Soc iety of America
. Witt commented on
two CAST reports, one on aldrin-dieldrin and one on
heptachlor/chlordane. (Aldrin/dieldrin and heptachlor/
chlordane are two controversial pesticides most uses of
which have been banned by the EPA.) The aldrin/dieldrin
report, he says, is brief, consisting of nine pages. The
extreme brevity of the document prevents a decent
analysis. Only one reference is provided and the only
data appears in the economic analysis section. The
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critical question confronting the EPA in deciding whether
to retain the registration of these chemicals was their
impact on humans and wildlife, but the report does not
consider the wildlife issue and the hu,„an health issue
is dismissed in one sentence:
hazard^'^f^^^" ^ potential public health
scnn^ A/^^^''''^^'-^^ ^^^^h is beyond theope of this report. °
7
Witt describes the chlordane/heptachlor report as
being better in quality but still having deficiencies.
The arguments tend to run in one direction emphasizing
the pro view and deemphasizing the con. Data favorable
to the chemical is uncritically admitted while unfavorable
data is exhaustively examined. Furthermore, the report
fails to cite all relevant studies.
During a series of hearings on the use of diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES) in cattle feed, the FDA criticized a
CAST report on the subject which said that DES residues
in meat were less harmful to humans than naturally
occurring estrogens in wheat germ and green vegetables.
The document was described as
:
. .
.a purportedly scientific document which in
fact is a collection of conclusions by a number
of cattle-oriented people followed by a list of
disconnected references and appendices . ^9
An FDA attorney referred to the report as, "a conclusion
7 0in search of citations."
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^^^^^^^-^Y^^^Iltit^^ In December 1978
, six scien-
tists resigned in protest from a CAST task force working
on a report on the risks of feeding livestock large but
less than therapeutic quantities of antibiotics in order
to promote growth. The six signed a letter of protest
which accused CAST of: omitting unfavorable evidence
on the risks of drug use from a draft final report,
emphasizing evidence on the benefits, and generally
bending science to fit the public relations aims of
the organization. All six of the scientists were
microbiologists or biochemists. They were joined by
a seventh, a microbiologist, who resigned in January
711979.
The protesting scientists said that the final
draft of the report contained numerous inaccuracies and
was misleading. They said that CAST had misrepresented
their statements which warned that the continued use of
antibiotics can lead to the development of drug-
resistant bacteria in livestock, some of which can pro-
duce disease in humans. Where the scientists had noted
that a given antibiotic increases the resistance of the
remaining organisms, it was reworded by the Council to
indicate that it "might" have that effect. According
to one of the scientists, Dr. Richard Novick, the Council
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Changed the whole tone of their work and softened the
wordings. The final draft suggested that the wholesale
use of antibiotic prophylactics is safe and beneficial,
an implication which, according to Dr. Novick, is con-
trary to fully accepted standards of medical practice.
In commenting on the research project Dr. Novick noted
that the CAST format was "highly superficial" and that
task force members prepared their reports in a "cursory
and offhand manner. "^"^
Agricultural scientific support for cast . one reason
why it is important to look at CAST is the fact that
although it is controversial, the support for it within
the agricultural sciences is rather substantial. The
list of twenty-five member societies, some of which
have been mentioned, is impressive. The fact that
these societies are members bestows on CAST reports
a significant degree of legitimacy. A survey in 1979
(which, it should be stated, was conducted by CAST) of
the deans and chief administrators of agriculture at the
U.S. land grant colleges showed solid support of CAST."^^
For example one question asked if CAST should continue
to respond to national news media on matters relating to
food and agricultural science and technology in the
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future as in the past. There were thirty three "yes-
votes and one "no." a request to grade CAST on its
past work produced:
16 votes Excellent
14 votes Good
2 votes Fair
0 votes Poor
AH this indicates that support for CAST among
the agricultural disciplines is rather substantial.
The views expressed by CAST are obviously the views
of many in the agricultural sciences. This suggests
that the criticisms of CAST set forth by such scien-
tists as Witt, Metcalf, Novick, and the other researchers
who resigned over the antibiotics study are criticisms
whose general content are applicable to much of agri-
cultural science in general. The one-sidedness of CAST
reports, their tendency to support the agribusiness point
of view, and their lack of concern with environmental
and public health problems are reflections of similar
orientations within much of the agricultural sciences.
CAST is important because it is not a marginal group
on the periphery of the agricultural sciences, it is
substantially supported and accepted.
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Motivation
The descriptions of the Entomology profession, the
university of California and CAST suggest strongly that
there is a definite similarity in the points of view
and policies supported by agribusiness and many in the
agricultural sciences. Some indications of the financial
relationship between these two sectors have been pre-
sented. The next step in reasoning might be to assume
that agribusiness "buys" scientists. This conclusion
has been made by many, but it appears to this writer to
be too simple. Basically this is a question of moti-
vation, one which the observer can only attempt to answer
by observing patterns of action and making some sensible
inductions concerning the probable reasoning beyond the
observed actions. This is, at best, a speculative
endeavor, but a bit of speculation fits in here.
It seems probable that some agricultural scientists
who regularly support agribusiness views intentionally
distort data and ignore reports of which they are aware.
The great majority, however, seem to sincerely believe
that they are being objective and fair. Their
perspectives, however, do not usually seem to rise outside
the immediate concerns of their own research and their
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own disciplines. The primary concern of their disci-
plines is to increase agricultural productivity. Many of
the concerns voiced by environmentalists, such as the
effects of pesticides on ecological systems, involve
many variables and require much testing in order to
prove their validity beyond any doubt. Until such
concerns are proven these scientists tend to dismiss
them as not being worthy of much attention. Furthermore,
they tend to differ with environmentalists concerning
how much proof is needed.
In approaching the areas of environmental and health
related science which are poorly understood, some sub-
jective judgements concerning the meaning of data are
needed. The subjective judgements of these scientists
tend to place less emphasis on risks to humans or the
environment and more on the need for agricultural
productivity. Looked at this way the correlation between
industry financial support for agricultural scientists
and the views of many of those scientists favorable to
agribusiness is not an indication that they are
"bought." As in the laboratory audit system, the
presence of agribusiness money seems to often favor
the research (and thus careers) of those whose point of
view is similar to that of industry. Industry money is
not likely to produce much support for research on
the advantages of biological control or the possible
damage to the environment which may result from the use
Of a pesticide.
Other Possibilities
This chapter has argued that ties based on
financial support and philosophical perspective ensure
a close relationship between industry and many in the
agricultural research community. This relationship
produces much information which has the effect of
supporting the industry in its goal of maximizing profit
rather than maximizing the amount of accurate, un-
biased knowledge concerning the risks and benefits of
pesticides
.
The industry does not "buy" scientists. Instead
it presents opportunities to do research related to the
benefits of chemical pest control. In this way scien-
tists who might have studied biological pest control or
some of the adverse effects of pesticides instead study
chemical control.
The example of DBCP shows how the economic relation
of industry to much of the research in the agricultural
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sciences encourages work which emphasizes the benefits
Of pesticides. This relationship offers little inducement
for researchers to report possible adverse effects to
regulatory agencies or to those segments of the public
who may be affected.
The problems noted in this chapter might be allev-
iated by reforms of the relationship between industry
and the universities. Universities could receive contri-
butions from industry only under conditions which allowed
the university to decide how money would be spent. All
donations might be distributed among university re-
searchers by a committee whose members were unaware of the
identity of contributors. All donations would become part
of a common fund, allocated to researchers on the basis
of the merits of research proposals determined by such
methods as peer review. Thus recipients of funds would
not be under pressure to interpret results or structure
research in ways conducive to the interests of industry
in order to get more research funds. The inability to
choose the types of research which it supported would
most likely lead to a drop in industry support for re-
search, but this loss could be replaced by increased
government support. Thus support based on the pursuit
of private interest would be replaced by support based
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on the public interest.
we have been arguing that the industry mobilizes
many of the resources of pesticide related science to
its advantage. We have just dealt with a primary focus
in this endeavor, the agricultural sciences. We will
now deal with a second focus of this activity, the
communication of information to the public and decision-
makers concerning the possible carcinogenicity of
pesticides
.
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CHAPTER VII
WHOSE VIEW OF CANCER?
The ability of industry to mobilize the information
generating resources of science to its advantage is not
restricted to the agricultural sciences. One of the
most controversial questions related to the regulation
Of pesticides is their possible carcinogenicity. This
subject is very important because many pesticides are
suspected of being carcinogenic and whether or not they
are is frequently debated. m the discussions sur-
rounding pesticides the question of carcinogenicity is
one of the most frequently debated topics. The question
of what scientific evidence constitutes acceptable
proof of carcinogenicity is strongly debated within the
scientific community. This is true not only of pesti-
cides but also of other chemicals. In communicating
with members of Congress and the public, industry
supports that side of the scientific debate which is
most compatible with its interest in being regulated
less. Because the environmentalists are not able to
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match the resources of industry in communicating with
congressmen, congressional committees, and the public,
the view Of carcinogenicity to which many congressmen
and members of the public are exposed is one which is
more favorable to industry. Thus legislators and the
public often tend to have a view of cancer and its
causes which, many would argue, does not adequately
allow for the protection of human health. Some scien-
tists question the sincerity of those who support the
industry's view of what constitutes acceptable evidence
of carcinogenicity. One very well known researcher
even refers to several industry supported theories as
"myths." This discussion will not criticize the
validity of the industry supported theories. it will
only point out that there exists a diversity of views
on carcinogenicity, that there are a substantial number
of reputable scientists who disagree with industry
theories and who support different theories of which the
public and legislators are often unaware. If the
public and legislators were more aware of these theories
it is probable that more substances would be considered
to be carcinogenic and it is logical to assume that
demands for more stringent regulation would rise. In
order to explain these alternative theories, and the
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scientific disputes concerning cancer theory it is
necessary to take a fairly extensive look at how
substances are tested for carcinogenicity.
How Testing Is Done
The primary ways in which chemicals are tested in
order to determine their carcinogenicity are through
laboratory tests and epidemiological analysis. Epi-
demiologists study human populations in order to link
the incidence of cancer with causal factors. Some epi-
demiological studies focus on a particular factory or
factories in order to determine the effect of chemicals
to which workers are exposed. Others look at larger
population groups, such as one study which compared
rural and urban populations in an attempt to correlate
increased incidence of cancer with pesticide use.^
All epidemiological studies are very difficult to conduct
Particular problems encountered in studying factory
workers include the long latent period of cancer, and
the difficulty of following up workers who leave their
factory jobs. Cancer often does not appear for twenty-
five to thirty years after exposure to a carcinogen.
In addition many workers leave their jobs and go on to
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new ones. it is often difficult to find workers who
worked in a factory as long as twenty-five to thirty
years ago. These problems are especially significant
if the carinogen being studied is comparatively weak,
that is, if it tends to cause cancer in fewer cases
than other carcinogens do. The weaker the carcinogen
is, the more workers will be needed in order to have a
sample large enough to provide statistically significant
evidence that detected cancers are caused by the sub-
Stance in question.
Epidemiologists often study large populations. In
studying large populations the long latent period of
cancer just discussed is also a problem as is the
mobility of the population. There is also the problem
of controls. In order to determine that a suspected
chemical causes cancer there must be a comparison of an
exposed group to a "control" group which is not exposed
in order to see if there is an unusually high number of
cancers in the exposed group. With many pesticide
chemicals it is often difficult to find a group which
is not exposed. For example when DDT was in widespread
use, most people in the United States had some residue of
this chemical in their bodies. Another problem is
that the public is exposed to so many environmental
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influences that it is often difficult to be certain
that the cause of cancer is the suspected chemical and
not some other etiologic factor such as age, smoking,
or another carcinogenic substance/
Thus it is very difficult to conduct epidemiological
analyses and it is not surprising that relatively few
adequate studies have been done for chemical carcino-
gens. This is particularly true concerning pesti-
cides
.
Given the problems associated with epidemiological
analysis, most testing for carcinogenicity occurs in
the laboratory. Laboratory studies range from DNA
modification experiments to mutagenesis studies on
cells in culture, to life time animal feeding studies.^
The most reliable and acceptable laboratory tests are
those involving animals. While other tests are useful
indicators of carcinogenicity, they are not yet ready
to replace animal tests.
^
In animal tests, a group of animals are systemati-
cally exposed to various amounts of a suspected chemical
under tightly controlled laboratory conditions. The
effects of the chemical can be determined by comparing
this group with a control group of animals who (except
for the chemical being studied) have been subjected to
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exactly the same environmental conditions as the first
group. The determination that the tested chemical is
carcinogenic depends on the detection of a statistically
significant excess of tumors in the experimental group
as compared to the control group. ^ Tests are normally
performed on at least two animal species in determining
the carcinogenicity of a questioned substance. The
species used are usually rats and mice, although other
species are also sometimes used. Because of the ex-
pense, tests generally do not include more than two
hundred animals and often the number is less.^^ Animal
testing is quite expensive and time consuming, a
thorough test costs $250,000 per chemical and takes
about three years to complete and analyze. "^^
Testing Controversies
There are several aspects of animal testing which
are warmly debated by scientists. In examining the
controversy over what constitutes acceptable proof of
carcinogenicity we will look at four of them.
1. The applicability of animal tests to human
beings
2. The size of test doses
337
3. The existence of a threshold level of exposure
to a chemical below which the chemical is safe
4. Whether or not benign tumors should be dis-
tinguished from malignant ones in determining
carcinogenicity
.
Animal testing. Scientists differ in the amount of
weight they are willing to assign to animal tests as an
indicator of carcinogenicity. Some tend to deemphasize
the importance of these tests. They repeatedly stress
the point that an indication that a substance causes
cancer in mice does not mean that the same substance
will cause cancer in humans. A paper on the causes
of cancer presents the view of a large chemical manu-
facturer :
Substances that produce benign or malignant
tumors in animals, on the other hand, are only
a potential cancer risk for humans since not
all animal carcinogens have been proved to cause
cancer in humans. In some cases, human ex-
perience with a substance may indicate that
the potential for cancer is very low.^"^
Other researchers interpret tests which demonstrate
the carcinogenic effect of a substance on animals as
very strong evidence that it is likely to be carcinogenic
in humans. While maintaining that there can be no
absolute assurance that a chemical found to be carcino-
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genie to animals will also cause cancer in humans, they
point out that all of experimental biology and medicine
assumes that effects in animals, properly qualified, are
applicable to man.^^ They argue that cancer in humans
and animals is strikingly similar and that virtually
every form of human cancer has an experimental counter-
^ 16part. According to Dr. Epstein:
However there is now overwhelming agreement bymost qualified scientists that if a chemical
causes cancer in well-designed animal tests,then there is a strong likelihood that it willalso cause cancer in exposed humans. 17
Epstein maintains that extrapolation of animal
test results to humans is fundamental to cancer research
and that:
This inference rests on over half a century ofintensive scientific investigation into thebiology and chemistry of carcinogenesis and
carcinogens in many organisms, including humans.
Acceptance of the extrapolation principle is
grounded in the fact that fundamental life
processes in mammalian and other animals are
basically the same as those in humans. 18
A fairly recent report of a committee of the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that:
The opinion is widely held that if a substance
is demonstrated to be a carcinogen for any mammalian
species in an appropriately designed and performed
carcinogenesis bioassay then the substance is
likely to pose a potential cancer risk to humans.
Scientists supporting the importance of animal tests
often point out that of the approximately twenty-five
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<ben.ene and arsenic) have
.een shown to oause cance.
in rodents. ^
Sosaae. one of the most often heard criticisms of
animal tests is that the doses to which the animals
are exposed far exceeds that to which humans are
normally exposed. Those supporting animal tests argue
that high doses are necessary because of shorter exposure
times and the limited number of animals used, while
humans may be exposed to a chemical for thirty years or
more, animal life spans are much shorter and animal
tests last for only about two years. ^1 The amount of
animals used in a laboratory experiment is very small in
contrast to the human population which may be exposed to
the substance being studied. Using a small amount of
animals makes it difficult to detect the effects of a
weak carcinogen. For example if a low level of exposure
to a carcinogen caused cancer in an exposed human popu-
lation at a rate of 0.01 percent, then one thousand
people in a total population of ten million would de-
velop cancer. In order to directly detect this low
an incidence in the laboratory would require hundreds
of thousands of animals at an astronomical cost. Thus
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.n order to increase the incidence of cancer and reduce
the amount of time necessary for it to develop, re-
searchers expose test animals to high doses of chemicals
and then use biologically reasonable models in extrapo-
lating the results to estimate risks at low doses. i„
doing this, scientists assume that If the substance being
tested Is not carcinogenic, exposure to high amounts of
it will not cause cancer.
Thresholds. Some researchers claim that there exists
a "threshold" level of exposure to a chemical below
which the substance has no carcinogenic effect. Thus,
for example, a substance which caused cancer when
people were exposed to it at concentrations of twenty-
five ppm or higher, might be harmless at lower concen-
trations. If this assumption is valid, then regulations
concerning the substance need not ban it. It would only
be necessary to ensure that public exposure was below
the threshold level.
Others suggest that there is insufficient evidence
to support the concept of a threshold level. One
critic of thresholds suggests that even if it is postu-
lated that they exist, there is presently no empirical
or theoretical basis for determining the dose at which
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they may occur. 2= „ thresholds do not exist then
complete protection of the public from the effects of
carcinogenic chemical would require that there be no
exposure at all.
Benign tumors
.
At the end of an animal experiment, the
animals are killed and autopsied in order to determine
whether or not the tested chemical has caused cancer.
At this time benign tumors are often found. Many
scientists argue that benign tumors should be considered
equally with malignant ones as indications of carcino-
2 6genicity. This argument is based on the opinion that
many tumors frequently develop into cancers at a later
27
stage. other scientists are critical of this assump-
tion.
Promoting A Point of View
The industry perception of carcinogenicity is
frequently conveyed to the public. When a regulatory
agency announces that a substance has been found to be
carcinogenic or when an allegedly carcinogenic substance
is discussed in the media, the frequent industry reply
is that the evidence is insufficient. For example in a
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newspaper article about ethylenebisdithiocarba^ate
(EBDC)
,
a pesticide chemical which has been shown to
cause thyroid tumors and birth defects in rats and
liver tumors in mice, an industry spokesman is quoted
as follows:
Itr^ .
emphasize to our knowledge there i
fCn^f:!;^^'°" "
"""^ ""-^^ that shows\hat EBDCu gicides, or ethylenethiourea
, are suspected
or ?hyroiI deLcr"'.""*^ "'Nations,tn d efe ts m humans. To say that thechemicals are suspected of these problems itotally without any scientific evidence?29
s no
se
s
This statement is fairly typical of those made by
industry to the press. The "no information" to which
the spokesman refers is epidemiological evidence. m
its public statements on pesticides and other chemicals
industry often takes the stand that animal tests indi-
cating carcinogenicity are insufficient proof. Animal
tests must be accompanied by epidemiological evidence.
However the previously described problems of conducting
epidemiological analyses make it very difficult to
establish such a link. In this way industry applies its
view of carcinogenicity to public statements which has
the effect of indicating that a concern raised by a
regulatory agency or environmentalists is not serious.
In confronting the possible carcinogenicity of a chemical
which many scientists believe should be stringently
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regulated, the typical industry approach is to set
forth any one or combination of the several theoretical
explanations of carcinogenicity which it supports. A
suspected chemical was given to animals in higher
doses than humans would ever encounter; many of the
tumors found were benign; humans would not be exposed
to the substance in amounts above a threshold level
which the evidence indicates is a safe level of ex-
posure. The public is usually confused because often
neither industry or environmentalists caution that
their explanations of carcinogenicity are theoretical
assumptions rather than established scientific facts.
Thus an essential element of the politics of pesti-
cide regulation (and toxic substance regulation in
general) is the manipulation of meaning concerning the
carcinogenicity of chemicals. The industry view of what
constitutes adequate evidence of carcinogenicity is one
which is strongly criticized by many scientists, but
this view is often presented to the public, congressmen,
state and federal regulators and farmers. Often the
manner in which it is presented gives the reader little
evidence that it is a theoretical assumption rather
than a scientific fact. Thus an ideology of cancer
causation is promulgated and reinforced by industry.
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This probably accounts for the strong opposition of most
farmers to stringent pesticide regulation and their
general lack of concern for the effects of pesticides
.
This subject will be discussed later. Suffice it to say
here that there is strong evidence to support the
assumption that most farmers receive the greatest part
of their information about pesticides from pesticide
salesmen. 33 This source of information and the generally
strong support for industry in the farm magazines tend
to reinforce the industry ideology.
Policy makers and scientific controver.c;i p. Many
authors have pointed out the need for policy makers to
distinguish between scientific facts and political
1 34values. It IS argued that in confronting a policy
issue involving science the policy maker should ask
the scientist what the scientific facts are and what is
unknown. Understanding the facts, the policy maker can
then make decisions based on these facts and on political
value choices. This approach makes sense; however in
applying it, it is often not recognized that in communi-
cating with policy makers and the public, scientists
are often very unclear about what is known and what is
not known. Often statements are made as if they were
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facts when in reality the theoretical bases supporting
these statements are the subject of substantial
disagreement. 35 Thus the policy maker who will be
making choices related to the regulation of carcinogens
and who would like to understand what is known and not
known about chemical carcinogenicity will not find a
clear known/unknown line, nor will he be able to easily
discern the political value choices open to him. The
boundary between scientific fact and political value
choices is amorphous and unclear. Discerning it re-
quires substantial communication with scientists and
at least some knowledge of the theoretical controversies
which exist in the scientific community. The problem
of thresholds provides an example.
Because they are related to the making of choices
which will involve the welfare of many people, scien-
tists will confront the unknowns of pesticide carcino-
genicity testing at least somewhat on the basis of their
personal values. The threshold theory illustrates the
influence of values in choosing a scientific theory.
To review what has been said about thresholds, according
to this theory there is a level of exposure to a carcino-
genic chemical below which the substance will not cause
cancer and above which it may. This level might be
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different for different chemicals. it
.ight be five pp.
for chemical A, ten pp. for chemical B, etc. The policy
implications of this theory are important. if a threshold
level exists, then the public can be completely pro-
tected by legislation limiting the amount of exposure
to an amount below the threshold. if a threshold does
not exist, then complete protection will require legis-
lation which prohibits any exposure of the public at
all. The scientist who supports or denies the existence
of thresholds does so on the basis of scientific knowl-
edge, but also, most probably, at least somewhat, on
the basis of his personal philosophy. There exists
data and theoretical explanations of this data which
tend to indicate that thresholds exist. There also
exists data and theoretical explanations which tend
to disprove the threshold theory. "^"^ The scientist
attempting to discern the answer to this scientific
question finds an incomplete explanation offered by the
scientific evidence. Thus in confronting this area of
uncertainty personal value choices are likely to be an
important variable. An examination of the literature
surrounding this scientific question indicates that
scientists are often fairly strong in voicing their
support or criticism of this theory. Given the
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inconclusiveness of the data, this strength of support
must be based at least somewhat on values. It is logical
to assume that the researcher whose personal priority
Of Choices tends to emphasize such goals as the pre-
vention of cancer and the avoidance of risks in con-
fronting environmental problems may tend to criticize
the threshold theory, or at least to assume that it
should not be accepted until proven. The researcher
who is concerned most highly with such values as the
need for productivity may tend to support the threshold
theory, or at least to assume that it should be supported
until disproved.
The policy maker who has at least some understanding
of the existence and nature of the debate over thresholds
is less likely to uncritically accept the assertions of
scientists on one side or the other of this controversy,
assertions which are often stated so forcefully that
they seem to be statements of fact rather than theoretical
assumptions. In their many statements on the scientific
aspects of pesticide regulation in hearings, the Congress-
ional Record
,
and in personal interviews, most legis-
lators do not seem to have much knowledge of the theo-
retical controversy over thresholds or of other pesticide
related scientific controversies.
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^SS^S^iion^^:^^ AS has been pointed out, the
industry view of carcinogenicity is frequently co^nuni-
cated to the public through the press and to congressmen
.n congressional testimony. 3^ we have described already
the tendency of industry witnesses to outnumber environ-
mentalists at hearings. Furthermore interviews with
several congressmen, aides, and Agriculture co^^ittee
staff members indicate that while they do not frequently
talk to the environmentalists they often see industry
people. The lack of contact with environmentalists is
not, they say, because they are unwelcome, but because
the environmental groups do not often attempt to make
contact. When questioned about this, the environ-
mentalists replied that they do not have enough people
to communicate more frequently with the legislators.
The EPA does support a view of chemical carcino-
genicity testing which is generally consistent with the
environmentalists' perspective. In its communication
with Congress it occasionally attempts to explain this
perspective and thus offers an alternative explanation
to that of industry. However given the number of
industry witnesses at hearings, and the frequency of
industry contacts with congressmen the opportunities
for industry to convey Its interpretation of this
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scientific issue are considerable. Because of their les
substantial resources, the environmentalists can not
muster anywhere near the number of industry witnesses
or lobbyists in order to present their perspectives.
When we also consider the frequency with which the
industry perspective is reported in the press, the pro-
industry attitude Of the farm magazines, and the in-
fluence Of the pesticide salesmen, the evidence appears
to indicate that the industry exerts substantially more
influence than the environmentalists in communicating
its scientific perspective to the public, pesticide
users, and legislators. Science is the legitimatizing
foundation of pesticide regulation. All participants
constantly use the language of science in supporting
their preferences. Those who are most able to support
research and communicate their theoretical interpre-
tations of data enjoy a substantial advantage.
Communicating with farmers
. While the attitudes of
the public about pesticides are important, the opinions
of farmers are particularly important. Most people are
exposed to pesticides only in relatively small amounts
such as a residue on foods. Farmers use pesticides
frequently and are thus more susceptible to possible
s
adverse effects, a strong desire on the part of farmer
and farm organizations for stringent regulation in
order to protect their health and the long term pro-
ductivity of their farms would be a powerful political
force; however, as has been pointed out, farmers tend
to have very positive attitudes toward the use of
pesticides and tend to be unconcerned with the possible
negative consequences of their use/° The numerous
farm groups appearing at congressional hearings
regularly testify in support of less stringent forms
of regulation. Given the possible adverse effects of
pesticides on their health it seems important to look
more closely at why this important group is not more
concerned with the potential dangers of pesticides.
A study done for the Council on Environmental
Quality and the EPA in Iowa and Illinois in 197 3
measured farmers' reasons for using pesticides, their
knowledge of alternate crop protection methods, and
their sources of information on both chemical and
nonchemical crop protection. The report found that
farmers receive their information about pesticides
primarily from pesticide sellers, labels (on pesticide
containers), and other farmers. Of these three,
pesticide sellers were the most popular source of
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information. The report pointed out that university
extension specialists, area extension agents, and
county agents (farm advisors) were regarded by the
growers as very useful sources considering their
small numbers in relation to the large number of
farmers they serve. However, the report continued,
the public servants are outnumbered by pesticide
industry representatives and pesticide sellers by
wide margins and their messages reach only a small
percentage of farmers directly.
The report notes that messages recommending re-
duced or no use of pesticides, "... do not flow
4 2well through this system." The reason that this
is a situation in need of correction can be seen in
the report's warning that there is increasing evidence
that in the long run, only those crop production
strategies that are ecologically sound will also be
economically sound. It warns that the fact that current
crop protection decisions may entail hidden future
costs is generally not known to farmers and no effort
is being made to bring it to their attention.
Van den Bosch points out the importance of another
significant flow of pesticide information, the agri-
cultural magazines. The agricultural press is,
352
according to van den Bosch, heavily dependent on the
chemical industry for revenue and it presents a one-
sided story regarding pesticides Examination of
issues of several agricultural magazines supports this
observation. The pesticide manufacturers advertise
heavily in these publications.
Concepts and regulation. This chapter has described
several theoretical disputes concerning how chemicals
cause cancer. These disputes are not merely academic
controversies among scientists. The ways in which
the public and decision makers look at carcinogenicity
will have a strong effect on the types of regulatory
legislation demanded. The industry utilizes its
superior resources in order to communicate its view of
carcinogenicity to decision makers, the public, and
farm users. Often this view is presented as if it
were a matter of established scientific fact rather
than a possible explanation. Policy makers wishing
to deal effectively with this issue will have to
acquire at least some knowledge of the basic theo-
retical controversies related to it.
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CHAPTER VIII
SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Many would argue that the pesticide problem was
the first of the environmental issues to emerge in the
late 1960
-s, the issue which contributed more than any
other to public awareness of the concepts and problems
of ecology. Because policymakers have had a longer
amount of time to deal with this issue, than say air
or water pollution, one might assume that greater
progress would have been made. This however is not
the case. The aspirations embodied in the 1972 FIFRA
have not been met and subsequent revisions of that
already weak legislation have weakened it further.
Weak legislation and less than vigorous enforcement
by the EPA have meant that our criteria for adequate
regulation discussed in Chapter II have not been met.
In this chapter we will first discuss these criteria.
We will then summarize the reasons why the political
system has produced less than adequate policy outputs.
In doing this the findings of this research will be
compared to the ideas of political theorists concerning
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how legislators make policy. This will be followed by
a brief examination of some long term causal variables
related to this policy issue. Finally, there will be
a short discussion of some potential solutions to the
pesticide problem and their political feasibility.
Examining the Criteria
In Chapter II we described several criteria for
the regulation of pesticides. These were:
1. A strong basic law regulating pesticides
2. Effective enforcement of pesticide regulatory
legislation free from arbitrary interference
by Congress
3. The production of accurate, objective, scientific
data concerning the effects of pesticides on human
health, wildlife and the total environment
4. The implementation of legal requirements which
would facilitate the increased use of Integrated
Pest Management techniques.
The preceding pages have shown how these criteria
have not been met. Let us now look at each one.
The pesticide law
.
An adequate pesticide law should
protect human health and the environment from the
adverse effects of pesticides while at the same time
taking into consideration the farmer's need to avoid
large crop losses and the importance of pest control
to public health. Thus the law should allow for the
use of pesticides when necessary, but should promote
the use of more environmentally sound means of pest
control whenever possible. Pesticide users should
be educated about the potential adverse effects of
these products and about more biologically sound IPM
alternative technologies.
Against these criteria the law, generally, has
been found to be deficient. The 1972 law did provide
the basis for more protection than the statute which i
replaced, however it contained significant weaknesses
such as its excessive procedural requirements, its pro
visions for indemnity and for state enforcement, and
its failure to adequately address such needs as the
training of applicators, the initiation of citizen's
suits, and the reduction of the overall amounts of
pesticides used. In subsequent years changes to the
law, such as the provisions for self-certification of
applicators, conditional registration, and the
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assignment of primary enforcement responsibility to
the states, have tended to directly weaken it. Many
other changes have weakened it by making it more
difficult to administer.
The framers of the law have provided language which
appears to be aimed at balancing the need to protect
human health and the environment from the adverse effects
of pesticides on the one hand, against the need of
farmers for a reasonable profit and the need to protect
public health from diseases caused by insects on the
other. The specific phrase in the law which refers to
this need is "unreasonable adverse effects." The
Administrator of the EPA is supposed to make his de-
cisions about whether or not to register pesticides on
the basis of this criterion. The problem with this
standard is that its meaning is always subject to debate
and differing interpretations. In practice, due
primarily to the pressure exerted by Congress on the
EPA, this phrase has usually been interpreted in a
manner compatible with the interests of farmers and the
industry.
The focus of FIFRA has been almost exclusively on
the registration of pesticides. There has been very
little effort aimed at reducing the overall use of
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pesticides or at educating the public about ipm
alternative pest control technologies. There has also
been very little education of the consumer about the
effects of pesticides, such as the harmful effect of
residues on food. The public generally prefers un-
blemished food and a very low level of insect parts in
food and is generally unaware that the cost of such
cosmetically appealing food may be a significant amount
of danger from exposure to higher than needed pesticide
residues
.
Enforcing FIFRA. The law is very difficult to enforce
because of its many procedural requirements and because
the Congress tends to interfere with EPA efforts at
substantial enforcement. There are many more pro-
cedural requirements than are necessary for the fair
treatment of those regulated. As originally written in
1972, the law contained an excessive amount of procedures
and subsequent revisions have added more unnecessary
requirements. These revisions have most often been
justified as ways to make the law more "rational."
As an effective means of protecting the public and
environment they have actually tended to make it less
rational. To the extent that the EPA has been able to
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cope with the procedural labyrinth imposed on it by
congress, it must still face congressional interference
of the kind seen in the examples of the tussock moth
and the pesticide hotline.
FIFRA is not a strong law and both its structure
and congressional interference prevent rigorous en-
forcement; however the considerable amount of attention
given to this legislation by environmentalists, legis-
lators and industry people suggest that there must be
a causal factor which explains its importance. This
factor appears to be its symbolic value. The preceding
pages have shown how the law fails to protect the en-
vironment; however on first reading it appears to be
a carefully drawn document aimed at environmental
protection. it is lengthy and complicated suggesting
an attempt to reach the socially optimal outcome in
every situation which might fall under its jurisdiction.
The language of the law and the language surrounding
its revisions and implementation, especially the
language of its legislative history, suggests a sincere
effort to reach a balance between the needs of the en-
vironment and such other needs as the protection of
crops, which is in the best interest of all concerned.
In this regard the use of risk-benefit analysis is
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particularly impressive. This tool is used in making
registration decisions and in many studies related to
the revision and implementation of the law. it is a
procedure which seems to present to many members of
the public the impression of being a much more objective
means of decision-making than many who are closely
involved with the use of this tool consider it to be.
Only after careful examination do certain aspects
of the law and its revision become apparent. Without
careful study it is difficult to see what ideas, such
as the implementing of IPM, have been consistently
ignored and what information, such as the many GAO
and other reports previously described, has also been
ignored. it is also difficult to see the bias in the
reporting of scientific information related to pesticide
regulation which the law facilitates. Most members
of the public lack the time to study the pesticide
issue to the extent necessary to discern these factors.
Furthermore even many of the everyday participants
in this policy process, caught up in the practical
demands of preparing testimony, or advocating or opposing
the registration of a particular chemical, apparently
lose sight of many of these problems.
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Thus impressive language and procedures tend, to a
significant degree, to obscure the reality of an ex-
cessively complicated law, loopholes in the law (such
as conditional registration) and the interference of
Congress with enforcement. The law in its symbolic
context becomes different things to different policy
participants. To the public it is evidence that
pesticides are being regulated in a reasonable manner.
To the legislator it is an acocmplishment to which,
when communicating with constituents, he can refer as an
indication that he has taken action to protect the en-
vironment or, if the constituents are primarily farmers,
to ensure that they have an adequate supply of different
pesticides available. To the industry it is a document
which answers the public's demands for protection of
the environment while providing relatively little regu-
lation. This does not mean that the industry is
satisfied with FIFRA. Industry often supports legis-
lation which will weaken the law further, but generally
there seems to be in the business community a realization
that some regulation is necessary. It is realized
that no regulation or extremely weak regulation would
soon be followed by demands for legislation and
possibly a high degree of regulation.
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For the environmentalists the law seems to be
evidence that their efforts matter. Their efforts do
matter for, as has been said, FIFRA does provide some
protection and some of the most dangerous products
have been removed from commerce or had their uses
severely restricted. However in the interviews con-
ducted with them, at least some of the environmentalists
provide the impression that they believe they have
accomplished more than this evaluation of FIFRA has
detected. They also seem to feel that they will be able
to accomplish more in the future than appears likely.
There seems to be an inability on the part of many
environmentalists to appreciate, either at all or at
least to the full extent, such factors as the bias of
much of the scientific input into pesticide regulation
or the anti-regulatory mood of Congress and the public.
They tend to think incrementally rather than systemi-
cally, proposing small changes to the law rather than
sweeping provisions which might change some of the basic
alignment of forces in the policy process.""" For example
they are somewhat aware of the bias of scientific input
to FIFRA, but seem to lack an appreciation of the scope
of industry influence, with its effects on pesticide
testing, on the academic community, and on the public's
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view Of scientific questions. Because they lack an
awareness of these systemic influences on the policy
process, they rarely advocate legislative provisions
aimed at correcting them.
Accurate data
.
The scientific data related to the regu-
lation of pesticides should provide an accurate, un-
biased analysis of the risks and benefits of these
chemicals. Reliable data is needed by the Congress in
its revision of the law and the EPA in its enforcement.
In order to be aware of potential dangers to its health
the public is also in need of accurate information.
In particular farmers and farmworkers, a segment of
the public in more contact with pesticides than most
people, are in need of unbiased data.
We have shown that the flow of accurate data is
strongly impeded:
1. by allowing the pesticide industry to supply its
own data related to the testing of pesticides for
registration
2. by the relation of the industry to the agricultural
sciences and
3. by the success of the industry in communicating its
theory of carcinogenicity.
368
The combined effect of all of the above relation-
ships is that the basic tone of the pesticide debate is
influenced in a direction which is beneficial to the
interests of the industry. Given their inadequate
resources, the environmentalists are often reduced to
refuting an industry study here or offering an alterna-
tive explanation of carcinogenicity there. They can
not present an alternative source of information which
can even begin to rival the extensiveness of the
industry's resources.
IPM. In the area of IPM, federal policy is, again,
lacking. The use of IPM is not widespread. ^ According
to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
the evolutionary shift to IPM is too slow to have a
significant impact except in a few instances.^ To
review the criteria established in Chapter II, federal
policy should encourage IPM through:
1. Research aimed at developing this technology
2. Education of farmers and IPM pest control advisors
3. Legal requirements that IPM methods be used to
control pests whenever possible.
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Of the above three criteria, the area of research
is the one in which the most has been accomplished. There
has been a substantial amount of funds devoted to IPM
research; however many experts have argued that more
funding is needed for success/ in its 1979 report on
IPM, the Council on Environmental Quality pointed out
the need for more research support.^ The Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment has also pointed out
that, "an infusion of new funding is essential for
success.
'
Efforts at education have been far from those
needed to familiarize farmers with IPM methods or to
train the IPM experts who will eventually educate
farmers. In 1975 the Congress did amend FIFRA to re-
quire that the EPA made sure that instructional materials
on IPM were made available to interested individuals."^
However, this provision, which was evidently thrown in
to placate the environmentalists, was a weak attempt to
confront an educational problem of substantial pro-
portions. In order to educate farmers about IPM, a
technology which is somewhat more sophisticated than
the use of chemicals, many more IPM experts will be
needed. In its 1979 report, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality pointed out that farmers and homeowners
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use pest control information provided directly by the
Chemical industry far more often than that provided
directly by the Cooperative Extension Service (CES) or
by independent pest management advisors.^ This is be-
cause there are fewer CES pest control specialists and
independent advisors compared to the number of chemical
industry representatives. A study of California cotton
farmers found that the great majority of pest control
decisions were made on the basis of advice provided by
industry salespeople.^ Specifically, only one percent
of the pest control information which the growers used
originated with farm advisors from the Cooperative
Extension Service. Chemical company employees were the
source of information in 70 percent of the cases sur-
veyed and independent pest management advisors were
consulted in only 17 percent of the cases. "^^
In 1977 there were, nationwide, about 1,120
specialists with the Cooperative Extension Service
assigned to crop and animal health, an area of responsi-
bility which includes IPM. There were also about 500
private consultants working independently or for farm
service firms and farmers' cooperatives who advised and
made recommendations on IPM. This compares with an
estimated 200,000 commercial pesticide applicators who
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are certified. This includes aerial applicators, pest
control operators and other commercial applicators.
It can be seen that sources of information about chemical
means of pest control far outnumber sources of IPM
advice.
Extension demonstration programs are an important
way of gaining the support of farmers who are appre-
hensive about trying new IPM technologies. Publicly
supported extension demonstrations have been useful in
demonstrating the feasibility of IPM for a variety of
crops and a few livestock operations, but due to limited
funding, these projects have not reached the majority of
growers in need of information. -"-^
There is a significant need for education to train
IPM experts who can educate farmers. There is also a
lack of personnel to conduct IPM research and develop
13IPM programs. As the Council on Environmental Quality
points out:
The lack of understanding and support for
interdisciplinary research projects and
companion educational and demonstration
projects at the public institutions is a
major impediment to IPM. Researchers,
educators, and administrators who under-
stand the concept - that is, who are well
informed in ecology, systems science, and
allied biological sciences that are the
backbone of the IPM strategy - are a
distinct minority . '^
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There have been established no legal requirements
that XPM methods be used to control pests whenever possi-
ble. The "use by permit only" classification of pesti-
cides. Which was proposed in the discussions surrounding
the formation of the 1972 law, would possibly have
provided a basis for the implementation of ipm. The
law might have defined this classification in such a way
that permits for the use of substances falling in this
category would not have been granted if a satisfactory
IPM method had been available.
The discussion of this proposal in 1971 and 1972
was the last serious discussion of legal requirements
for the use of IPM. From time to time an environ-
mentalist may advocate the "use by permit only" concept
or the establishment of pest control districts in
which all pesticide use by farmers would require
approval by a pest control specialist. However most
discussion of pesticide regulatory policy, including
that of the environmentalists, has centered on the need
to remove the most dangerous chemicals from the market
or to restrict the ways in which they can be used.
There has been relatively little emphasis placed on
the idea of cutting down on the total amount of all
pesticides used.
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Congress: Avn idinq Conflict.
We now move to a political analysis of why the
criteria just discussed have not been met. The ex-
planation for this is rooted in the distribution of
resources among the groups involved, the ways in which
Congress deals with conflict and the mobilization of
information.
No change in criteria. One might well ask why if Congress
has tended to be so unhappy with the EPA's administration
of FIFRA, it has not passed laws which clearly require
the EPA to do exactly what it wants? Most congressional
criticism of the Agency's administration of FIFRA claims
that it is too strict, that the EPA should be more
willing to allow farmers to use controversial pesticides.
If those legislators who think this way desire to have
the EPA do what they want, a first step in this direction
would be to pass a law requiring this. They might pass
legislation which specifically prohibited the Agency
from banning such controversial pesticides as DDT,
2,4,5-T, chlordane/heptachlor
,
aldrin/dieldrin , and
2,4-D. Alternatively, they might specify new standards
with which to consider pesticide registrations. The
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present standard directed by FIFRA (unreasonable adverse
effects) is very broad. Congress, if it wanted to, could
change this standard by changing the law. The new
standard for banning a pesticide might be more specific.
It might specifically direct the EPA to allow the use
of a chemical unless it did not conform to specified
criteria in specified laboratory tests. These tests
and criteria could be selected in such a way that many
of the chemicals which are now banned, would be back
in use.
On the other hand if the smaller number of legis-
lators who criticize the EPA for not being strict
enough wished to do something to change this situation,
they could introduce legislation which set stronger
environmental standards for the EPA to implement. They
might require the establishment of the previously
discussed IPM Pest Management Districts in which all
pesticide use was approved by a local pest management
expert. They might also require that all pesticides
which specified tests indicated to be carcinogenic
would be banned unless specified economic criteria
were met, these criteria indicating the extreme economic
importance of the product.
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The legislators could do this, but they don't,
criticism Of EPA decisions is strong by those on both
Sides Of the environmental issue, but rarely is there an
attempt to make more specific the very broad basic
criteria on which pesticide decisions are made. On
the rare occasions when such an attempt is sponsored
by one or a few legislators, it is defeated. fifra
has been weakened, but by the introduction of many small
changes many of which make the EPA's job more difficult
and by congressional interference with administration.
Since 1972, there has been no clear change in the criteria
for the registration of pesticides. One can argue that
by not delineating clearer standards for the EPA, Congress
has delegated to that agency a degree of responsibility
which the legislators might otherwise have had to face.
Because of the broad standard of "unreasonable
adverse effects" the EPA shoulders much political
responsibility. Farmers dissatisfied with the EPA
decision to ban most uses of DDT tend to blame the
Agency for interpreting "unreasonable adverse effects"
in the way it has. On the other hand, environmentalists
who are upset with the Agency for not banning a particular
chemical, tend to blame it for not being more environ-
mentally oriented in its interpretation of the standard.
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Furthermore its constant involvement in administrative
decisions on controversial pesticides keeps the EPA in
the forefront of public visibility in regard to the
issue,
In having to determine the meaning of a broad and
controversial standard, and in being highly visible in
relation to conflicts brought on by the existence of
so broad a standard, the EPA assumes much of the
political responsibility which Congress might otherwise
have had to shoulder. A reasonable amount of discretion
is required for the Agency to regulate pesticides, but if
the standards for pesticide registration were con-
siderably more specific, the role of the Agency would
be less one of making controversial decisions and more
one of judging the extent to which chemicals proposed
for registration met congressionally specified standards.
Some theoretical explanations
. Several political scien-
tists have commented on the tendency of Congress to
delegate responsibility. For example Randall Ripley and
Grace Franklin note that while delegation of authority
to the executive branch allows Congress to keep its
workload manageable, that body sometimes intentionally
uses delegation in order to delay making a final
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decision.
A clear-cut policy decision may result in
c:rman^?L?".r^""'^^ group^ 'wSich
drLTn^ ^^^"-^ unhappiness by with-awing their support from members of Conqress
a gre:t"d:^rof"'"'''"^ ^^^^ would^J^sf'-
?o state a il^f ^^PP^^^, they may choose nott:o c ear policy and leave the nolicvoutcome ambiguous by delegating decisionmaking to parts of the bureaucLcy/or ?oregulatory commissions or to the ciurts withonly vague congressional guidance. Su^ thewinners and losers affected by the policy are
for'd^i?^"'^ ^"^'"^^ respons?bnLy
ofh
"^akina is deflected from Congressto t er agencies . '-^ ^ ^yj-ci^b
Perhaps the best known analysis of congressional
delegation of authority has been made by Theodore Lowi
who has criticized any delegation which is not accompa-
nied by clear standards of implementation. According
to this author the typical American politician displaces,
defers and delegates conflict wherever possible. By
broadly defining the power of administrators, the poli-
tician can avoid the conflict which might otherwise
result from the clear choices required by specific
standards of implementation. For Lowi, however, the
opportunity that it offers congressmen to avoid conflict
is more a result of broad delegation than a fundamental
cause of it. The primary reason why lawmakers choose
to enact legislation in this manner is rooted in a
public philosophy that holds that all issues should be
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bargained rather than settled by a fixed rule of law.^^
Morris Fiorina agrees with Lowi that the delegation
Of authority is too broad, and argues that we can expect
the continued abdication of political responsibility by
congress. He disagrees, however, with Lowi s explanation
of why delegation is so broad. Fiorina sees this
practice as rooted in the aims of individual congressmen
who adopt (or appear to adopt) a public philosophy based
on pluralist tenets because it rationalizes what their
political self-interest dictates. The typical legislator
is, according to Fiorina, likely to think along the
following line:
Why take political chances by setting detailed
regulations that are sure to antagonize somepolitical actor or another? Why not require
an agency to do the dirty work and then stepin to redress the grievances that result from
f^tivities? Let the agency take the blame
and the Congressman the credit.
Along this line of reasoning, Fiorina quotes
author Peter Woll approvingly.
A major reason for the power of the bureaucracy
in policy formulation is the frequent lack of
congressional incentives to adhere to the
Schechter rule and establish explicit standards
for administrative action. This is particularly
true in the regulatory realm, an area involving
political conflict that legislators often wish to
avoid. Congress is always willing to deal
rhetorically with problems requiring regulation
and with the area of regulatory reform, but real
decision on the part of the legislature will
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Author Michael T. Hayes provides further development
for the concepts described by Lowi and Fiorina. Hayes
sees the broad delegation of discretionary power as not
merely the passing of a political problem on to adminis-
trators, but also as a conscious attempt to pass an
ambiguous bill which will be interpreted as a victory
by both sides, and which often is actually a disguised
choice in favor of one side."""^
In describing a number of policy types this author
notes that when conflict between interest groups is
present the most likely outcome will be a regulatory
policy. Often this type of policy is produced when
established and threatened groups which would preserve
the status quo are faced by challenging groups which
are strong enough to force some congressional response.
This response normally takes the form of a discretionary
and essentially symbolic bill. The result is that the
group conflict is not resolved in the visible public
arena, but is passed on to the bureaucracy or courts
to be accommodated there. Bills passing political
problems on to administrators are constructed in such a
way that they appear to be a victory to both sides, but
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they are ambiguous by design and constitute a collect
decision by Congress to avoid choice. They are, as Haye
puts it, "an exercise in duplicity
.
Not all delegations of discretionary authority are
alike. Some do not at all resolve the legislative
struggle. They create instead a conflictual adminis-
trative process for which the outcome is indeterminate.
Others produce an administrative process almost certain
to be dominated by the organized at the expense of the
unorganized. This is particularly true whenever an
organized interest is opposed by a mass public. In
such a case accommodations are likely to be worked out
between the regulators and the regulated groups at the
expense of the general public. A time lag which some-
times occurs between enactment and accommodation merely
allows for a period of tentative public attentiveness to
the regulatory process and a cosmetic period of regulation
in the consumer interest which is designed to provide
symbolic reassurances that the intent of the statute is
2
1
indeed being followed.
In passing the laws authorizing these administrative
processes. Congress is aware of who will benefit and who
will lose as a result of them. As Hayes puts it:
Lowi is not entirely correct, then, in asserting
that the danger in delegation lies in the refusal
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.
th^esfS^^ en^suI^^L °is\rS ^^^^
fo^eord^ined'^'n"/^ outco^ris
rtll JV t . ^"""^^^ ^^ch circumstances, theea effect of delegation is not so much toavoid choice as to disguise it. 22 ^ ^°
Public acceptance of regulatory structures and
outputs which fail to uphold its interests is facili-
tated by the generation of symbols. Using concepts
developed by Murray Edelman, Hayes theorizes that
members of the mass public see the attainment of
information on policy issues as having a very high
cost and will usually not obtain enough information
to identify their interests on a given issue. Conse-
quently they are vulnerable to symbolic reassurances
that these interests are being protected.
a disguised choice
. Pesticide regulation tends
to fit well into the just described theoretical interpre-
tations. According to Hayes a regulatory policy is the
most likely result of a conflict between interest groups.
The federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
of 1972, which established the basic pesticide regulatory
structure which exists today, was the result of a con-
flict between established farm and industry groups and
relatively new environmental groups. Even in 1972 the
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environmental groups were less organized and not
numerous as their adversaries, but they did exert
appreciable amount of influence due to the strong
public support for environmental issues which existed
at the time and the publicity which Rachel Carson's book
and the ensuing congressional and presidential committee
reports had given to the pesticide issue. A public
response was needed and the result was the passage of
an ambiguous and essentially symbolic bill which dele-
gated a large amount of discretionary authority to the
EPA in order that the legislators could avoid the
political responsibility for pesticide regulatory
decisions
.
As Fiorina points out in quoting Woll, the lawmakers
are certainly willing to deal with the problem rhetori-
cally. The pages of the hearings on FIFRA abound with
critical congressional remarks concerning the EPz^'s
actions in regard to aldrin, heptachlor, DDT, toxaphene,
or the pesticide hotline. Calls for more liberal pesti-
cide decisions in order to combat grasshoppers, the fire
ant, or coyotes are an Agriculture committee ritual;
however real proposals to make fundamental changes in
the criteria set by the 1972 law are extremely rare.
Instead changes in FIFRA are confined to small alterations
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in the law making enforcement more difficult and
complicated while legislators discourage rigorous
enforcement by the EPA by pressuring the Agency in
hearings and threatening to pass more restrictive
legislation.
One exception was the proposal discussed in Chapter
IV to amend FIFRA to allow the use of Mirex. Had this
measure, which was approved by the House Agriculture
Committee, passed the full House and Senate, it would
have been a clear alteration of standards, an un-
mistakable weakening of the discretionary authority
of the EPA. Probably for this reason, the measure did
not pass and it is arguable that its sponsors knew all
along that it would not, and only introduced the bill
as a club with which to bargain with the EPA con-
cerning its position on the use of Mirex. The fact
that some legislators did vote for the measure suggests
that there are some who are willing to clearly change
standards, but the defeat of the bill supports the con-
tention that most of them are not.
FIFRA is ambiguous because it lacks clear standards.
The fundamental criterion for banning a pesticide,
"unreasonable adverse effects," is a very broad one.
It is defined as "any unreasonable risk to man or the
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environment taking into account the economic, social,
and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide. "24 it is up to the EPA to decide the
relative merits of costs and benefits in determining
what is unreasonable. Given this broad area of adminis-
trative discretion it is inevitable that political
considerations will enter into decisions about how costs
and benefits will be balanced in deciding about pesti-
cide registrations. The EPA employs a complicated
decision making process in making these decisions.
This process is lengthy and includes ample opportunity
for administrative hearings and court appeals. However
because of the political considerations which the broad
criterion for registration permits to enter into the
process, there is no reason to believe that the im-
pressive administrative structures surrounding FIFRA
will lead to consistent decisions. There is no reason
that because Pesticide A is banned or permitted to stay
on the market, a decision on Pesticide B, which is a
similar product, will be the same.
In the administration of FIFRA, an emphasis on
form displaces considerations of substance, as problems
which Congress might have dealt with more squarely are
handled through a complicated bureaucratic decision
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making process or lengthy court hearings. A focus
administrative process distracts energy and attention
which might otherwise be directed at examining the
fundamental norms underlying the legislation. if the:
is a problem, the response is to invent a new adminis-
trative procedure, but basic directions are ignored.
Although the changes made to FIFRA since 1972 have
tended to weaken the bill, the lawmakers have included
some changes aimed at satisfying the environmentalists.
An example is the provision passed in 1975 that IPM
instructional material be made available to those
interested in it. Thus when addressing the local farmers
a lawmaker, say in 1975, could refer to the provision
in the recently revised FIFRA requiring consultation with
the Secretary of Agriculture, or the provision pro-
hibiting the EPA from requiring a written examination as
proof of a grower's competence to handle restricted
pesticides. To the environmentalists in his district
concerned with what he is doing about pesticides, he
could refer to the provision for supplying IPM material.
Hayes notes the tendency of the administrative
process resulting from a congressional grant of dis-
cretionary authority to be dominated by the organized
at the expense of the unorganized when an organized
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interest is opposed by a mass public. m such a case
accommodations are likely to be worked out between
the regulators and the regulated at the expense of the
general public.
It would not be correct to refer to the public
in its relation to the pesticide issue as completely
unorganized. Several environmental groups involved
in the issue have been described, but it has also been
pointed out that these groups are fewer in number and
have less resources than their adversaries. However
if we refine the above thesis of Hayes to read
"dominated by the organized at the expense of the
substantially less organized when an organized interest
is opposed by a mass public," then we can argue that
pesticide policy fits generally into this pattern.
Policy outputs tend to be more in favor of farm and
industry interests rather than the interest of the
public in protecting the environment. However domi-
nation of the pesticide policy process by farm and
industry groups is more the result of the basic
structure of the law which these groups have managed
to get Congress to pass, than an accommodation with
the EPA.
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The EPA has been exceedingly inefficient at admin-
istering this law and decisions on registration have
often taken an excessive amount of time. Many of the
Agency's decisions have been strongly criticized by the
environmentalists, and the fact that it takes so long
to make a decision on whether or not to register a
substance means that there may be many dangerous
pesticides on the market which will not be removed
until they move through the lengthy decision making
process. However the Agency has made some decisions
which have been quite beneficial to the environment.
For example it has banned most uses of DDT, aldrin/
dieldrin, chlordane/heptachlor
, and endrin. Some of
these decisions were made in the face of excessive
political pressure as when Administrator Russel Train
banned most uses of chlordane/heptachlor in August, 1975
in the face of opposition from Congress and industry
25lobbyists.
Within the structure authorized by the present law
there is not much which the EPA can do to improve the
environmental situation resulting from the use of pesti-
cides. Given the complexity of the law which it must
administer, the limited resources of staff and money
which are available to it, and the continued harassment
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of its enforcement efforts by Congress, it can remove
only a relatively few of the most dangerous pesticides
from commerce. Because of these problems, an increase
in the Agency's efficiency would, at best, increase the
number of regulatory decisions conducive to a sound
environment by only a relatively small margin. Further-
more, even if the Agency could make timely decisions
on the registration of all pesticide products on the
market, it would only have solved a part of the pesti-
cide problem. A fuller solution would require a con-
siderable decrease in the amount of pesticides used,
and the present law authorizes no structure aimed at
achieving this criterion. The present regulatory
process centers on a relatively few battles over the
use of several controversial pesticides. There is no
structure, such as an IPM district, aimed at controlling
the use of all pesticides.
Hayes points out that a time lag which sometimes
occurs between enactment and accommodation merely allows
for a period of tentative public attentiveness to the
regulatory process and a cosmetic period of regulation
in the consumer interest which is designed to provide
symbolic reassurances that the intent of the statute is
indeed being followed.
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This portion of his theory also seems applicable to
the pesticide issue, again with some qualification. fifra
has always been an essentially weak law and there has
always been much to criticize in the enforcement efforts
of the EPA, however the law was stronger before it was
first weakened in 1975. Furthermore, as described in
Chapter III, EPA enforcement efforts tended to be more
vigorous before 1976 when the Agency's less than en-
thusiastic enforcement efforts prompted three of its
lawyers to resign and five more of its employees to
complain in Senate hearings about the Agency's failure
to take action, its failure to carefully examine health
and safety data, and its poor organization and inade-
quate resources. As has been said, we cannot argue
that there has been an "accommodation" between the
EPA and those whom it regulates, because the Agency
does, at least occasionally, take some actions opposed
to the interests of the regulated. A time lag has
occurred, however, between more vigorous enforcement
and less vigorous enforcement.
The other problem with Hayes's theory is that he
speculates that the time lag in question is "designed"
to provide symbolic reassurances. The evidence related
to the pesticide issue suggests that the time lag does
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provide symbolic reassurances, but whether or not this
is by "design" is a difficult to determine question of
motivation.
In 1972 public opinion was strongly in favor of
producing a more healthy environment and the pesticide
issue, especially in the context of DDT, was highly
visible. However by 1975, public enthusiasm for the
environment was not as high and less attention was
being paid to this issue. m 1972 administrators may
have tended to be more bold because they were aware of
the public's generally approving attitude toward their
efforts. By 1975 or 1976, a less enthusiastic public was
likely to provide less support for controversial EPA
decisions. Also because of public opinion Congressmen
who may have wanted to weaken the law in 1973 or 1974
were possibly discouraged from this until 1975.
Thus it appears that the time lag which occurs be-
tween more vigorous and less vigorous enforcement (and,
we might add, between the initial legislation and efforts
to weaken it) is less a result of a design, than a
response to the political conditions surrounding adminis-
trators and legislators.
Since 1972 FIFRA has been weakened and the EPA's
enthusiasm for pesticide enforcement, although not
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extinguished, has been substantially diminished. The
EPA occasionally takes a dramatic action in relation to
pesticide enforcement, but the general trend is as just
described. m order to achieve this effect on pesticide
regulation. Congress has devoted considerable attention
to it, revising the law three times and frequently
putting pressure on a sometimes uncooperative EPA. When
the EPA used the 1972 law to justify a level of regu-
lation which Congress felt was too stringent, the law-
makers weakened the law in 1975. The same process took
place in 1978 and in 1980. In defense of Congress, one
might argue that to the extent that this is so, it is
all a mistake, it is the misguided result of sincere
legislators who truly sought to revise FIFRA in the hope
of further promoting the public interest. The revisions
to the law were made in the interest of bringing more
rationality and science into the regulatory process.
If the result was that it made the law weaker and more
complex and difficult to administer, this was an un-
intended consequence of well meaning efforts.
This dissertation argues, on the contrary, that the
example of pesticides suggests that when it passes
political problems on to the bureaucratic sphere. Congress
is aware of who will win and who will lose. Hayes is
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correct in arguing that in a very real sense. Congress
does choose when it creates administrative processes
insofar as the ultimate outcomes are foreordained. Thus
the real effect of delegation is not so much to avoid
choice as to disguise it.
Legislation, pressure and selective perception
. The
argument to support these contentions about the moti-
vations of congressmen must be based on an assessment
of their knowledge and patterns of behavior. Specifi-
cally, the evidence to support these claims is centered
in the following three factors:
1. The results of years of legislation produced by '
reasonably knowledgable and able legislators
2. The administrative pressure put on EPA officials,
and
3. The tendency of the legislators to selectively
perceive information.
The first point assumes that most congressmen are
reasonably intelligent and politically sophisticated.
It seems reasonable to argue that those who have had
enough political sophistication to be elected to
Congress, also have enough sophistication to realize
what the probable outcomes of their legislative actions
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will be. Of course no one, no matter how sophisticated
or intelligent, can know the exact outcome of laws which
are passed, but it seems that most legislators are aware
of the general directions which policy will follow in
response to legislative changes. The general trend for
FIFRA in the years which this study has focused on
(1972-1980) has been a weakening in the law and its en-
forcement and no movement toward what we have defined
as an adequate condition in relation to the public's
interest in the use of pesticides. If the legislators
were concerned about moving toward a regulatory situation
which would support the public's interest, it is
reasonable to assume that they might occasionally make
a mistake and enact a measure which supported the farm
or industry interests at the expense of the public.
It does not seem likely, however, that given the
reasonable level of intelligence of congressmen, their
experience, and their political sophistication, they
would have passed as much legislation as they have
without realizing what the effects of their actions
were likely to be. Legislators are not naive. They
have enough intelligence, experience, ability and
political sophistication to realize that the effects
of their activity in relation to FIFPiA would be
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to weaken it.
The second point involves the administrat
pressure put on EPA officials by the legislators. Even
if we did assume that congressmen are somewhat naive and
Often fail to realize what the effects of their legis-
lative activities will be, the pattern of administrative
interference with EPA enforcement which this dissertation
describes, clearly indicates the intent of many legis-
lators. A favoring of the interests of industry is
obvious in cases such as the "pesticide hotline" or the
use of DDT to control the tussock moth. There are some
legislators who pressure the EPA in the opposite di-
rection, that is, in the direction of more environ-
mental protection, but the primary vectors of congression-
al pressure are aimed in a direction favoring industry.
The third point is based on the assumption that
legislators who approached a policy issue with a desire
to avoid favoring particular interests would attempt to
obtain information from various reliable sources in
order to develop an objective as possible understanding
of the policy problem. This assumes that objective
assessment is facilitated by obtaining information from
parties with different goals and points of view. On the
other hand, lawmakers with predetermined opinions would
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be more likely to selectively seek information which
they could use to legitimatize their already chosen
positions
,
in Chapters III and iv we noted the strong tendency
Of the legislators to readily accept information from
some sources and to reject it from others. While
reports, data and testimony from the farm and pesticide
industry receive the attention of most of the legis-
lators interested in FIFRA, the many GAO reports, the
information supplied by environmentalists, and the re-
ports of a few congressional committees (all of which
tend to point out the need for stricter legislation to
protect the environment) are ignored. This selective
perception of information, especially that emanating
from its own GAO, surprised the writer. One might think
that a GAO report which suggested that stricter legis-
lation was needed to protect the public would eirher be
criticized by those legislators in favor of industry
goals, or treated symbolically in the form of vague
commitments to correct the problems noted. Instead
these reports seem to be treated as if they don't
exist. They are simply ignored.
This observation of congressional behavior confirms
Kenneth Entin's finding in observing the House Armed
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services Coimnittee. Entin noticed a similar tendency
Of legislators to use or reject information. According
to him, the initial reference in the choice process of
legislators is internal. Committee members are likely
to evaluate and react to a message in terms of the
various biases which condition their behavior, and they
communicate with outsiders only if they respect their
intentions and the accuracy of their information. Thus
the information role of interest groups is minimized.
Legislators communicate with these groups primarily in
order to legitimate decisions already made and increase
committee member confidence . ^"^
Thus the findings of this investigation tend to
confirm Hayes's contention that congressmen do choose
and are aware of who wins and who loses. Delegation
is not an effort to avoid choice, but to disguise it.
Choice is disguised by the rhetoric surrounding the
adoption of new measures and by the fact that many of
the changes made in the law seem by themselves to be
either only slightly in favor of industry or a mere
procedural innovation designed to increase the accuracy
of decisions. Taken together, however, they comprise
a substantial weakening of FIFRA because of the cumu-
lative effects of small changes which favor industry,
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and because of the burden of complexity which they add
to an EPA which possesses limited resources. We have
argued that the legislators are generally aware of
the Choices they are making. This argument is based
on the results of years of revision of FIFRA, the
political sophistication of legislators, the adminis-
trative pressure which they put on the EPA and their
selective perception of information.
Legislative revision and congressional pressure- a
.un..nuous process. While the tind.ngs^t thC dis'ser-
tation tend to strongly support the observations of
Ripley, Franklin, Fiorina, Lowi and especially Hayes,
they also suggest a need for further theoretical expla-
nation. These authors describe the tendency of Congress
to avoid political responsibility by delegating too much
discretionary authority to the bureaucracy. Their
analyses tend to stop, however, at this point; that is,
they note the delegation of responsibility but do not
look at what happens once that responsibility has been
delegated. They do not analyze the congressional-
bureaucratic interaction which occurs subsequent to the
act of delegation. From reading their theories one might
assume that once a legislative delegation takes place.
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that is the end of Congress's interest in the issue.
However this investigation suggests a different
interpretation
.
This study suggests that when the outcome of the
congressional delegation of authority is not what
the legislators want, they will take continuous action
aimed at producing the desired policy outcomes. This
interpretation sees congressional involvement with policy
in at least some issue areas as an ongoing, continuous
process. In those policy areas where there is a high
degree of congruence between the goals and opinions of
bureaucrats and legislators, it seems reasonable to
assume that congressional involvement with policy will
be relatively infrequent. If administrators in these
policy areas tend to produce outcomes desired by legis-
lators there is little need to interfere.
On the other hand, this study suggests that in
those policy areas characterized by differences in the
goals and opinions of legislators and bureaucrats, there
is likely to be a continuous congressional involvement
rather than an infrequent revision of the law. Many
EPA officials, especially those who formerly worked in
the Department of Agriculture, tend to see the pesticide
issue from a point of view which is similar to that of
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congress. Some, however, tend to favor a more stringent
regulation of pesticides. The resultant of the inter-
action of these forces within the EPA is a level of
regulation which has never satisfied environmental
interests but which has often been more stringent than
the legislators desired.
In 1972 Congress passed an essentially symbolic
bill. However a relatively enthusiastic EPA, charged
by public support and some idealistic, enthusiastic
personnel, enforced this bill more vigorously than
Congress had intended. They did this by interpreting
the broad criterion in the bill of "unreasonable adverse
effects" in a way which led to the banning of several
substances. The farmers and the pesticide industry
complained to Congress, and especially to Agriculture
Committee members. This led to proposed revisions of
FIFRA and hearings in which the committee members
continuously charged the EPA with not following the
"intent of Congress." FIFRA was revised in a way that
made it a weaker law. The subsequent revisions in 1978
and 1980, the frequent administrative interference of
Congress and the practice of authorizing money for FIFRA
enforcement on a yearly basis, have all been aimed at
bringing the more environmentally oriented EPA into line
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with congressional desires. Congressional involvement
with FIFRA, primarily through the Agriculture Committees,
is a constant, ongoing process in which the legislators
continuously try to impose their will on a sometimes
unsubmissive EPA. Pesticide policy involves a struggle
between Congress and the EPA. The weakening of FIFRA
the years and the more cautious EPA attitude on enforce-
ment indicates that Congress has had the upper hand in
this struggle. However there is no undisputed winner.
If the EPA regulated pesticides too strictly. Congress
could and would weaken the law even further, making the
Agency's job more difficult or removing some of its
enforcement authority. it would also increase its
pressure on the EPA bureaucracy. On the other hand,
if Congress took away all or most of the Agency's
authority to regulate pesticides, or if it withheld
the resources needed for the Agency to provide at least
a minimal level of regulation, the editorial and public
outcry could be substantially damaging.
Thus we can add to the theory developed by Hayes
et al. in order to more thoroughly describe the situation
which occurs when the will of Congress conflicts with an
agency, such as the EPA. If an agency enforces legis-
lation, if not vigorously, at least more vigorously than
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congress had wanted. Congress will not remain inactive.
If the results of the administrative process do not tend
to adequately support the interests of the parties
favored by the legislators, they are only too willing
to correct the situation by interfering directly in the
administrative process and by weakening the law.
Depoliticizing FIFPA. All this takes place within a
context of depoliticizing of the pesticide policy process
Depoliticizing equates to what Hayes would call a
disguising of choice. To the maximum extent possible
the issue is removed from the realm of conflict by
reducing the visibility of changes made in the law and,
to the extent that the visibility of change is not re-
duced, by providing a set of explanations for congress-
ional actions. The visibility of change is reduced by
making numerous small changes in the law rather than
a few large ones, by constructing many of these changes
so that the statute has been made needlessly complex and
by weakening the law by weakening efforts to enforce it.
The explanations offered for their actions by the
legislators are important in understanding this policy
issue and suggest the importance of the role of language.
Legislators justify their actions by referring to the
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need to solve the world food problem, the importance of
balancing risks and benefits, the importance of agri-
culture to the national economy and especially the need
for more "rationality" or "science" in decision making.
Alterations in the law are rarely described as value
choices which will affect one interest at the expense
of another, they are rational procedures introduced for
the purpose of increasing the scientific quality of the
regulatory process. The approach to science, however,
is anything but objective. The results of scientific
investigations which confirm the lawmakers' points of
view are often cited while other work which suggests
an alternative interpretation is ignored.
Language
.
Two important ways in which language is
used are:
1. To legitimate the choices of legislators and
2. To influence the opinions and perceptions of law-
makers and the public.
Understanding the first of these uses requires a
relatively short term time perspective, the second
demands a relatively longer view.
A few pages back we described the tendency of legis-
lators to selectively perceive information and we
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referred approvingly to Entin's explanation of this
behavior. For him the initial reference in the choice
process of lawmakers is internal. Legislators accept
or reject information on the basis of the various
biases which condition their behavior. Thus the in-
formation providing role of interest groups is minimized.
In the relatively short time spans related to the
making of changes in FIFRA, interest groups are important
not so much as suppliers of information which may change
a legislator's decision, but as sources of information
with which to legitimate decisions already made and
increase the confidence of the lawmakers in the de-
cisions they have made.^^
Influencing bias. If Entin is correct in claiming that
the biases of legislators condition their behavior in
regard to their reception of information, what are the
sources of these biases? Why are legislators biased in
favor of certain interests? To examine this question,
one must think systemically and in terms of long term
influences on values. Certainly important in under-
standing the formation of a legislator's biases are
his political philosophy, the values of his constituents
and what he knows about specific policy questions. This
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dissertation has employed a systemic perspective in
order to examine one of the variables related to the
long term formation of biases, that is, the flow of
information, the source of what the legislator knows.
The types of information available to legislators can
not but influence their choices. The same is true of
constituents, and information which influences constitu-
ents is likely to have a long term influence on their
political representatives. In a similar manner, the
information available to regulators is likely to affect
their decisions. If most of the information which
lawmakers and citizens obtain from the press, television,
hearings, and contact with lobbyists describes the
advantages of pesticides, minimizes their dangers, and
emphasizes their economic importance, it is not sur-
prising that many legislators and members of the public
do not press for more stringent regulation. If the
data submitted by a manufacturer to the EPA in order to
support the registration of a pesticide indicates that
it is safe, it is not surprising that the Agency
registers the substance.
Considering information in this broad context,
there are sources which supply data to support the
arguments of both the environmental and the industry
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sides of the pesticide issue, however the industry side
tends to dominate. Data tending to support an environ-
mental perspective is produced by some public interest
groups, some environmentally oriented scientists, the
EPA, and, sometimes, the General Accounting Office,
on the other hand data indicating the safety and useful-
ness of pesticides is produced by many industry associ-
ations, many individual companies, and many agricultural
institutions. Most of the time the variation in the
scientific conclusions produced by the opposing en-
vironmental and industry interests can be explained as
varying and scientifically valid interpretations of the
same data. To a lesser extent, as has been shown, there
is fraudulent manipulation of data. To the extent that
varying results are based on differing interpretations
of the same data, both of which are scientifically
valid interpretations, the science surrounding the
pesticide issue tends to become a political activity
in itself. Environmentalists and industry representa-
tives struggle to have their interpretations of data
accepted by lawmakers and the public. We have argued
that industry, because of its greater resources, is the
dominant participant in this struggle. The dominant
position of the industry can be seen by looking at its
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economic influence on the scientific superstructure which
produces information related to pesticide safety and
usefulness. We have described this influence in three
chapters: one which described the industry influence
over the safety data used to support pesticide regis-
trations; one which examined the relation of the industry
to the nation's agricultural colleges, and one which
looked at the industry's effect on public understanding
of carcinogenicity.
In order to understand the pesticide issue one must
look not only at the "political system" as it is often
viewed by political scientists, that is, a view which
focuses on a Congress receiving inputs from interest
groups and producing policy outputs. It is necessary to
take a wide view and a long term one, to look at the
political culture which forms the context of pesticide
policy. In looking at this political culture this
dissertation has described how the economic power of
farm and chemical company interests has been mobilized
in the areas of pesticide testing, agricultural research
and carcinogenicity testing. The result of this mobili-
zation of economic influence has been an influence over
the public's and legislators' understandings of the
pesticide policy issue.
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What follows is a brief look at other aspects of
political culture which are related to many issues
rather than only the pesticide question.
Other Explanations
Attitudes and knowledge. Thus far we have explained why
pesticide policy is inadequate by focusing on variables
directly related to this issue. These include: the
nature of FIFRA, the greater resources of the pesticide
companies and farm organizations, the flow of information,
the political pressures put on the EPA by Congress, and
the tendency of legislators to avoid responsibility for
political choice by delegating excessive discretionary
authority to administrators in such a way as to favor
industry interests while disguising this choice of
interests
.
Two other causal variables are beyond the scope of
this dissertation because they function at a different
level of analysis, a higher level of abstraction. These
variables are characteristics of the political culture
in which pesticide regulation occurs and they are
important enough to mention here. They are public
attitudes concerning cooperation and the good of the
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coimnunity, and public understanding of environmental
problems. In their book The Politicized Economy
, authors
Michael H. Best and William Connolly point out that in
order to solve many substantial environmental problems
there will have to be changes in attitudes concerning
cooperation and the welfare of the community. These
attitudes, they explain, are rooted in economic, social
and political structures which presently encourage
minimal concern for the welfare of the community.
Connolly and Best describe this lack of concern:
Are the costs of recycling and of modernizing
waste disposal systems worth it to us when
there is no internalized "we" that any of us
naturally identifies with? Is the future
condition of this stream, this park, this
local atmosphere, this soil of deep concern
to me when my relatives live elsewhere and my
children are also likely to move? When I am
likely to be a transitory resident myself?
Will I tolerate high tax levels and the cur-
tailment of consumer purchases to protect the
environment for others when the promise of
consumer pleasures and the dangers of personal
insecurity provide my basic incentives to work?
The solution of many environmental problems, in-
cluding pesticides, will require at least some dislo-
cations which will be perceived by a substantial number
of those who are regulated as burdens. In the absence
of a substantial atmosphere of cooperativeness and
concern for the welfare of the community, it is unlikely
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that these burdens will be readily accepted. without a
high degree of cooperation the best that could be ob-
tained in relation to pesticide regulation would be the
imposition of strict regulations on a vast chemical and
farm industry opposed to this regulation. Given the
opportunities for evasion of stringent regulation, ade-
quate enforcement would be either impossible or astro-
nomically high in cost.
Furthermore, although pesticides may harm many,
their effects are often difficult to establish. Many
argue that they cause cancer, but the chances that they
will cause cancer in any one individual are low. Many
citizens may see their own chances of getting cancer
from pesticides as low, and if their concern for the
welfare of the community is not high, they may not see
the damage which these substances may cause to others as
a sufficient reason for investing their time in attempting
to understand the problem and advocate a solution.
Public understanding of environmental problems
must be increased if environmental issues are to be
treated with the priority they merit. The problem of
public knowledge is best treated in the context of a
discussion of possible solutions to the pesticide problem.
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on solutions
.
At this point, many policy studies custom-
arily offer some proposed solutions to the policy problem
being analyzed. Following custom we will mention several
steps which, if followed, would significantly improve
the pesticide regulatory situation. These are:
1. Invest more resources in IPM research
2. Invest more resources in the transfer of known
IPM technology to growers
3. Establish IPM districts
4. Devote more resources to the EPA
5. Revise FIFRA in order to provide the EPA with
clear standards and a strong mandate to protect
public health and the environment
6. Remove FIFRA from the jurisdiction of the Agri-
culture committees.
Other recommendations centering on the testing of
pesticides and the influence of industry in the agri-
cultural schools have been discussed in previous chapters.
All of these recommendations would help to strongly
improve the pesticide regulatory situation; however they
are not likely to be implemented because within the
present context of American political culture they are
not politically feasible. They are not feasible because
of what has been discussed as characteristics of the
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political culture in which pesticide regulation occurs,
that is a public lack of understanding of ecological
problems, and attitudes toward cooperation.
Many members of the public are not aware of the
potential effects of pesticide chemicals including
their potential to cause cancer, often after long latent
periods. Furthermore there is little public understanding
of the additive effects of pesticides when combined with
other chemical residues in the environment or the
synergistic interaction of pesticides with other chemi-
cals. Nor is there much public understanding of how
little is known about these phenomena. Public knowledge
is also lacking concerning insect resistance, and the
assumptions made by scientists who imply that specific
pesticide products are safe. Because the public lacks
this type of knowledge concerning the potential harm
which pesticides can cause, it is unlikely to support
substantial reforms of pesticide regulation.
If farmers had to operate within an IPM district
all pesticide use decisions would have to be made by
the local pest control expert who supervised the district.
Whenever possible, biologically sound IPM methods would
have to be used in lieu of pesticides. Initially, at
least, farmers would most probably find it a burden to
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learn the new IPM methods and irksome to accept regu-
latory authority concerning decisions which were once
up to them. In the absence of attitudes emphasizing
the importance of cooperation in confronting social
problems, it seems likely that they will oppose the
inconvenience and irritation of IPM Districts.
Implementing the measures proposed above as so-
lutions to this policy problem will require changes in
political structures, attitudes, and public understanding
which will make them feasible. Changes in political
structure must foster attitudes centered on cooperation.
Changing public understanding will require education of
the public about the nature of ecological problems and,
in particular, the potential of some ecological problems
to cause long term environmental damage. There must also
be developed a greater public awareness of the subjective
aspects of science, a greater ability and disposition to
separate scientific opinion from fact.
Closing Observations
We have looked at the criteria for pesticide regu-
lation established in Chapter II and determined that
the present regulatory situation does not meet these
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standards. The reasons for this are rooted in:
1. The distribution of resources among the group.
involved
2. The ways m which Congress deals with conflict.
and
3. The mobilization of information.
Resources. A fundamental advantage of the pesticide
companies and farm groups is their resources in terms
of money and organization. m hearings, or in communi-
cation with legislators, these interests far outnumber
environmentalists and can thus generate and distribute
more information. in the long term, the resources of
industry enable it to mobilize information related to
this issue and consequently to influence the opinions
of citizens and legislators. A counterweight to the
pull of industry is exerted by the public but, except for
the environmental groups which possess inferior resources,
the public is unorganized and is unlikely to have much
knowledge concerning this complex issue.
Congress: depoliticizing and dealing with conflict
. In
analyzing how Congress deals with FIFRA, we have described
how the findings of this research confirm or differ from
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the theories of several political scientists. Congress
could change the law in order to implement the prefer-
ences voiced by many legislators. It could do this by
enacting a statute which provided clear standards for
the EPA. Of course in an area of policy involving as
many technical concepts as pesticide regulation does, it
would be necessary to delegate a substantial degree of
discretion to the Agency, but if legislators wished to
achieve through legislation the goals which they often
express verbally, it would be possible to make more
specific the very broad standards which the present law
establishes while leaving the Agency needed discretion
in how to go about the enforcement of those standards.
It has been argued that while Congress could make
standards more specific, it does not because it wishes
to delegate the political responsibility for pesticide
decisions to the EPA. The broad delegation of responsi-
bility in FIFRA is not, however, merely the passing along
of a political problem to the bureaucracy. It is a
conscious attempt to pass an ambiguous bill which will
be interpreted as a victory by both sides. FIFRA is a
disguised choice in favor of industry. We have shown how
it is a bill which favors industry by extensively de-
scribing the bill. Furthermore the advantages which the
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bill gives to industry are no accident. it has been
argued that the fact that the regulation of pesticides
has not met our criteria for adequate regulation is the
result of conscious choices of lawmakers in favor of
industry rather than the unforseen consequence of well-
intentioned acts. This argument is based on the knowledge
and political sophistication of lawmakers, the pattern of
congressional pressure on the EPA bureaucracy, and the
tendency of legislators to reject information indicating
that more stringent pesticide regulation is needed.
The choice is not only conscious, it is disguised
by depoliticizing it. The pesticide issue is de-
politicized by reducing the visibility of change and by
providing explanations for congressional actions. The
visibility of change is reduced by making many small
changes rather than substantial alterations of basic
criteria, by making the statute needlessly complex, and
by weakening enforcement by pressuring administrators.
In offering explanations for their revisions of FIFRA
lawmakers tend to cite the costs and benefits of pesti-
cides, the need for a greater food supply and, in
particular, the need to introduce "rationality" or
"science" into the regulatory decision making process.
The approach to science is, however, highly selective.
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information which tends to indicate that planned legis-
lative Changes would not be wise is ignored. The function
Of information in this policy area appears to be, from
a short term perspective, the legitimatization of de-
cisions which are already made and the increasing of
the confidence of lawmakers in their legislative choices.
The pesticide policy issue suggests the importance
of looking at the ongoing processes of revision of the
law and pressuring of bureaucratic officials. If the
policy goals and opinions of administrators and congress-
men are substantially different, this research suggests
that congressional involvement in the policy area will
be high. If the outcome of the congressional delegation
of authority is not what the legislators want, the basic
statute or statutes will be revised relatively often,
money will be authorized on a short term basis, and
congressional pressure on the bureaucracy will be high.
Mobilizing information
. The long term influence of the
industry on the opinions of the public and legislators
has been looked at by examining its ability to mobilize
scientific information. The science surrounding the
regulation of pesticides is, in part, a political
activity as proponents of alternative theoretical
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explanations of the same research data compete in
promoting their theories. in this political struggle,
the industry is dominant because it is able to generate
more information. it is able to do this because of its
greater resources and its economic relation to the
scientific superstructure which produces information
related to pesticide safety and usefulness. This
relation has been described by looking at pesticide
safety testing, the agricultural colleges, and con-
trasting ideas about carcinogenicity.
Solutions. Finally there have been mentioned some
possible solutions to the pesticide problem. It has
been argued, however, that these solutions are not, at
present, politically feasible. They are not feasible
because, given the present public attitudes toward
cooperation and the present level of understanding of
ecological problems, they are unlikely to be seriously
considered. A solution to the pesticide problem must
await changes in public attitudes concerning cooperation
and greater understanding of the nature, complexity, and
potential seriousness of ecological problems. Many would
argue that these causal factors are also related to other
ecological and social problems. To the extent that this
418
is true, the pesticide problem will never be adequately
dealt with by confronting it as an isolated question.
It will be resolved in the context of confronting
many issues.
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